

PATRICIA
SOUTHERN
ANCIENT
ROME

The Republic
753BC - 30BC

Author of *Julius Caesar*, 'Her style is
delightfully approachable: lean and
lucid, witty and pacy' *ANTIQUITY*



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ANCIENT ROME

*For Mum and Dad, who took me to castles, forts and museums and waited
patiently for me to come out.*

*And for Tiddles, Bunty, Whisky, Lady Cat, Socks, Bobby, Wendy, Tibby,
Trajan, Tiger, Cleo, Tiddy, Felix, Stripy Kitten, and Slasher.*

ANCIENT ROME

The Republic 753BC-30BC

PATRICIA SOUTHERN

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About the Author

Patricia Southern has written and researched on Roman history for over thirty years. She has written ten books on Roman history including *Antony & Cleopatra: The Doomed Love Affair That United Ancient Rome & Egypt*, *The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine*, *The Roman Army* and seven classical biographies; *Mark Antony*, *Augustus*, *Cleopatra*, *Julius Caesar*, *Pompey the Great*, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant* and *Empress Zenobia: Palmyra's Rebel Queen*. She lives in Northumberland.

Preface & Acknowledgements

Judging by the number of new books that have appeared and the frequent programmes on television, there has been an upsurge in the popularity of ancient Rome in the past decade or so, which provides an excuse, if an excuse is required, for writing another one. Most of the books and television programmes have concentrated on one period or one aspect of Roman life and history, such as the rule of one particular emperor, or on the city of Pompeii, or on Rome's enemies such as Hannibal or Attila. There was a television history slot dealing solely with Cicero and the trial of Roscius, which was very well done and thoroughly enjoyable – many more like that would be very welcome, at least to this author. This book attempts to tell the story of Rome from the beginning to the fifth century, to provide the background for all the particular aspects that have achieved popular coverage, and many that haven't. As far as possible it is arranged chronologically, but when Rome became a world power, and things were happening simultaneously in different countries, the linear treatment is not always feasible. One advantage of a chronological approach is that it can be seen how Rome evolved, adapting to circumstances by amending political and military procedures. The Romans continually developed the system of government that had been intended for one relatively small Italian city so that it could fulfil the demands of a growing empire. They adjusted their fighting methods as new enemies were encountered. As time went on, after an initial intransigence, they shared their citizenship with selected individuals and peoples, and admitted them into their government. The longevity of the Roman Republic and Empire makes it impossible to cover all events and all aspects in a book of this length, so inevitably some details have to be selected and others left out, otherwise twenty volumes would still not be enough. Another point to note is that history is about people, whose mind-set we cannot totally penetrate, but the Romans were not too different from ourselves, and we know a great deal about some of the many personalities who shaped Rome. This book describes who they were and what they did, and sometimes why they did it. It is intended for the non-specialist audience, who might want to find out more from the selection of books listed in the bibliography.

My thanks are due as always to a number of people who have helped in the production of the book. Jonathan Reeve of Amberley Publishing was always willing to discuss details and answer questions,

Jacqui Taylor, Jim Eden and Graeme Stobbs let me raid their photos and use their maps, and Cleo and Tiddy provided feline assistance with the typing, though the mistakes belong wholly to me, and cannot be laid at their paws.

Patricia Southern
Northumberland
2009

A Note About Dates

The traditional dates of 753 BC for the foundation of Rome, and 509 BC for the foundation of the Republic are convenient but artificial. Both dates were worked out by Roman historians trying to establish their past without verifiable records, but since modern historians suffer from the same lack, 753 BC will suffice as a starting point and 509 BC as a time of change. History does not change as abruptly as the choice of dates for turning points would suggest.

In the study of ancient Rome, modern scholars have typically utilized historical divisions largely based on significant events – significant, that is, according to our modern views, retrospectively applied. Such divisions are necessarily artificial, and may not have been so obvious to contemporaries who lived through these significant events, nor even to the ancient historians who examined the events at a later date. Turning points are not always recognized as such until comparison can be made, with the benefit of hindsight, between what went before and what came afterwards.

The great advantage of the use of artificial historical divisions, utilized throughout this book, is that such a scheme facilitates the study of the subject by creating manageable chunks, with a starting point and an end point before the next epoch begins. The dates of these starting points and end points always demand the addition of the qualifying symbol ‘circa’ because they are not absolute. The inhabitants of early Rome did not keep records of their activities, or if they did, such records have not survived, so it was left to their descendants to work out the age of their city and the probable time slots when military and political developments took place, or the most likely dates of the achievements of important men. Ancient historians were sincere in their attempts to reconcile their mythology with ascertainable facts, but there is considerable discrepancy in their opinions, just as there is still debate among modern scholars about the controversial issues in Roman history, of which there is no lack, especially for the early years.

Proud Tyrants: The Kings of Rome c.753–c.509 BC

The site where Rome was to develop enjoyed several advantages. It lay in the area called Latium, on the banks of the River Tiber, on the fertile western side of the Italian peninsula. The land to the east of the central ridge of the Apennines is not so fertile or conducive to prosperous settlement, nor does it boast as many benign coastal landing places. For the first settlers at Rome, a good defensible site and a water supply would be of prime importance and the seven hills near the Tiber offered both. The route along the south bank of the Tiber gave access to the salt beds near the mouth of the river, and there was also an easy crossing point, in a bend of the river downstream of what was later to be called the Capitol Hill. This facilitated north–south communications through the regions of Latium and Etruria. Other considerations were the distance of the site from the western coast, not too far for trade and transport, but far enough for early warning of attacks.

The full impact of these geographical and social advantages were not perhaps appreciated or utilized all at once by the first inhabitants. To expound them all in one place might give the impression that the founder of the city arrived at the site, took a swift look round, dug in his spear at the intended spot, and harangued his followers about the fact that they could grow plentiful crops, use the trade routes, bring in supplies by river from the sea and use the same route in reverse to export goods, tax travellers and merchants, make a profit from controlling the route to the salt pans, defend themselves on the hills if they were attacked, and use the settlement as a base for expanding into everyone else's territory all around them. That is what eventually happened, but not because this was the original intent of the first Romans, pursued with unrelenting vigour after they had identified the best location on which to settle. It was the nature of their site, with its considerable advantages, that explains in part why Rome survived and expanded. The geographical setting facilitated such development, but geography in isolation would not have helped the early Romans to flourish. If it had not been for the social and political character of their succeeding generations, their capacity to overcome calamities, to adapt their procedures to circumstances and absorb the ideas of others, the prehistoric settlement may have petered out and failed.

The combination of all the above circumstances helped the inhabitants to prosper and to dominate much of the ancient world.

The foundation of the city of Rome is the stuff of legend, only dimly illuminated by modern tools of archaeological, historical and literary investigation. Each of these lines of exploration can answer some, but not all, of the questions about how the settlement on the banks of the Tiber became the leading city of the Mediterranean world and the ruler of most of modern Europe and the Middle East. Archaeology can provide information about which artefacts or buildings were in use before or after other types, and about the origins of artefacts, thereby giving some clues about the chronology of various cultures. This provides an invaluable framework on which to build a more complete picture of the people who used the artefacts and buildings, and their relationships with other groups. Archaeological evidence can reveal how people lived and died, though it has to be admitted that the evidence accruing from excavations more commonly illustrates the way of death rather than the way of life of any given people, since cemeteries often survive longer and yield more evidence than ruined or abandoned settlements. In isolation, archaeology cannot tell us everything we would like to know about the people who used the artefacts or lived in the settlements, what they were like or how they thought. For that, documentary evidence is necessary, but even the information contained in archives and literature does not necessarily flesh out the details of daily life, nor is it always reliable. Writers often worked to their own or someone else's agendas, with a consequent bias, and archival documents can be forged or tampered with.

Each method of investigation of the past naturally has its limitations, especially if used without regard to other methods, but the difficulty lies in amalgamating the disparate information from the myths and legends, from the works of the ancient historians, and from archaeology. The production of a rounded picture of the remote past, using all the available but often limited evidence, ultimately and inevitably requires the addition of large amounts of speculation.

One of the major problems concerning the origins of Rome is the lack of any historical record for at least five centuries after the supposed date of foundation in the eighth century BC. The earliest recorded view of the Romans is provided by the Greeks, who began to establish colonies in southern Italy from about 750 BC. Their most northerly settlement was founded at Cumae in the bay of Naples at some time before 725 BC. While the Greeks were building their new colonies in Italy, Rome was quite unremarkable and unimportant, merely one city, or perhaps not yet worthy of that description, among

several others in the region of Latium. From about the fifth century BC, the Greek historians took only cursory notice of the emergent settlement on the Tiber, but they were eventually alerted to the growing power of Rome when her armies gave a good account of themselves in fighting the Greek general Pyrrhus at Heraclea in 280 BC, where the phrase 'Pyrrhic victory' was born. The Romans were defeated and had to withdraw but they had inflicted such tremendous losses on the Greeks that Pyrrhus could not risk another battle. The Romans stood up to Pyrrhus once again in 275 BC near Beneventum. In less than a century after that, the Romans began to develop more than a passing interest in the Greeks and embarked on the gradual process of absorbing them.

The first acknowledged Roman historian who wrote about his native city is Quintus Fabius Pictor, who lived and worked towards the end of the third century BC. Little is known of him except that he was a senator, who went as an ambassador to Delphi in 216 BC. Although he was a Roman, he wrote his history in Greek, not Latin, possibly with the aim of presenting Roman politics and way of life to a Greek audience. The Romans of the late third century BC were anxious to make overtures of friendship to the various Greek states because at that time they were at war with the Carthaginians. From 218 onwards the Carthaginian general Hannibal was in Italy with his victorious army, inflicting defeat after defeat on the Romans. An alliance of the Carthaginians with any of the Greek states was to be feared, and in 215 Philip of Macedon did ally with Hannibal.

The next most important historian to document the rise of Rome was the Greek Polybius, brought to Rome after the Romans defeated the Greeks at the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. Polybius started out as a political prisoner, but soon became a protégé of the influential family of the Scipios, so when he wrote his history there was a strong bias towards the achievements of the various members of this family, but the total contribution of the Scipios to Roman glory was undoubtedly important. Polybius was, and still is, a singularly reliable writer who acknowledged his sources, and weighed the evidence, dismissing some tales out of hand and then trying to make sense of them according to the state of current knowledge. Since he wrote in Greek for a predominantly Greek audience, he took the trouble to explain things that would not have been familiar to his fellow countrymen, an extremely fortuitous and useful device for modern historians.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus was another Greek historian, who migrated to Rome in the late first century BC. He taught the art of rhetoric for a living, and wrote a history of Rome in Greek, but of his original twenty books, nine have been lost. The extant work covers the

development of Rome up to the middle of the fifth century BC, consisting mostly of stories and legends, but Dionysius tried to assess their historical accuracy rather than simply relaying the tales.

A contemporary of Dionysius was the Roman Titus Livius, who was born in the mid-first century BC and died at some time between AD 12 and AD 17. He embarked on the mammoth task of producing a history of Rome from the foundation to the end of the civil wars which brought Augustus to power. Augustus is commonly regarded as the first emperor, though he would not have used such a title in his own day. He portrayed himself as first among equals, but in reality was in total command. The historian Livy was therefore not entirely free to write what he wanted to say, and he relied on the legends and stories and the works of other writers such as Fabius Pictor and Polybius. His other sources are unidentified. He reproduced what he found in these sources, without checking all the facts or evaluating the legends, sometimes including anachronisms, perhaps without realizing that he was doing so. This would not detract from his main purpose, which was to glorify Rome and the Romans, but nonetheless the 35 books that survive from his original 142 are objective enough, and modern historians can corroborate some of his facts from other documents, inscriptions and archaeological evidence.

For the Romans themselves, of course, the foundation of their city was quite straightforward. When they had begun to think of themselves as a distinct people they naturally wanted to explain where they had come from and to outline their history. The modern historian Eric Hobsbawm categorized embryonic nations as a people sharing a common misconception about their origins and a common antipathy towards their neighbours. This description can be applied to many emergent peoples, including the formation of various tribes as well as settled communities, but with regard to the Romans it fits the situation perfectly. Weaving together the various strands of myth, legend, and tradition, the Romans adopted and exploited Greek models and managed to combine a variety of legendary events into the narrative of their origins. After the conquest of Troy, they said, the Trojan hero Aeneas came to Italy and founded the city of Lavinium, then his son Ascanius founded Alba Longa. Romulus, who was allegedly related to the rulers of Alba Longa, founded Rome. The foundation of Alba Longa is traditionally dated to 1152 BC, and the Romans reckoned that Romulus founded their city in 753 BC, so that four centuries separate Ascanius and Alba Longa from Romulus and the foundation of Rome. The legend blithely ignores the impossible chronology, and embarrassed ancient historians, trying to take it seriously, had to jump through hoops in their attempts to account for

the discrepancy.

The Romulus legend serves to explain, in part, the historically attested and long standing connection of Rome with Alba Longa. The story goes that Numitor, the King of Alba, had an evil brother called Amulius, who deposed the king and took his place, though he did not kill him. When he became king, Amulius secured his position by forcing Rhea Silvia, the daughter of Numitor, to become a Vestal Virgin. This meant that the right to marry and have children was denied her, so she could not produce an heir to challenge Amulius. These evil plans went awry when the god Mars himself came down to earth and impregnated her. When Romulus and Remus, the twin sons of Mars and Rhea Silvia, were born, Amulius had them thrown into the Tiber in some sort of small vessel, which washed up on the river bank where they were rescued by the famous she-wolf, and then found and reared by the shepherd Faustulus and his wife Acca Larentia. When they grew up, the twins kicked out Amulius from Alba Longa and replaced Numitor on the throne there. Then they founded Rome.

The association of Romulus and Remus with Alba Longa neatly explained an archaic ritual whose origins were lost in the mists of time. During the annual festival of the *Feriae Latinae*, a religious rite common to the tribes of Latium as the title suggests, most of the magistrates, officials and the populace of Rome trekked out from the city to journey to the Alban Mount south-east of Rome, to observe religious ceremonies there. This festival was important to the Romans, and was celebrated until the late Empire, even though reliable information about its origins was lacking even in Republican times. Neither the ancient nor the modern authors agree upon the exact site of the supposed city of Ascanius. Nowadays, the most famous buildings on the site are the vast palace built by the Emperor Domitian, of which only scant remains are known, and Castel Gandolfo, where the Pope's summer residence was established. Nothing has so far come to light to suggest that there was ever a city full of people dwelling near the Alban Mount, but there are abundant traces of the dead from the extensive cemeteries, dating to remote times, as far back as the tenth century BC. The cemeteries yield evidence of a common heritage, identified as a Latin culture, and it is thought that Alba was the chief gathering place of an ancient league that had expired by the time that the Romans got around to writing their own history. Nevertheless, the ancient festival endured.

The Romulus story attained iconic status, though it was the she-wolf that became the symbol of Rome, not necessarily accompanied by the twins that she protected and reared. According to Livy, a statue of the wolf together with the twins was dedicated in Rome in 206 BC,

but the somewhat wary and worried wolf in the Capitoline Museum conveys the message more than adequately without the addition of the twins. The rotund infants that accompany the wolf now are the creation of the sculptor Pallaiolo, who produced them at some time in the fifteenth century AD.

It was said that Romulus built a fortified enclosure on the Palatine Hill, but his brother Remus persistently leapt over the walls, or perhaps kept on destroying part of them, and Romulus, or one of his entourage, killed Remus for this transgression. In the words of a dry-stone waller, wearily resigned to repairing field walls broken down by inconsiderate tourists, this was a perfectly justifiable homicide. But it was a sinister precedent that the city of Rome was said to have begun with a fratricide.

The Romulus legend may not even be very ancient. It cannot be shown to have begun at the same time as the traditional foundation date in the eighth century BC. It has been argued that it was current at least by the sixth century BC, but on the other hand it has also been suggested that the story may have circulated only from about the fourth century. The heroic tale has a Greek parallel in the story of the sons of Poseidon, the twins Neleus and Pelias, who were left for dead as babies but rescued and suckled by a bitch. The Romulus story may have been a deliberate fabrication utilizing elements of the Greek version.

After founding the city, Romulus offered the Capitol Hill as a refuge for men fleeing from various oppressors or perhaps from justice, and he followed this by kidnapping some of the women of the neighbouring tribe of Sabines, so that the original settlers would be able to marry and produce descendants, ensuring that the new city would flourish. A leader of the Sabines called Titus Tatius was said to have joined Romulus and brought some of his people to live in Rome. According to this version, Tatius and Romulus settled their differences, agreed to share the kingship, and ruled amicably together. Far from being a courageous leader, especially in the modern age of the anti-hero, Romulus has been designated the chief of a band of mongrel thugs and criminals. On the other hand, regarded in a more positive light, the open invitation for outsiders to join the settlers does foreshadow the Roman practice of integration and extension of citizenship to non-Romans, a practice that endured throughout the Republic and Empire.

The date of the foundation of the city of Rome was calculated retrospectively by its later inhabitants, when the settlement had evolved into a city state and the Republic had been constituted. Even among the ancient authors there was no real agreement on the exact

moment of the foundation. Various dates were suggested, ranging from about 814 to 725 BC, but largely due to the work of the late Republican historian and polymath Terentius Varro, a date was finally established, probably by extrapolating backwards from the equally traditional date of the formation of the Republic in 509 BC, to arrive at c.753 BC, according to our modern calendar. When they began to keep records, this date became year one of the Roman calendar, and all subsequent dates were reckoned from this time onwards, *ab urbe condita*, abbreviated to *a.u.c.*, meaning 'from the foundation of the city'.

The first habitations on the Palatine Hill were primitive huts, nothing like the sophisticated dwellings of the Greek cities or those of the later version of Rome itself. The Romans of the Republic proudly acknowledged their humble beginnings by displaying a diligently preserved shepherd's hut that they said Romulus had lived in on the Palatine, their museum piece shown to visitors so that they could marvel at the contrast between what Rome once was and what she had become. There is plenty of room for jeering scepticism about the authenticity of Romulus's hut, allegedly preserved with due reverence throughout the centuries, but excavations on the Palatine in the 1930s revealed the remains of just such primitive huts, which have been dated to the middle years of the eighth century BC. The traces of fortifications which were discovered on the north-eastern side of the Palatine Hill have been dated to the same period. It is not certain that the huts and the defences are contemporary, but it is virtually impossible to resist the notion that the legend of the foundation of a settlement at Rome and the establishment of its early fortifications probably contains some elements of truth.

It does not matter whether the Romans firmly believed in the foundation myths, or the truth or otherwise of the actual date. The stories were embedded in the life of the Republic and the Empire and were never seriously challenged. In AD 248 the Emperor Philip celebrated 1,000 years of Rome, declaring a public holiday of several days, with splendid gladiatorial combats, sports and games, chariot races, theatrical productions, musical shows, literary and artistic exhibitions.

The huts on the Palatine that have been dated to the eighth century BC are not the only examples from the city. More huts have been found near the later Forum Boarium, and there were people living on some of the other hills, especially on the Quirinal and the Caelian. It is probable that settlers also colonized the other four of the famous seven hills of Rome, but archaeologists have always tended to concentrate much more on the Palatine than anywhere else, and

therefore more and better detail derives from this location than from any of the others.

The primitive hut groups of the eighth century BC do not constitute the first settlement in the area that eventually became the city of Rome. Archaeological evidence attests that people were living there, or at least cremating their dead there, as early as 1,000 BC, but the nature of this early settlement is not fully understood. Only the cremations have been found without accompanying traces of habitation at the same time, so it cannot be demonstrated beyond doubt that there were any huts or houses contemporary with the cemeteries of 1,000 BC. There may have been no permanent dwellings, but transient peoples may have built flimsy huts and then moved on after a short stay, leaving behind their dead. On present evidence it cannot be said that there was a city in embryo, dating back to 1,000 BC.

On the other hand it is clear that even if Romulus really did exist and if he was the founder of a settlement on the Palatine c.753 BC, he did not choose a virgin site that was completely devoid of population. The famous phrase, 'Rome wasn't built in a day' is very true, but Rome was not founded in a day, either.

Italy Before the Romans

Although the foundation myth may contain no elements of truth whatsoever, it cannot be summarily dismissed in its entirety. If the Romulus legend was fabricated during the Republic, and made to fit the way in which the Romans wished to portray themselves, then at least the traditional date for the foundation does have some plausibility. Cultural, political and social stirrings are detectable in the eighth century BC. It was definitely a time of change, affecting much of Italy.

Society all over Italy at the time of the traditional foundation of Rome was organized on a tribal basis. The tribesmen did not think of themselves as Italians, or even as a group of peoples living in a country called Italia, which is a later concept. The tribes would not necessarily have entertained notions of unity, or of loyalty to other tribes. Despite the division into tribal groups, during the centuries preceding the foundation of Rome, in the late Bronze Age, there seems to have been a remarkably uniform culture, with a similar way of life and type of settlement all over Italy, but this culture started to diversify from about 1,000 BC, when different regional cultures started to appear. At the beginning of the Iron Age, around 900 BC, the phenomenon was already entrenched and continued to develop.

Generalization always contains an element of hyperbole or even untruth, but there was a detectable north–south divide in the way in which people disposed of their dead. The southern tribes buried their dead, while the peoples further north, including those of Latium, Campania and Etruria, preferred to cremate theirs. There were slight variations in the treatment of the ashes. There was a recognizable subgroup, called by modern archaeologists the Villanovan culture. These peoples placed the cremated remains in a vessel with a lid, and placed the vessel in the earth, marking the spot with a stone laid on top.

In Latium, people fashioned cremation urns in the shape of houses or huts, sometimes including with the ashes miniature utensils, presumably symbolic tools for use in the afterlife. Then the urn and the artefacts were placed into a large jar and buried in a pit. This practice was sufficiently widespread for archaeologists to give it a separate label, the Latial culture. It is indicative of a shared sense of identity among the Latins. They spoke the same language, adopted the same customs, shared the same religious beliefs and observed the same religious ceremonies. The Romans were part of this shared culture, sharing the Latin language and customs, and cremating their dead in the same way.

The multicultural nature of the peoples of the Italian peninsula was not entirely eradicated, even when Rome had taken over the whole country and started to expand into the rest of what was to become Europe. People still spoke different languages and followed different cultures in Italy, with the Roman veneer spread over them, even in the time of Augustus. A major problem in studying the different tribes who inhabited the territories around early Rome is the fact that they were only recorded by the Romans themselves at a comparatively late date. Several nuances about tribal life, readily apparent to the early Romans, may have been missed altogether or misinterpreted by the later writers.

In the eighth century BC, the Romans were surrounded by peoples of diverse origins. In the far north, up to and beyond the Alps, were the Celtic tribes. On the coasts around a large part of the south of the peninsula, there were Greek colonies, bringing Greek culture, art and architecture, and language to the attention of the early Romans. In the centre of Italy on either side of the Apennines were a group of tribes, including the Sabines, the Marsi, the Picenes and probably the Aequi and Volsci, who spoke a language called Oscan. And from the Tiber up to the north of Italy were the Etruscans, the most mysterious of all the ancient Italian peoples.

‘Etruscan’ is the name by which we know this tribe, the name coined for them by the Romans, with an alternative name Tusci,

which was applied to the area we now know as Tuscany. The Greeks called them Tyrrhenians, and the Etruscans called themselves the Rasenna. Their origins are entirely unknown, and therefore very much disputed. To a previous generation of modern historians, this strange people seemed to have come from the east, perhaps Asia Minor, because their art, their artefacts and their luxury goods have discernible connections with oriental cultures. The Etruscans are not just set apart by their culture, but mostly by their language, still not fully understood. It is not part of the Indo-European group, though the Etruscans borrowed and adapted Greek symbols to write it down. Archaeologists and philologists do not have sufficient material to be able to decipher this language, and unfortunately the Romans absorbed into Latin only a few Etruscan terms. More extensive Roman borrowings may have enlightened modern historians about the Etruscans, their language and their origins.

An ancient Roman tradition maintains that their early society comprised three tribes, called the Ramnes, the Tities and the Luceres. Each tribe was subdivided into ten smaller groups called *curiae*, thirty in all, which formed the basis of the political assemblies, and of the early Roman army. Possibly these three tribes represent three different groups of settlers, the Ramnes representing the Romans, originally under Romulus, living on the Palatine. The Tities represented the Sabines under Titus Tatius on the Quirinal, and the Luceres were perhaps Etruscans living on the Caelian Hill, under a certain Lucumo, who was said to have rendered some assistance to the Romans. This is mostly conjecture, but in the absence of any other theory it seems perfectly feasible.

Unfortunately, different ethnic backgrounds cannot be so clearly revealed by archaeological means, though it used to be thought that the cremations and inhumations that were discovered in the early cemeteries in the vicinity of the Forum may represent the two different races of Romans and Sabines, who favoured different kinds of funerary arrangements. The facts would bear that interpretation but without further corroborative evidence it remains unproven. In modern society, cremations and burials take place contemporaneously, representing for the most part personal choice, not purely ethnic or even cultural preferences.

The early inhabitants of Rome were probably farmers, as their traditional stories seem to indicate. Not much is known about how they subsisted, but they would need to grow crops and engage in animal husbandry, and perhaps import foodstuffs as well. The Romans of the Republic looked back nostalgically to the time when simple farmers served as soldiers, when even great generals laid down their

powers when the battles and times of danger were ended, and returned to their ploughs. Towards the end of the eighth century BC it is possible that a wealthy land-owning class had begun to emerge, who became the elite rulers of the settlement. How this wealth was reckoned in the early days is uncertain. It was probably assessed on property and land, perhaps also on livestock and crops. Coinage was not in general use in Rome at the end of the eighth century BC, although the Greeks had already started to issue coins round about then. By 500 BC it is generally agreed that the Romans had adopted a rudimentary system using bronze of a standardized weight.

The first steps towards urbanization were made during the seventh century, though Rome was not the only nascent city to develop in this way. Archaeological investigations at other cities of Latium, such as Lavinium, Satricum and Fidenae reveal that urbanization was taking place at the same time, so what was happening at Rome was not a unique phenomenon. Urban development in the city was neither sudden nor rapid, but progressed steadily. The first signs of corporate activity are detectable from about the middle of the seventh century BC, and round about 600 BC the first communal area was laid out and paved, at the expense of some hut dwellings which were destroyed, in what was to become the Forum. The first Senate House probably belongs to this epoch, and also the first building, one of several, on the site of the Regia, whose name indicates the dwelling place of kings. This first edifice was perhaps not labelled as such from the very beginning, but it may have been intended as an official and probably public building, associated with the early kings of Rome.

Rome Under the Kings

The sensational discovery at the end of the nineteenth century of the Black Stone, or *Lapis Niger*, in the assembly area in the centre of the city was one of those rare occasions when archaeological evidence could be married up with ancient literature. The ancient historians wrote about the *lapis niger in comitia* which was said to mark the burial place of Romulus, slightly puzzling if he had indeed simply disappeared and become a god, but as a commemorative site the area was generally associated with him by the historians. It was probably the shrine to the god Vulcan. Various finds buried underneath the stone yielded a date in the middle of the sixth century BC. It bore an inscription written in *boustrophedon* fashion, just as early Greek inscriptions were carved, with every second line in reverse direction, just as a ploughman ploughs a field, which is the original meaning of the Greek word *boustrophedon*. The language of the inscription was an

older version of Latin, containing the word *regei*, from *rex*, or king, thus providing proof, if any were needed, that early Rome was definitely ruled by kings.

According to Roman tradition, from 753 BC until the foundation of the Republic in 509 BC, there were seven kings of Rome, starting with Romulus and ending with Tarquinius Superbus. The number seven may have significance, an ancient magical number, perhaps not just coincidentally equal to the number of hills of Rome. An immediate problem concerns this vast time span occupied by so few kings, seven rulers in nearly two and a half centuries. If the tradition is to be taken seriously, each king enjoyed or endured an extremely long reign. At first sight, this defies normal human stamina on such a consistent basis, but it is worth pointing out that during a comparable time span, the English monarchy can show a similar track record. Discounting Edward VIII, who was never crowned and abdicated after only a few months in 1936, there have been only eight kings or queens from the accession of George III in 1760 to the current monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, so the alleged long reigns of the seven ancient kings of Rome is not perhaps such a physical impossibility.

One suggestion is that there may have been more kings of Rome whose names have not been recorded or passed down to the later Romans, but there is not a shred of evidence to support such a theory. Another solution is to bring forward the dates of the seven kings, discounting the probably mythical Romulus in the mid-eighth century, and equate the reigns of the succeeding six kings with the tangible developments in Rome from the middle of the seventh century, when it seems that corporate policies, centrally directed, were being put into operation.

The nature of Roman kingship differed from the monarchical rule of later centuries, as modern Europeans would understand it. The kings of Rome qualified as tyrants, in the ancient Greek sense of rule by one man, rather than in the modern sense with all the connotations of cruel and unjust despots. Although family connections played a part in the selection of the kings, the kingship was not a hereditary institution, so there was no ruling dynasty passing its powers down through the generations and retaining its position with regard to other families and other cities by means of diplomatic marriages. Roman kings were not exactly elected but were appointed with the approval of the aristocracy and the people.

The king in Rome was head of state, the director of political life and of all administration, supreme military commander, chief priest and religious leader, lawgiver and chief justice. His power was embodied in his *imperium*, specifically in the command of the armies,

and the symbols of his power, borrowed from the Etruscans, were the bundles of rods signifying his right to punish malefactors by flogging, grouped round an axe, signifying his right to execute them. This was the *fascēs*, taken over by the consuls when the monarchy was abolished.

When a king died, there was an *interregnum*, literally a period of between rule, and an *interrex* was chosen to take the place of the king. The heads of the leading aristocratic families took up this office for five days at a time, laying down their powers in favour of the next man, and the process went on probably for a year, until the new king was chosen.

Each king was credited in Roman tradition with various attributes, achievements or innovations. The historical truth of the alleged actions and successes of the kings is beyond retrieval. In archaeological terms, certain developments or changes are detectable in Rome and can be roughly dated, but not necessarily assigned to a particular king. For social, legal and administrative events which do not involve buildings or leave any tangible trace, there can be no proof whatsoever of the legendary innovations set in motion by the Roman kings. What follows is based on ancient Roman tradition, only tenuously related to attested archaeological or historical facts.

Romulus was said to have ruled from c.753 to c.716 BC. He brought in the Sabines under their king, Titus Tatius, and reconciled the two peoples by marrying Hersilia, a woman of the Sabines. He was a formidable warrior, continually fighting against Rome's neighbours and then taking them over to absorb them into the new Roman state. It was said that he chose one hundred men to be his advisers, perhaps the embryonic Senate, though to hazard such a guess is fraught with difficulties. The heads of Roman households habitually surrounded themselves with a group of friends and acquaintances to advise and help them, so Romulus's circle may not have been an official organ of state. It was a common enough model. Other cities were governed by kings or a ruler by some other name, with a group of men acting as counsellors and/or councillors, and the rest of the populace divided into more manageable sub groups.

Romulus's followers, loyal or otherwise, were present at his death, which occurred during a religious ceremony taking place near the River Tiber. A furious storm broke, and most people dispersed. Romulus simply disappeared. He was nowhere to be found when the wind and rain ceased. No one knew what had happened, but it was said that he had died and become a god. More prosaically, it was also murmured that his loyal followers, tired of his increasingly autocratic rule, had assassinated him and carved him into portable sections to

spirit him away, as it were. It is permissible to ask if the assassins managed to convince everyone that all the blood and gore really did come from the sacrificial animals. Whatever his fate, henceforth Romulus was worshipped as the god Quirinus.

The choice of the next king was supposedly made by the Sabines. They opted for Numa Pompilius, whose wife was the daughter of Titus Tatius. Numa's reign was dated from c.716 to c.673 BC. He was a good organizer, whose strengths lay in administration and law. He reformed the calendar, establishing a year of 360 days, and ensured that the appropriate religious ceremonies were celebrated at the proper times. He was responsible for the installation of the Vestal Virgins at Rome, importing the cult from Alba Longa, and he built the Temple of Janus, where the doors were open at all times except when the whole Roman world was at peace, when they were closed with great rejoicing and ceremonial.

When Numa Pompilius died, the Romans chose a Latin to rule them, called Tullus Hostilius, whose reign lasted from c.673 to c.641 BC. He was a successful leader who declared war on Alba Longa, ruled by their king, Mettius. Instead of campaigning with their whole armies, the two kings agreed to appoint their own champions to fight each other, and swore an oath that the losing side would submit to the victors. This is the context of the story of the three Horatii brothers, who fought successfully against three brothers from Alba Longa. Whether or not this event really took place, it is clear that Alba Longa never developed as did Rome and the other Latin cities, and it retained its importance only as the site of the annual religious festival of the *Feriae Latinae*. Tullus Hostilius was said to have built a new Senate House, called the *Curia Hostilia*, to accommodate the larger numbers of senators that resulted from Rome's expanding population and increased settlement in the city. The later, successive, Senate Houses were on a different alignment.

Ancus Marcius, the fourth King of Rome, was the grandson of Numa Pompilius. He ruled from c.641 to c.616 BC, his main achievement being the extension of Roman control along the Tiber as far as the coast, where he founded the port of Ostia at the mouth of the river. None of this can be proved, since nothing has come to light from the extensive archaeological excavations of Ostia Antica to verify the date or the name of the founder. Another achievement was the successful repulse of an attempt by the Latin cities to check growing Roman supremacy. He destroyed one of the Latin cities and settled the population in Rome itself, and he was said to have destroyed the settlements of Tellenae, Politorium and Ficana.

The fifth king, Tarquinius Priscus, or Tarquin the Elder, was an

Etruscan citizen from the city with the same name, Tarquinius, but traditionally he was probably of Greek origin, since it was said that his father Demaratus left his native Corinth to avoid persecution and settled in Etruria. Priscus was closely associated with Ancus Marcius, and more or less seized power, though he did at least have the grace to wait until the king died. Then he manoeuvred himself into the kingship, bloodlessly it seems, and set about strengthening his own and the city's position, during a reign that lasted from c.616 to c.579 BC. He is said to have increased the size of the Senate, though it is not certain that the Senate at this stage was a permanent body whose members could be labelled senators, as in the Republic. The size of the Senate, if it existed as such, is not known for certain at this period, nor what were the conditions for entry to its ranks. There may have been a Senate House, attributed to Tullus Hostilius, but the group that met in it may have consisted of men from the leading families, not necessarily all aristocrats, who were chosen by the king on an *ad hoc* basis for deliberation about specific problems, perhaps with a changing membership according to the nature of the problem.

Another innovation was the increase in the size of the Roman cavalry. Romulus allegedly created three cavalry units, based on each of the three tribes of Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, and Tarquinius wanted to create three more, but there was opposition on religious grounds, so in the end he kept the original three units and doubled their size.

Leaving aside the uncertain fate of Romulus, Tarquinius Priscus was the first king to be assassinated. The aggrieved sons of Ancus Marcius, who probably hoped to be made kings themselves, hired two assassins who killed Tarquinius by a blow from an axe as he presided over a court sitting. If the sons of the previous king were hoping to take over the government and install themselves as rulers after the assassination, their plot was foiled because Tarquinius's wife, Tanaquil, acted quickly and concealed the body, pretending that he was badly wounded, but still alive and would recover. She persuaded the Romans that all would be well if, in the meantime, her favourite Servius Tullius took over the reins of state as deputy of the king. By the time the truth emerged, Servius was firmly entrenched in power, and unassailable. He had not been appointed in the proper fashion, and worse still he was said to have started life as a slave, taken prisoner with his mother when Tarquinius captured the town of Corniculum. Later Roman historians tried hard to compensate for his origins, by inventing noble ancestry for him, which, in a perverse way, indicates that they accepted the story that he was low-born. His origins did not seem to bother Tarquinius Priscus, who recognized the

talents and abilities of Servius and offered him one of his daughters in marriage.

During his reign from about 579 to 535 BC, Servius restructured the administration of Rome. The so-called Servian reforms were far-reaching and pragmatic, but it is impossible now to extricate precisely what Servius set in motion, since his achievements were not described until centuries later by ancient historians whose viewpoint was influenced by the customs and procedures of their own day, in other words by the fully evolved system.

The extent of Roman territorial control had certainly increased since the days of the early settlers. The population of the city itself had no doubt increased, and even more people had been transferred to the city itself to be added to the citizen body, so the original division of the populace into three tribes was probably unwieldy and obsolete. Servius replaced this system, possibly creating a fourth tribe in the city of Rome. Each of the postulated four tribes may have had a section of the surrounding territory attached to it, or alternatively Servius may have created extra tribes for the periphery, though this is much disputed. In the Republic there were four tribes in the city and thirty-one in the regions surrounding Rome, but it is unlikely that this represents the reforms that Servius instigated. He can be credited with laying the foundations for such a scheme, whereby more tribes could be added in modular fashion as the expanding population outdistanced the previous tribal divisions.

The tribes were subdivided into smaller groups called centuries, which applied to the electoral systems and to the organization of the army. There was, presumably, a close connection with the centuriate assembly, the *comitia centuriata*, but the details of precisely what the connection was and how it worked are obscure. During the Republic, the *comitia centuriata* was responsible for the election of the more important magistrates such as the consuls and praetors, for enacting laws, and declaring war and peace.

The first census of the population of Rome was conducted perhaps as a preliminary to this reorganization. The tribal organisation was based on place of residence, and so cut across the different strata, mixing rich and poor alike in one tribe. The census was conducted to collect information about the status and circumstances of each man, so that he could be slotted into the relevant category or class based on wealth. The Latin word used for these divisions is *classis*, the original meaning of which is far removed from the construction put upon it by modern English speakers: it concerns calling up men to serve in the army. These class divisions were used to determine the contribution that each man should make when the army was assembled. Once

again, the ancient historians were influenced by the fully evolved Republican system of five classes, with the wealthiest citizens providing full armour and weapons, down to the poorest, the last two classes, who went into battle virtually unprotected and bearing only light weapons. This brief description is an oversimplification that demands further elaboration. In the context of the Servian reforms, the five class system would probably have been too elaborate. Servius may have divided the Romans into only two classes, or even one class and a sub-group who did not qualify for inclusion in the class.

The new system arose as part of Servius's reorganization of the army. The king was concerned not only with the political divisions and assemblies, but with military command, a matter of importance to him since he had not been made king in the usual manner, and could be categorized as a usurper. More than any of his predecessors, Servius needed the army as the infrastructure of his power, and at this time it seems that he adopted the formation of the hoplite phalanx, heavy-armed troops who fought *en masse*, shield to shield. The Romans said that they had learned this formation from the Etruscans, but it was originally of Greek derivation. It is perhaps not important to debate where the Romans found their model, only that they did so around the time when Servius Tullius was allegedly the king. For the hoplite army, he would need only two classes, one class of those men who could afford the armour, the long lance and the shield of the hoplite soldiers, and one of the poorer men who served as light-armed troops. It is likely that this more simple system was the origin of the five classes of later times, further divisions being made as circumstances altered during the history of the Republic. Debate on these issues will probably continue until the end of time, unless by some fortuitous means, incontrovertible evidence comes to light dating from the early sixth century.

The reorganization of the tribes and the division of the population into classes had a political purpose as well as a military one, but it is not entirely clear how government was carried on under these schemes in the time of the kings. What emerges from later Roman history is on the one hand their conservatism, and on the other their capacity for adaptation, when circumstances demanded it. The Romans successfully modified and amended the systems they had inherited from the reforms of Servius Tullius for the next five centuries.

Servius attended to the defence of the city, as all the other kings were said to have done, but the wall named after him proves to be more elusive than previously thought. The ancient wall still standing near to the central railway station in Rome probably has nothing to do

with King Servius, though tradition associates it with him. It is not easy to date the ancient walls of Rome and attribute them to any of the kings. Work on the defences was probably an ongoing perennial concern, either to establish walls or to repair them. There may never have been a complete enclosure, though it could be assumed that points of easy access would be protected somehow, and a king such as Servius, efficient and thorough, would probably make sure that everything was in order. According to Strabo and Dionysius of Halicarnassus he fortified the section between the Esquiline and the Viminal Hills, but it is impossible to verify this.

Another of Servius's achievements may have concerned the extension of the city boundary, which was not necessarily directly connected with the defensive walls. The actual boundary probably took in territory beyond the walls. It was called the *pomerium*, and had religious significance as well as marking the outer edge of the city. A general at the head of troops was supposed to lay down his command and disband his army before he crossed the *pomerium*. Centuries later, Lucius Cornelius Sulla infamously led his soldiers across it into the city to obtain what he wanted from the Senate and People of Rome. It was not his only encounter with the *pomerium*. When he had taken full control of Rome, Sulla extended the Servian boundary.

The seventh and last King of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, 'the Proud' was an Etruscan, perhaps the grandson of Tarquinius Priscus. He is portrayed as an unscrupulous criminal with autocratic tendencies, which served, of course, to provide the excuse for his eventual expulsion and the overthrow of the monarchy. In 535 or 534 BC he allegedly arranged a *coup d'état*, seizing power by forcing the Senate to recognize him as king, even though the aged Servius was still alive. There was a fracas in which Servius was physically ejected from the Senate House and then murdered on his way home.

Despite his unlawful seizure of power and his subsequent anti-aristocratic behaviour, snubbing the senators and ruling without their advice, Rome flourished under his rule, which lasted from c.535 to c.509, when the Republic was established. Tarquinius was probably the founder of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Jupiter Best and Greatest, the chief deity of Rome, on the Capitoline Hill. Tradition also credits him with road building, further attention to the defences of the city, and a concern for health, safety and plumbing, demonstrated by the construction of the great sewer, the Cloaca Maxima. In order to hurry along his public building schemes, it was said that he forcibly assembled a large workforce of the poorer elements among the populace, thus keeping them occupied and giving them no time to foment trouble.

External relations were pursued with the same energetic determination. The Latin cities were brought under Roman domination, and their citizens contributed contingents to the Roman army. Rome was recognized as the chief city of Latium, a situation that is corroborated by a treaty arranged between Rome and Carthage, during the very first years of the Republic, probably in 507 BC. Carthage was a city state founded in North Africa by the Phoenicians. The Romans would fight several bitter wars with the Carthaginians in the future. The treaty of the sixth century BC is described by the reliable and respected Greek historian Polybius, who may even have seen the original. He is not suspected of elaboration or distortion of the facts. True, he was writing some centuries later, so it is possible that someone could have forged the document at any time between Polybius's day and the alleged date of the treaty, but it is generally accepted as authentic by modern scholars. Part of the text of the treaty mentions Latin cities which were subject to Rome, and also Latins who were not subjects, indicating that there were still some parts of the area not yet under Roman hegemony. The Latin League is a convenient modern term applied to this amalgamation of the Latin cities, conveying something of how it worked, but it is not backed up by any evidence that the Romans ever used such a description. They usually dealt with the Latin cities on an individual basis rather than as a uniform group.

By the end of Tarquinius's reign, Romans from all walks of life had been given serious cause for resentment, but rebellion did not arise from a united people standing for their rights, until an event that started out as a family vendetta turned into a political revolution. The story was told that Tarquinius's younger son Sextus raped the virtuous Lucretia, who then killed herself, prompting Tarquinius's nephew, Lucius Junius Brutus, and Lucretia's husband, Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, to lead the rebellion against their kinsman, who was reportedly absent from Rome at the time, besieging the city of Ardea. Tarquinius hurried back, but was denied entry to the city and went off to rally the Etruscan cities of Caere, Veii and Tarquinii to fight for him.

In the meantime, Junius Brutus and Tarquinius Collatinus took control of the state. It was said that they became the first consuls, though this may be an anachronistic interpolation, since it is not certain that this magistracy was established quite so early. Whatever their actual titles were, Brutus and Tarquinius held supreme power, but Brutus passed a decree banishing all the Tarquinii from Rome, and Collatinus had to go into exile. Tarquinius Superbus remained a thorn in the side of the Romans, even suborning the two sons of Brutus to

agitate for his reinstatement. Brutus chose the noble path, and obeyed the law that he himself had passed, advocating the death penalty for anyone who tried to restore the monarchy. He executed his own sons, setting the precedent for the stern Roman virtues that sustained the Republic. Family loyalties and personal feelings were subordinated to the law and the security of Rome.

The Etruscan allies of Tarquinius met the Romans in battle c.509 BC. Junius Brutus was killed but the Romans won the battle, discouraging the Etruscans from further action, until Lars Porsenna, the King of Clusium in Campania, managed to unite them again and marched on Rome, probably in 506 BC. Here the tale becomes even more confused, one version insisting that the Romans repulsed Porsenna when the heroic Horatius Cocles held the bridge across the Tiber until it could be destroyed, and another version, repeated in the first century AD by Tacitus and Pliny, declaring that King Porsenna occupied the city for a while, perhaps even imposing a treaty on the Romans. If he did so, then he signally failed to reinstate Tarquinius Superbus as he had supposedly promised to do, or make himself king in place of Tarquinius. His role in the affair is not understood. A modern theory is that Porsenna actually put the final touches to the eradication of the Roman monarchy, though Tarquinius Superbus did not abandon hope of reinstatement as King of Rome, until his death in c.495 BC. He ended his days as an exile, living at Clusium.

The battles against Tarquinius's Etruscan allies, and the Etruscan origins of the family of Tarquinius Priscus and Tarquinius Superbus, lend support to the theory, now discounted, that the foundation of the Republic was in reality a rebellion against Etruscan political domination, but there is no real evidence that Rome was dominated by the Etruscans at any time during its development. The struggle was not between the supposedly inferior civilization of the Romans and the superior civilization of their masters, nor was it an ethnic war between the Latins and the Etruscans. In the spheres of art and architecture, systems of government and the insignia that went with them, and in general culture, the Etruscans definitely influenced the Romans, who were eclectic borrowers of all things practical and useful, but there is no evidence of oppression or racial strife. There was probably no immediate eradication from Rome of all settlers of Etruscan origin, nor any attempt to reduce their influence and subordinate them. Indeed some Etruscan names appear in the lists of consuls, though some historians have found ways of rejecting them as part of an attempt to prove that all things Etruscan were anathema to the Romans after the overthrow of Tarquinius Superbus.

The somewhat impossible and garbled tales of the end of the

monarchy and the beginning of the Republic are probably mythical, at least in part, but even though the chronology is all wrong and even though some the main participants may be fictional, the accounts cannot be entirely rejected. Archaeological evidence of destruction dated to about 500 BC indicates that the expulsion of the kings and perhaps the struggle against Tarquinius's allies, may have been violent and bloody. The buildings and areas associated with the kings, or at least with government, were destroyed, such as the Regia and the Comitium, or place of assembly.

The revolution at Rome may not have occurred in isolation. At the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries BC other cities in Italy were in the process of changing their governments, sometimes ejecting their rulers with violence. The end of the monarchy at Rome can be seen as part of a more widespread movement. It was a time of political upheaval and warfare, which probably contributed directly to the archaeologically detectable economic decline of the middle years of the fifth century, when in several cities, including Rome itself, the import and manufacture of fine wares and luxury goods, and the public building programmes, all came to a halt.

Thus it was in the midst of rebellion and warfare that the Roman Republic was born, c.509 BC. The new government would have to reorganize itself to overcome the many problems that faced it. Rome was surrounded by various states and tribes who might seize their chance to overcome her in this period of weakness. Lars Porsenna was not finally defeated until c.504 at the battle of Aricia, and Tarquinius Superbus was still at large trying to persuade various cities to help him to reinstate himself as King of Rome. The Latin cities were beginning to agitate against Roman supremacy, and the Etruscans could not be counted on or trusted as allies. After the expulsion of the kings of Rome, there was no guarantee that the infant Republic would survive.

Fierce Neighbours: The Expansion of Rome in Italy 509–290 BC

The traditional date for the foundation of the Republic in 509 BC derives from the *Fasti*, or lists of the annually elected consuls. There is more than one version, but there are not too many alarming discrepancies in these different versions, all of which start at some date towards the end of the sixth century. The most complete version is that of Marcus Terentius Varro who compiled the *Fasti Capitolini* with a start date in 509 BC. Varro's list contains some inaccuracies, perhaps not due to fabricated entries on his part – he was too conscientious for that – but possibly in some cases his sources were erroneous, or there were gaps that he filled with informed speculation. The *Fasti Capitolini* provides better information than anything else that is available, so scholars use it despite the problems.

The ancient historians who tried to reconstruct the establishment and development of the early Republic could use a variety of materials, some of which are now lost. Information is quite sparse for the initial years, gathering momentum in volume and depth as the Republic grew, with the result that extrapolation backwards from what was known, to explain what was not known, may have distorted the opinions of the historians about the first years of Republican Rome. There would be some official archival sources, such as those that Varro used to document the names of the first consuls. The Pontifex Maximus, or high priest, kept annual records known as the *Annales Maximi*, citing the names of the annually elected state officials and noting selected events. The information for the early years of the Republic is sporadic and of dubious worth, but from the end of the fifth century BC the records are considered to be more reliable, so the ancient historians who used them are also more trustworthy. The Romans kept records of the laws that were enacted, and the treaties that were made with other states and powers. Senatorial decrees would need to be recorded if they were to be given validity. All types of records may have been inscribed on stone, while others may have been written on less durable materials. Some of the leading families recorded and archived the exploits and achievements of their ancestors, and even if they kept no physical records, they still had a body of oral traditions about their part in the progress of the Roman Republic. Around these documents, coupled with the traditional tales

handed down by successive generations of the aristocratic families, historians could hang a fairly credible narrative.

It has been questioned whether the roots of the Republican system of government could have been organized and put into operation immediately after the expulsion of the kings. A few modern scholars prefer to interpret the growth of the system in evolutionary terms, as a gradual accretion of procedures and personnel built up empirically, based on experience and changing circumstances. It is unlikely that the truth will ever be revealed, but it is permissible to ask why the leading citizens of Rome are not considered capable of holding discussions to decide on how to govern from the first moment that they were free to do so, c.509 BC. At a distance of over twenty-five centuries it is perhaps too easy to overlook the fact that the largely anonymous men who guided the transition of Rome from monarchy to Republic were real people, endowed with the same brain capacity as modern humans. Whoever they were, collectively they most likely possessed all the attributes that were necessary in their new situation, and were probably courageous, efficient, capable of deliberation and making decisions, and sufficiently powerful, authoritative and ruthless to ensure that their decisions were not overruled. The heads of the most important families would have been able to hand down to their descendants a group consciousness of the government of Rome, derived from their association with the kings and from their tours of duty serving for five days, turn and turn about, as *interreges* when the kings died. They would not approach the art of ruling as complete novices, devoid of any experience at all. There is no reason why they could not have combined innovation with evolution, starting with an immediate improvisation which laid the foundations of the government, and constantly monitoring and adapting as time went on. The Romans usually dealt with new or changed situations by reshaping established systems that were already in place and of proven worth, which may be the method adopted by the first administrators of the Republic. The problem is that there is scarcely any information about the administrative system of the monarchy, and therefore it is impossible to discern how much of the Republican government grew out of that of the kings.

It was not as though the leaders of the newly established state could afford the luxury of indecisive vacillation, burying their heads in the sand and hoping that things would turn out all right in the end. There were several problems that beset the nascent Republic, some of them downright dangerous, and someone had to take over the government and make it function, attending to the administration, the economy, the food supply, the law, state security, and religion,

without too much of a confused hiatus which could be exploited by neighbouring states or tribes. As well as being surrounded by potential external enemies, Rome faced internal upheavals as well, and it all had to be dealt with if Rome was not to be annihilated by combination of these dangers.

Government of the Republic

The governmental system of the Republic consisted of an advisory body of the leading men of the state, collectively called the Senate. The people were grouped together in assemblies, with certain limited powers, but sufficient to justify the proud title *Senatus Populusque Romanus*, the Senate and People of Rome. Administration was carried out by annually elected magistrates, who could serve for further terms, but never more than one year at a time, so that theoretically no single individual could legitimately retain power for a longer period, though it must be acknowledged that many of the internal problems of the Roman Republic arose from ambitious men trying to bend the rules to achieve and retain power, until finally someone accomplished it without upsetting too many people and created the Empire.

The Senate was probably already in existence before the Republic was formed, as the advisory body of the kings, though it may not have been a permanent establishment consisting of members appointed for life. It may not have been a body of a standard predetermined size, all of whose members were eligible to attend regular meetings. The kings may have summoned advisors on an *ad hoc* basis to debate specific problems, and then dismissed them, choosing a different set of senators when the next matter for discussion arose. The concept of the Senate as an advisory body, and no doubt many of the individual senators, survived the transition to the Republic, but the new Senate enjoyed considerably greater power than an advisory council.

Membership of the Senate was always based on wealth. In the Republic the property qualification was 400,000 sesterces (*sestertii*), and it remained at that figure until Augustus increased the minimum qualification to 1 million sesterces. The senators were mainly land-owners, but the Senate was not necessarily a totally aristocratic institution. Sons of senators did not automatically follow their fathers into the Senate since membership was not purely hereditary. Unsuitable men were not admitted, or if they had managed to become senators, they could be weeded out. From the middle of the fifth century BC, two magistrates called censors were elected by the people's assembly every four years, later changed to every five years. Their principal duties were to carry out a census of the Roman populace, as their name suggests, but during their tenure of office,

which lasted for a year and a half, the censors could tidy up membership of the Senate and eject men whose behaviour or character did not conform to the desirable specifications.

The size of the Senate varied from time to time, according to requirements. There were 300 members in the second century BC, rising to 900 in the following century under Julius Caesar, who elevated certain individuals to senatorial status. At the end of the civil wars between Caesar and Pompey, and then between Mark Antony and Octavian, there were 1,000 senators, but Augustus reduced the number to a more manageable 600 in 18 BC. This remained the norm until the third century AD.

The senators shared a considerable collective experience of government, which qualified them for the supervision of domestic and foreign policy, the law, and religion. During the later Republic foreign embassies coming into Rome reported not to the magistrates but to the Senate, and likewise it was the Senate that collectively monitored the government of the Italian states, with the authority to interfere if it was considered necessary. The Senate delegated and despatched embassies to other countries outside Italy. Public trials for serious crimes, such as treason, conspiracy and assassination, were presided over by the Senate. Since the administration of finance was also under senatorial control, the commanders of the army were dependent on the goodwill of the senators, because it was only the Senate that had the power to authorize the provision of food, clothing, and pay to the troops. Campaigns could grind to a halt for lack of supplies and pay if the Senate was not feeling generous, as attested when the youthful general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus wrote scathing letters from Spain, threatening to abandon the war because he had used up all his own money in buying food and paying his soldiers. He was exaggerating of course, since he was one of the wealthiest landowners in Rome, but he was not alone in having to go cap in hand to an intransigent Senate who wanted results without having to pay for them.

As time went on and the territory controlled by Rome increased, membership of the Senate was gradually modified and regulated, and a career path emerged, usually combining a succession of military and civilian posts. Senators were expected to take on many different tasks without very much training. They commanded armies and governed provinces, as well as taking part in the government at Rome. When the Empire was established, membership of the Senate was still the gateway to an administrative and political career, but the Emperor alone took control of military affairs and financial policy.

The people's assemblies of Republican Rome had some limited powers. They voted for candidates for the annual magistracies, and

they accepted or rejected proposals that were put to them by the magistrates, but they had no right to discuss or to amend anything contained in the proposals. The two main assemblies were the *comitia curiata* and the *comitia centuriata*. The former assembly was the oldest, operative during the reigns of the kings of Rome, based on the thirty *curiae* or divisions of the tribes. The *comitia curiata* confirmed the appointment of the magistrates, and passed the necessary law (*lex curiata de imperio*) to bestow military power (*imperium*) on those magistrates who were to command armies.

The *comitia centuriata* was formed some time later than the *comitia curiata*, as part of the so-called Servian reforms, whereby the voting centuries and the military centuries were the same, so the functions of the *comitia centuriata* were related to those of the army. Perhaps its most important function with regard to the army was that this assembly was responsible for the declaration or rejection of war, and contrary to the popular image of the Romans as a totally warlike people, the assembly sometimes did not approve of going to war. In later years, as army organization changed, the divisions of the *comitia centuriata* lost their relationship to the composition of the army, but the assembly continued to carry out its political functions, declaring for or against wars, enacting laws, and electing the censors, consuls, and praetors.

Government by the Senate and People required personnel to carry out the various functions. The most powerful official, with supreme command of all things military and civilian, was the Dictator. This was not a regular appointment. A Dictator was usually chosen only in times of emergencies, for a period of six months. Everyone was subject to his rule, even the chief magistrates, the consuls, who were not removed from office. They resumed their own powers when the Dictator resigned.

In the later Republic, the supreme magistrates were the two annually elected consuls. It is generally assumed from the information contained in the *Fasti*, or lists of the consuls, that these magistrates were installed immediately after the ejection of Tarquinius Superbus, but this is not accepted by all scholars, and the nature of the consulship and the date of its institution have been questioned. One suggestion is that for an unspecified length of time, the chief magistrates of early Republican Rome may have originally been called praetors, a title that derives from the verb *prae-ire*, meaning 'to go before'. There may have been only one praetor, though there are references from the early Republic to a *praetor maximus*, implying that since there was a most important praetor, there may have been at least two lesser ones, but there is no definite information from which

to draw firm conclusions about the rank or the number of praetors in the very early Republic, so informed speculation is the ultimate recourse for historians.

Alternatively it has been argued that the first magistrates after the fall of the monarchy were Dictators, elected annually and ruling without a colleague, and only later was this post limited to a six month term and adopted solely for times of emergency. The concept of a single all-powerful ruler was supposed to be anathema to the Romans, and the death penalty could be imposed on anyone who aspired to *regnum*, or kingship, so the story goes that the Romans adopted the collegiate principle of electing two chief magistrates so that one of them could check the over-weening ambitions of the other, if such a situation should arise. In the fully fledged system, if one of the consuls died before the termination of his office, the other consul was obliged to hold elections to replace him, presumably to remove the temptation for the surviving consul to exercise supreme power even for a few months.

Despite the Roman aversion to sole rule, it is possible that the collegiate system was not observed when the very first consuls were installed. Some scholars suggest that the consuls were not originally elected in pairs, but this too remains speculative. A further complication is that the consuls were not elected in unbroken succession every year from the foundation of the Republic. Interspersed with the consuls, for blocks of several years in succession, a number of officials were appointed, called *tribuni militum consulari potestate*, military tribunes with consular power. The concept of consular power was retained but the magistrates exercising this power were not consuls, and they were not paired. There were never less than three at a time, sometimes four, and most commonly six. This situation lasted, on and off, from the middle of the fifth century until 367 BC.

During the later Republic, the consuls attended to all aspects of government, and were responsible for raising and commanding the armies. It was the summit of a politician's career to reach the consulship, and there was considerable cachet in belonging to a consular family, whose ancestors had all been consuls, sometimes more than once. It was permissible to stand for election after attaining the first consulship, and some men held the office several times, especially in times of danger. At the end of the second century BC when Italy was threatened by invasion from roving Celtic tribes, Gaius Marius was elected for six years in succession, mostly without even having to present himself in the city, because he was with the army, preparing for the next attack by the tribes. Other politicians tried to

manoeuvre themselves into more than one year as consul, because they felt that holding office for only one year, and working with a colleague who could oppose any proposals, restricted the development of their policies, and it was especially irksome for the implementation of long-term plans. Hence men like Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Julius Caesar accepted the Dictatorship, eventually having it conferred on them for life, in order to push through their reforms with a tenuous semblance of legality. At the demise of the Republic, Augustus was much more covert and subtle, and managed to arrogate all power to himself without using inflammatory titles. The office of consul still held attractions for ambitious men under the Empire. Although it was the Emperor who was supreme commander of the armies and the master of the government, consulars were required to fill the posts as provincial governors and subordinate army commanders, and anyone who impressed the Emperor could rise to prominence and wealth.

Probably in 367 BC, after the Licinian-Sextian law was passed implementing reforms of the consulship, the praetors appeared, or possibly reappeared. These magistrates were elected annually and were subordinate to the consuls, and the post eventually became one of the stages on the path to the consulship. Originally only one praetor was elected. He could hold *imperium*, meaning that he was empowered to command armies, and he was left in full charge of the city when the consuls were absent. His principal duties involved legal functions as well as government of the city and military command. As Rome extended control over Italy, and then over countries outside Italy, the government required more personnel to carry out the increased administration, so the number of praetors was continually increased to cope with a growing workload. From the middle of the third century BC, there were two praetors, one to deal with internal affairs (*praetor urbanus*) and one to deal with foreigners (*praetor inter peregrinos*). The first provinces were governed by praetors. For a short time under Julius Caesar there were sixteen praetors, but the final total under Augustus was twelve. After holding office, the ex-praetor's subsequent post was usually as legate of a legion or as governor of a senatorial province.

Viewed retrospectively from the later Republic, this was the basis of the system that the Romans adopted once the monarchy was abolished. Whether they arrived at this level of sophistication soon after the ejection of the kings, or over a period of time, is still debated, but with a rudimentary form of the government that lasted for several centuries, the first Republican Romans faced their future. There was a long way to go and several problems to overcome. Internal upheavals and external wars occurred sometimes simultaneously and sometimes

in succession, and occasionally one was linked directly to the other. Roman political life could never be long removed from war.

Patricians & Plebeians

Within the Roman populace, as with any other people, there were several divisions and dissensions. Perhaps the most important of these divisions, and the most problematic both for the Romans and for modern historians trying to analyse it, was the split between the aristocrats, the patricians, and the ordinary people, called plebeians, or the plebs. At a casual glance this seems quite straightforward, but on investigation it becomes more complicated. The ancient historians, accustomed to the patrician/plebeian divide, assumed that the division had begun in the days of the kings, probably dating back to Romulus and the foundation of the city. This is by no means proven, and no one can say definitely what was the distinction between patricians and plebs, nor when the differences became crystallized. It is not clear by what criteria patricians and plebs distinguished themselves, or how they recognized their own status and that of the other group.

Perennially, the differences between the patricians and plebs are categorized as the diametrically opposed rich and poor, landowners and landless, senators and people, none of which is accurate and none of which completely rationalizes the situation. Modern historians have suggested various origins for the two groups. Some of them subscribed to the theory that the patricians may have been the original settlers who came with Romulus, so the Greek and Roman scholars may have been correct in their assumption that the division went back to the foundation of Rome. More alarmingly for modern audiences, some historians preferred to explain the distinction as racial, the patricians being Romans and the plebs Sabine, or alternatively the patricians were the first settlers and the plebs were the hangers-on who came to Rome either voluntarily or were brought there as captives after their cities had been defeated and the inhabitants transferred. This neatly accounts for the inferior status of the plebs.

Another theory turns the problem on its head, preferring to label the plebs as the original residents of Rome, and the patricians as the non-Roman aristocracy who imposed their authority over the indigenous population, who were relegated to a lower status. This theory accounts for the fact that the patricians were confined to a few clans, or *gentes*, from *gens*, denoting members of a family all descended from a common ancestor.

The political friction between the patricians and plebs has been

described as the 'struggle of the orders', a label invented by historians to describe a common thread that ran through many years of Roman history, but one of the side-effects of this label is that it also gives the impression that there was a prolonged campaign in which the plebs consistently strove towards their goal of political and social equality, and in response, the patricians fought to retain their supremacy. The reality is more like a series of squabbles over different grievances, sparked off by specific events or by legislation, and resolved, eventually, one at a time.

The plebeians were free-born Roman citizens who were not patricians, but it is not certain that every member of the population who did not belong to the patrician clans was necessarily a plebeian. There seem to have been other divisions or cross sections which are not clearly elucidated, and it is possible that people could belong to a selection of them. Plebeian and patrician status was hereditary. The plebeians were not all in dire poverty, and patricians did not derive their status solely from wealth, or to put it another way, wealth could not buy patrician status. In the later Republic, some plebeians were wealthier than some of the patricians, and a plebeian nobility arose, side by side with the patricians. Marriages between plebs and patricians were initially forbidden by law, but this legislation was quickly rescinded. Marriage liaisons took place between the two orders, but the plebeians remained plebeians and the patricians remained patricians, so it is clear that even over a prolonged period, intermarriage did not annul the differences between the two.

The so-called 'struggle of the orders' did not emerge until the fifth century BC. According to tradition, in 494 and again in 471 BC, the plebs uprooted themselves and left Rome, events known as the first and second secessions, the first one being somewhat doubtful. The legend says that in 494 the plebs occupied a hill, perhaps the Sacred Mount near the Tiber a few miles downstream from Rome, or possibly the Aventine, which was still outside the city boundary at the time. Some time later the Temple of Ceres on the Aventine became the cult centre for the plebs. It is not certain what gave rise to this first secession, nor is it clear whether the whole of the non-patrician population left the city, or even if all the plebeians were included in the dissident group.

It may have been mounting debts, or a decline in the standard of living, or oppression by the patricians, or all these burdens and more, that caused the plebs to rebel. Oppression by the patricians was a theme that ran through all agitation by the plebs. Debt and land distribution also featured constantly. In the context of the fifth century BC, the constant warfare with neighbouring tribes most likely

contributed to the economic decline that is archaeologically attested for the same period in Rome and many of the cities in surrounding Roman territory. It would be the poorer people who felt the pinch more than the aristocrats, and most likely the plebs borrowed from the patricians just to keep going. Men could be legally imprisoned for debt, but creditors did not always have recourse to legal proceedings, and stories were told of men being beaten up, or arbitrarily imprisoned when they could not repay their loans. There is probably a basis of truth in the tales, even if hyperbole did the rest.

There may have been food shortages when the plebs seceded from Rome, perhaps the most inflammatory problem of all because the effects would be felt more rapidly than mounting debts. There were several occasions when food shortages were serious enough to be recorded in the annals of the fifth century BC. Once again the constant warfare probably contributed to and exacerbated the problem of the food supply by limiting production. Agriculture suffered when the farmer soldiers could not attend to their farms, or if the enemy destroyed the crops or stole them. Raiding of this sort and encroachment on agricultural land was probably the most common cause of the wars in the fifth century.

It was not only Rome's enemies who encroached on land, however. Another perennial problem that surfaced from time to time throughout the Republic was the distribution of public lands, the *ager publicus*. Theoretically this land was open to all citizens but in reality it was dominated by the aristocrats who were powerful enough and rich enough to drive people off the land and install their favourites, or their clients (*clientes*) with whom each patrician family surrounded themselves in a mutually supporting group.

The Romans were nearly always fighting some enemy or other from the tribes that surrounded them, and at the time of the so-called first secession in 494 BC they were involved in an ongoing war with the Latin cities, so the bargaining tool of the plebs was a refusal to serve in the army. But to serve as what? It is considered unlikely that the plebs formed the bulk of the main Roman army of the time, the hoplite phalanx, so if the plebs normally served as light-armed troops, this would leave the phalanx intact, and would probably not represent a crippling disadvantage to the Romans.

The first and second secessions in 494 and 471 BC are not unassailable truths and may have been fabricated, in whole or in part. The only certainties are the long term results of plebeian agitation in the early fifth century, beginning with the eventual establishment of the *concilium plebis* and the annual election of tribunes of the plebs. The *concilium plebis* was an assembly of the plebeians, distinct from

the other assemblies called the *comitia curiata* and *comitia centuriata*. In its fully established form, the *concilium plebis* was responsible for the election of the tribunes of the plebs, and two magistrates called aediles, who were answerable to the tribunes, serving as their executive assistants. The principal duties of the aediles concerned the supervision and maintenance of the temples of Diana and Ceres on the Aventine Hill. From 367 BC onwards, two more aediles were elected, this time by the patricians, but all four of these magistrates protected the interests of the plebs, and were responsible for the maintenance and administration of the city, the streets and markets, and the organization of the public games. The post of aedile was a multi-tasking occupation, and a good grounding for participation in administration and government. Eventually the *concilium plebis* was called *comitia plebis*, like the other assemblies, probably after 471 when its voting mechanisms were reformed by the tribune Volero Publilius. It is not clear how votes were cast before this date, but when the system was reorganized, local tribes were taken as the voting units, decisions being made on the majority vote. The method by which Publilius reorganized the voting system was known as a plebiscite. He put forward his proposal, and the plebs voted on it (by whatever method was in use at the time), which is how the tribunes operated in the plebeian assembly. The plebiscites were designed to regulate the organization of the plebs alone, but from about the middle of the fifth century they were recognized as laws affecting the whole community, provided that they were approved by the patrician senators. In the third century BC this need for this approval was no longer necessary and plebiscites had the validity of laws.

The tribunes of the plebs understandably had to be of plebeian origin. They were not magistrates, and were not eligible to command armies, being quite distinct from the military tribunes who shared the title but not the functions. Using their political powers (all embraced under the heading of *tribunicia potestas*) the main duty of the *tribuni plebis* was to protect the plebs from harm. Their most important political tool was the right of *intercessio*, or veto, against proposals emanating from any other tribune or any magistrate except the Dictator, whose authority overrode all other state officials. The tribunes enjoyed the protection of sacrosanctity, anyone who harmed them being subject to terrible curses, a useful device during the next centuries.

Originally there were only two tribunes, but their number was soon raised. The ancient historians seemed uncertain of the date when the increase in numbers of tribunes took place, and could not even agree about how many tribunes there actually were in this interim

stage. There was probably an addition of three tribunes, making five in total, and it probably happened in 471 BC, the traditional date of the second plebeian secession. Information is more definite for the middle of the fifth century BC when the number of tribunes was increased to ten, and remained at that strength throughout the Republic. Tribunes entered office in early December, slightly earlier than the rest of the magistrates whose annual tour of duty began in January.

Naturally some of the patricians were opposed to the institution of the tribunes, epitomized by the probably mythical story of Caius Marcius Coriolanus, the heroic soldier who took his name from his exploits at the siege of the Volscian city of Corioli. The Volsci tried to break out through the siege lines, and Coriolanus drove them back. As a military hero, he would possess some influence, and as a staunch patrician he objected to plebeians in positions of power. He tried to prevent the adoption of the tribunes, allegedly by locking up the grain supply to force the plebs to give up the scheme. The story neatly highlights the ruthlessness of the patricians, and also illustrates how serious were the intentions of the plebs, who were not diverted from the cause despite the threats.

The power of the *tribuni plebis* was accrued only in gradual stages. At first the tribunes were confined to summoning the plebeian assembly, and were excluded from the Senate. In the third century BC they were allowed to listen to senatorial debates, and were eventually granted the right to convoke meetings of the Senate. The office evolved into one of the most useful organs of the state, as the tribunate gradually acquired more influence, but towards the end of the Republic some of the influential and ambitious politicians used unscrupulous methods to buy the co-operation of amenable tribunes to pursue their own political agendas.

The plebs did finally achieve recognition and equality with the patricians but it took a very long time. One slow burning result of plebeian pressure was their admission to the Senate, and to the major magistracies and priesthoods. Originally the plebs were probably not excluded from the Senate but it seems that the patricians made concerted efforts to keep them out of the government, so successful that it took more than a century after the first secession for the plebs to gain access to the consulship.

For a decade, from 376 to 367, the tribunes of the plebs Gaius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius Lateranus campaigned to open up the consulship to plebeians, to ameliorate the problems of debt, and to establish a fairer system of land distribution. In 367 they succeeded in passing their law which achieved most of what they desired. The laws

of Rome were always labelled with the family names of the men who succeeded in getting them passed, so this legislation is known as the Licinian-Sextian law.

The next law that dealt with plebeian access to the consulship was passed in 342 BC by the tribune Lucius Genucius. The accounts in the ancient histories, principally the information found in the Roman history of Livy, are at odds with what resulted from the two laws. It was said that the law of 362 stipulated that one of the consuls must be a plebeian, and the law of 342 made provision for both consulships to be held by plebeians. The lists of consuls contradict this assumption, showing that from 362 onwards the patricians still dominated the consulship, but after 342, one of them was consistently a plebeian, so modern historians have reinterpreted the two successive laws. The Licinian-Sextian law most likely allowed plebeians to stand as candidates for the consulship, which did not necessarily mean that any of them would be elected, and the law of Genucius stipulated that one consul should be plebeian every year, because the evidence shows that this is what in fact happened.

The Twelve Tables: The Codification of the Law

Another successful outcome of plebeian pressure was the clarification and codification of the law. It was difficult to remain on the right side of the law if no one except a select few knew what the law was. Agitation began in 462 and produced results after a decade. Allegedly the Romans sent an embassy, in reality a working party, to Athens to study the laws of Solon. It has been pointed out that the laws of fifth century Athens had moved on since the time of Solon, but his name perhaps carried weight with the Romans. When they had completed their studies in Athens and other Greek cities, the Romans adopted a novel scheme to institute their own laws. In 451 BC it was agreed to replace the normal system of government with a new one. The consuls and tribunes stepped down, and in their place ten men were elected, to carry out all the usual tasks of day to day government and administration, but also to draw up the law codes, as reflected in their title, *Decemviri legibus scribundis*, literally ten men to write the laws.

The *Decemviri* held office for one year, at the end of which they had drafted several laws, arranged in ten groups, called tables. These were approved and ratified by the whole people in the *comitia centuriata*. Since the ten tables did not embrace all the necessary laws, a second set of *Decemviri* was elected for the year 450 BC to continue the work. A significant factor was that the first group of ten men was made up predominantly, perhaps even totally, of patricians, and the second set comprised a mixture of plebeians and patricians. One man,

Appius Claudius, had served with the first ten and canvassed energetically for re-election. He succeeded in being appointed, but there was trouble ahead, and he was one of the causes of it, or was blamed for it after the event. The new *Decemviri* produced two more sets of laws, thus raising the total to the Twelve Tables, by which they are known today. The complete text was inscribed on bronze and displayed in the Forum, but according to Livy the bronzes were destroyed when the Gauls sacked Rome in 390 BC. At any rate, the bronze tablets had already disappeared from view by the later first century BC, but the text itself survived and, according to Cicero, schoolboys had to learn it by heart. Modern scholars have been able to put together some of the laws from the surviving quotations in the ancient literature, but it is not absolutely clear to which table each of the laws belonged. The incomplete text is usually presented nowadays arranged under the twelve headings, following the painstaking study of a nineteenth-century scholar, but new evidence may one day come to light which could alter the allocation of laws to specific tables.

After their achievement in adding the two new tables, the *Decemviri* refused to relinquish their power. Historical fact now shades off into varying degrees of fable, involving a scandal when Appius Claudius tried to rape a young girl called Verginia, the daughter of Verginius a centurion in the army. Not content with having assaulted her, Claudius tried to prove that the girl had started life as a slave in his household, but was somehow spirited away as an infant, which meant that she was legally his property. Rather than have his daughter so dishonoured, Verginius killed her, then led the army in a revolt, while the people marched off to the Janiculum Hill, where they remained in protest against such arbitrary treatment of Verginia. The story recalls quite closely the rape of Lucretia by the son of the last Tarquinius, and the parallel may not be wholly coincidental. Tyrannical behaviour quite rightly ends in tears and, when calm and normal government had been restored, Appius Claudius met his just deserts. Verginius accosted him in the Forum, and accused him of breaking one of the laws he had helped to establish, namely the false enslavement of a free person. Claudius was imprisoned, and according to Livy he committed suicide, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus says he was murdered by the reinstated tribunes.

It is not certain whether the *Decemviri* were originally constituted as a permanent body, staffed by annually elected personnel who would permanently replace the consuls and other magistrates. The original intention may have been to suspend normal government on a temporary basis, and appoint the *Decemviri* to carry out the specific task of drafting the laws, so that when this task was completed, the

consuls and other magistrates, and the tribunes, would return to office. The chaotic circumstances when the *Decemviri* tried to hang onto power threw into disarray the original plans, whatever they had been. Legislation was required to restore the peace, and to reconstitute the government. Traditionally, it was a series of enactments, known as the Valerio-Horatian laws, that put an end to the powers of the *Decemviri* and reconciled the plebs and patricians, who had temporarily united against a common enemy. As with most aspects of the early Republic, these laws are subject to debate, not least because very similar laws were passed in successive years, by different consuls all named Valerius, so it is almost impossible to disentangle the original legislation of the fifth century from that of later centuries.

External Affairs

From the foundation of the Republic, Rome was embroiled in constant wars, not entirely on an annual basis, but frequently enough to provide them with considerable experience. Although the various military activities are labelled as wars they were not the full scale actions that characterized the later campaigns of the Republic and Empire, and not on the same scale as the wars of the modern world. War in the early Roman Republic was more of a seasonal hazard, or a series of periodic spats. There were casualties on both sides, but often there were no long lasting consequences, and there was not always any wide ranging political aim, consistently pursued.

The most common causes of warfare were territorial. Rome searched for safe boundaries and tried to maintain them – an excuse that would lead eventually to the establishment of the Empire. All wars waged by the Romans were of course perfectly justified, even if they had to enter into sundry contortions of the truth to prove that they were fighting in a just cause. Their enemies no doubt went through the same motions. Rome's neighbours waged war most often because of population pressure and the need for expansion, to find more land in which to settle and grow crops. The Volsci gradually encroached on the southern areas of Latium for this reason. This is not to imply that all wars were started by migratory tribesmen looking for the ancient equivalent of *Lebensraum*. Some wars were more readily categorized as raids, to run off livestock or steal crops, or simply to loot and pillage. Other wars were fought for political reasons, often over rights of way and monopoly of trade routes, and the commercial advantages that accrued from controlling them. Commercial rights and privileges feature in some of the treaties that were arranged when the wars ended.

The Romans were by no means always the aggressors in the wars

of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, nor did they always emerge as the victors. The armies came home with bloody noses more often than the historians liked to admit, but one consistent and stubborn characteristic of the Romans emerged quite early, namely that despite their defeats they did not give in. They lost battles, and sometimes wars, but they did not even consider long-term submission. It sometimes took many years, involving several wars and several generations of citizen-soldiers, to reach a satisfactory conclusion – that is, satisfactory to the Romans – but the Romans never acknowledged that they were beaten and never gave up. The tribes around them were nearly as persistent as the Romans, and kept on trying at irregular intervals to make their point, but in the long run Rome kept on raising more armies, and it was her neighbours who crumbled and finally stopped fighting. Periodically an end to hostilities was declared, alliances were forged and treaties were drawn up, but the terms of the treaties were just as easily broken, often by the Romans themselves if changed circumstances and expediency demanded it. The Romans made common cause with other tribes or cities, and most often these tribes and cities were only too willing to throw in their lot with Rome to unite their forces and fight against their mutual enemies, for instance when the Campanians joined the Romans to counter the threat from the Samnites. After the wars ended and the emergency was over, these arrangements did not always work to the advantage of Rome's partners, who were made aware of their inferior standing. Occasionally Rome's allies reasserted their independence and tried to shake off what they saw as Roman domination, but the result, more often than not, was a reaffirmation and strengthening of that domination

The army that Rome assembled to wage these wars was composed of citizens called up at an annual levy, or *legio*, which means 'the choosing', but the word was also applied to the fighting unit itself, and has descended into modern times as legion. Throughout the Republic, armies had to be gathered in this way by levying troops for specific campaigns. There was no regular standing army as there was in Imperial times, with pay and pensions, and opportunities for promotion. Whenever the army was assembled men who had served as centurions in the last war might find themselves in the ranks again, and then, if they were lucky, they might be promoted during the course of the campaign. There was a property qualification for service in the army, so the poorest men who had very small farms or no property at all were normally excluded from service. Of the eligible male population, it is highly unlikely that every single one of them was recruited when campaigns began, which is why Rome was always able to field yet another army when disasters occurred. Due

consideration had to be made for the farming year, to planting and harvest times, and it is probable that in recruiting farmer-soldiers, some able bodied men were left at home to tend the crops and animals, and ensure the food production. Traditionally, the first time that a Roman army was retained under arms beyond the harvest season, and indeed for several years, was at the siege of Veii at the beginning of the fourth century. The state had to introduce payment for the soldiers for the first time to alleviate their problems caused by being under arms for an extended period.

The early Republican army was modelled on the Greek hoplite phalanx. The citizens of the Greek colonies of Italy introduced the system, which was perhaps transmitted to the Romans via the Etruscans, who also adopted the phalanx. This was a heavy-armed infantry army, each soldier carrying a round shield, (*clipeus*) and a long spear. The men lined up in close formation, usually in lines consisting of twelve men, and about eight ranks deep. They overlapped their round shields, and advanced almost as a single unit, bristling with spears, a bit like an ancient forerunner of the tank, or like a roller, which is the literal meaning of phalanx. It was a formidable military machine, but for maximum effectiveness it required the protection and support of cavalry and light-armed troops on the wings. These extra troops would eventually be supplied by the allies of the Romans, since the terms of most alliances included the obligation to raise troops whenever there was a war. One problem that the Romans encountered at the end of the fourth century BC, when they fought in Samnite territory, was that the phalanx was unwieldy in rough terrain, because it was difficult to maintain the vital close formation.

For many years, the annual levy produced only one legion, but by the middle of the fourth century BC, the Romans were often faced with wars on two fronts, and the levy was increased to two legions. By the end of the fourth century, the Romans were regularly raising four legions, and at some point they changed the formation from the phalanx to a looser system based on small sub-divisions of the legion called maniples, which means 'handfuls' of men. The round *clipeus* was abandoned, and an oval shield was substituted, called the *scutum*. It is possible that the soldiers also abandoned the long spears of the phalanx, and started to use javelins instead, but this is a controversial issue. According to Livy each legion of this reformed manipular style was drawn up in three main battle lines, with heavy infantry in the front ranks, assisted by light-armed troops. The front ranks were usually made up of the younger men, and the middle ranks behind them were composed of older men with more experience. The

veterans and the lighter-armed troops brought up the rear. This is a simplistic outline, giving only the main points, the details of which have been debated by scholars at length and in depth, but in general this is the kind of army employed by the Romans against their neighbours, perhaps from the middle of the fourth century BC.

Almost immediately after the end of the monarchy, the Romans were opposed by a coalition of the Latin cities, in a co-ordinated attempt to put an end to the domination of Rome. Modern scholars label this coalition as the Latin League, and at least one ancient historian refers to it by the Greek term *koinon*, which translates as league, and implies that there was such an association, but it is not certain whether the cities made any formal alliance beyond their shared sense of identity and common heritage. The Latins met each year at the sacred site of Ferentina, south of Aricia, to be distinguished from Ferentinum, several kilometres to the east in the territory of the Hernici. As well as conducting the annual ceremonial, the Latins drew up their army at Ferentina if there was to be a campaign, so they were already accustomed to acting in concert and may not have required any formal alliance or documentation to spur them on to concentrate their efforts against Rome.

Whatever the Latins hoped to achieve, they were seriously disappointed when the Romans defeated them at the battle of Lake Regillus in 499 BC. Some years later in 493 BC, a treaty was arranged by the consul Spurius Cassius. If the Latins had been quiescent for the intervening six years, their subsequent history reveals that they were not yet prepared to acknowledge Rome as the leading state and themselves as subordinate to her. For the Romans, it was imperative to work closely with the Latins and to monitor what was happening in their territory, to prevent the tribes all around Latium from taking over parts of it. What threatened Latium ultimately threatened Rome. The terms of the treaty of 493 BC may have become confused with those of later treaties, but it is likely that the main features were worked out in the fifth century, and perhaps revisited in later agreements. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in 493 BC each side agreed to render assistance if the other was threatened, and just as important, they agreed not to assist enemies of either party. The most important feature for the Romans was the contribution of the Latins to the campaign armies. Allies of Rome could look to the Romans for protection, but reciprocally they were expected to levy troops to fight on Rome's behalf. The number of men to be raised was formally agreed and recorded for each allied state or tribe. Though the military contribution was paramount, the treaty took due notice of civilian affairs. Romans and Latins were granted *conubium*, or the right

to intermarry, and *commercium*, which allowed mutual trading and business rights in Rome itself and in the Latin cities. Citizenship was interchangeable. A Roman became a Latin citizen if he resided in a Latin colony, but if he moved back to Rome he resumed his Roman citizenship. A child of a Roman father and a Latin mother was counted a citizen of Rome, and if they were boys they were eligible to serve in the Roman citizen legions.

During the fifth and most of the fourth centuries BC the Romans fought all their immediate neighbours in various campaigns. These wars cannot be documented in detail, in the same way that the campaigns of the later Republic can be described. The surviving accounts of most of the early battles are sketchy and intertwined with legend to such an extent that it is impossible to elucidate what actually happened, save for a few indications of who fought whom and when, what the outcome was, and less often, why they did so, but it is not possible to follow the course of the wars with battle plans, positions of troops, strategic manoeuvres and the like because such information is lacking. Even if a place name is given in any of the sources, the modern location is not always certain, so it is impossible to speculate about the terrain and its influence on the battle.

Rome's neighbours consisted of tribes or cities of varying degrees of sophistication and military prowess. To the south and east of Latium were the Volsci and Aequi, who most often fought independently of each other, but occasionally united to make a concerted effort against Rome if circumstances were favourable. At the beginning of the fifth century the Volsci invaded Latium, sparking off a war which lasted according to traditional dating from 490 to 488 BC. This is the context of the rebellion of Coriolanus, the Roman who had tried to deprive the plebs of their tribunes. He joined the Volsci and fought against Rome, but he was persuaded to withdraw his troops when the Romans sent his mother and his wife to plead with him. He did not come back to Rome and no one knows whether he survived to old age among his adopted people, or was killed by them after the army withdrew. Nor is it known what happened between the Volsci and the Romans.

A few years later the Romans embarked on the first of three wars against the city of Veii, which had been part of the Etruscan sphere of influence since the eighth century BC. Among other grievances, Rome disputed the control of the crossing of the Tiber at Fidenae. The two sides fought each other, on and off, for a long time, culminating in a siege by the Romans which was said to have lasted for ten years. In 396 BC the siege ended in the complete destruction of the city and the absorption of the territory by the Romans. It is significant that the

other Etruscan cities did not unite to oppose Rome on behalf of Veii.

In the middle of the fifth century BC the Aequi threatened Rome, at one point surrounding the consul Lucius Minucius in his camp. The army commanded by the other consul was engaged elsewhere, and the situation was desperate, so the Romans pleaded with Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus to accept the Dictatorship and take the field with another army. According to the legend, Cincinnatus was ploughing on his farm when the senators called on him, but he left this task, took up the Dictatorship, recruited more soldiers, marched to the enemy and defeated them, came home, laid down his office and returned to his farm, all in the breathlessly short time of fifteen days in 458 BC. There seems to have been no conclusive treaty to avert further hostilities, which broke out again on various occasions, until a Roman victory in 431 BC put a temporary end to the endemic fighting. Some time later the Aequi and Volsci pooled their efforts and resources but were defeated once again. A period of relative quiet followed, but the tribes were simply waiting for a more favourable opportunity when Rome was weakened or compromised.

Such an opportunity presented itself after 390 BC, the traditional date according to Varro when the Gauls streamed down from northern Italy and took Rome. The Gallic tribes had settled in the mountains and plains on the south side of the Alps, in an area known as Cisalpine Gaul, literally meaning Gaul on this side of the Alps, or the side nearest the Romans. The Gauls were restless and prone to raiding expeditions to carry off portable wealth and demonstrate their skills as warriors. They were not looking for places to settle, but could cause considerable damage on their way into and out of their raiding zones. The Roman army turned out to try to stop the tribes after they had besieged Clusium. The two sides met at a tributary of the Tiber called the Allia, a name that always recalled utter disaster for the Romans, who turned and fled, scattering all over the area. The road to Rome was open. The Gallic attack on Rome has been played down by modern historians, and indeed it probably attracted heroic hyperbole in later tradition, but the Romans took it seriously enough to evacuate the city, except for a small garrison on the Capitol Hill. There may have been little fighting after the entry into Rome. The Gauls were easily bought off with gold, anxious to return home because they had heard that their own settlements had been attacked. It was not the last Gallic invasion, but it was perhaps the most vivid and traumatic for the Romans, who set up a treasury to finance any future wars against the Gauls. The fund was preserved until the late Republican era, when it was appropriated by Julius Caesar as he was embarking on the civil war with Pompey the Great. Caesar pointed out that since he had

spent the last ten years conquering the Gauls, there was no need to maintain the fund any longer.

Taking advantage of what they assumed was Rome's weakened state after the disaster of the Allia, the loss of an army and the sack of Rome, the Aequi, Volsci and Etruscans joined forces to raise rebellion. The wars continued for years, but the uneasy allies were not sufficiently co-ordinated and Rome eventually defeated them one at a time. The Etruscans made peace in 351 BC, while the Volsci held out until 338, when they made an alliance.

In that same year, the Latins were also finally defeated and brought into an alliance, after two attempts at rebellion had been crushed. The treaty of 493 BC had laid down the ground rules of the relationship between the Romans and Latins, ostensibly mutually advantageous to both sides, but with the passage of time, any sense of equality evaporated and Rome began to dominate. The Latins had furnished troops for Rome for a hundred years before the invasion of the Gauls but, although they fought the battles, they did not enjoy the spoils of war or the benefits of peace, and their interests were swept aside in favour of Rome's when treaties were arranged. After 390 BC, the cohesiveness of the Latin League began to dissolve. Rebellion against Rome was fomenting. Some of the Latin cities remained loyal, but the larger and more important ones allied with the Hernici and the Volsci to try to throw off Roman domination. The only result was defeat by Rome and a new treaty in 358 BC, which may have reiterated or been confused with the original treaty of 493. This time, however, there was not even a pretence that Rome was merely the first city among equals.

By 340 BC the Latins had lost patience with an alliance that increasingly relegated them to inferior status. They allied with the Campanians, likewise the victims of unfair treatment by the Romans. Even the cities which had been loyal in the previous rebellion were now increasingly disaffected and joined in the struggle. It took the Romans two years to win the war, but the defeat of the Latins and their allies was total. New treaties were arranged, not with the Latin League as a corporate association, but individually with each city, including the Campanian cities which had joined the Latins. Some cities were incorporated into the Roman state, and the inhabitants became full Romans citizens, with the right to vote and all the legal privileges that Roman citizenship bestowed (*civitas optimo iure*). Other cities that lay in Campania or in the Volscian territory outside the boundaries of Latium, received a half citizenship, without voting rights (*civitas sine suffragio*), and they were expected to contribute troops when called upon as were the other allied communities. Some

cities which had fought against Rome were punished, and had to hand over some of their territory to the Romans, but for the most part they retained their own governments, with little interference from the Romans except in cases where their own interests would be compromised. Each city retained its rights of intermarriage and trading with Rome, but not with other cities, and they were forbidden to form any kind of alliance or association with any other community. From then onwards they could direct their internal affairs but not their external policies; they were to have the same friends and enemies as Rome, and to fight in Rome's wars. The Campanian and Latin cities were therefore isolated from each other and from all other Italian cities. They were permitted to form a relationship only with Rome. The Latin League was dead, never to be revived.

The Samnites

While these continuous wars were fought with Rome's immediate neighbours throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, a group of tribes to the south was busily expanding and settling, threatening the Greek coastal cities and the Italian inland settlements. The tribes formed and reformed themselves into different groups as they settled down, taking different names. The Romans knew them as the Samnites, who became their fiercest opponents, and the two sides fought with each other in three wars until the beginning of the third century BC, when the Samnites made peace.

Ironically the Romans began their relationship with the Samnites with an alliance formed in 354 BC. It was a temporary marriage of convenience, which averted hostilities between the Samnites and Rome, and made each party stronger against other tribes, principally the fearsome Gauls. The alliance did not last very long. The first Samnite war began in 343 BC, when the Samnites attacked Capua, whose citizens appealed to Rome for help. At the time, the Latins were disaffected and restive, and Rome needed their manpower, so there was a hasty mobilization while the Romans could still call upon Latin manpower, and the Samnites were defeated in 341. In making peace with them, the Romans handed over to the Samnites some Campanian territory, with scant regard to the wishes or needs of the Campanians themselves, who were supposed to be allies of Rome. Then, when the Latins and Campanians rebelled after this roughshod treatment, Rome enlisted Samnite assistance to help to quell the revolt.

The next war broke out in 326 and rumbled on for two decades, collectively labelled the second Samnite war. It was basically a territorial dispute, with a major squabble over the city of Naples. The Romans accused the Samnites of encouraging the Neapolitans to

attack the Campanians, Rome's allies. The Romans had not cared very much when they ceded Campanian territory, but now they were outraged when the city of Naples tried to stake a claim to yet more of it. In 327 the Romans attacked Naples, and the Samnites sent troops to help the Neapolitans, but the city fell to the Romans in 326. From then on there were a series of skirmishes between the Romans and the Samnites, until 321 when the Romans tried to invade Samnium itself. On their way from Campania into Apulia, the Roman army inadvisedly marched through a valley and were ambushed there by the Samnite army. There was no choice except surrender. The Romans were allowed to go free, but only after they had disarmed, shed most of their clothing, and bowed their heads while passing under a makeshift yoke formed from three spears. It was known as the disaster of the Caudine Forks. Until the Romans met the Carthaginians, the Caudine Forks eclipsed the Allia in the annals of spectacular Roman defeats.

The Romans lost some territory to the Samnites, but they were not given to wasting their time in sulking, so they quickly started to wage wars and form alliances in the lands all around the Samnite heartland, gradually creating a Roman-controlled barrier designed to cut off and isolate the Samnites. Protesting, the Samnites invaded Latium in 315 BC. They were victorious against the Romans in that year, but defeated in the next. The Roman victory in 314 BC seems to have stunned the Samnites, affording the Romans the opportunity to continue to strengthen their position, extending their control over much of central Italy in the process. These campaigns were deliberately aggressive, resulting in the annihilation of some tribes and the absorption of their territory. Where they could not annexe, or did not wish to, the Romans made strong alliances. It was clear by now that the Romans were never going to be content with control of the lands bordering Latium. It was time for the tribes and cities which had not yet been assimilated to sink their differences and unite against Rome.

The third Samnite war started in 298 when the Samnites attacked the Lucanians, and Rome came to the assistance of the victims. In 297 the Samnites joined the Etruscans, and in 295 they allied with the Gauls. Before they battled against this alliance, the Romans employed a strategy that was to prove useful later on in the third century BC. By sending a reserve army to attack the Etruscan city of Clusium, they drew the majority of the Etruscan contingent away from the alliance. That left the Samnites and the Gauls, and the Romans met them at the battle of Sentinum. It was a decisive victory for Rome, and probably the first battle which was reliably documented, though the numbers of

men given in the ancient sources vary, and are probably greatly exaggerated. The sources for the events of the next five years have not survived, so it is not clear what happened to the Samnites after this military defeat. The Romans probably harassed them, destroyed crops and settlements, until they sued for peace, in 290 BC.

New Ideas

During the wars with their neighbours, the Romans developed and adapted their political and military organization according to circumstances. In the military sphere, the Romans learned from their experience and were willing to make changes to meet their current needs. In the war against Veii, when the Romans besieged the city allegedly for ten years, the army had to be kept in the field for a much longer period than usual. The campaigning season ought to have ended in the autumn or as winter approached. The soldiers would expect to disband and go home for the harvest, but the siege could not be abandoned, so arrangements had to be made to keep the army up to strength, and to ensure that the men and horses did not starve. Traditionally, it was during the siege of Veii that the Romans began to pay their troops, perhaps from the proceeds of a property tax that was levied at about the same time. The connection with the siege of Veii may be apocryphal, and since the Romans had not yet adopted coinage, the payment probably consisted of supplies and equipment rather than money, but it seems clear that at some point at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries BC the soldiers were no longer expected to serve entirely at their own expense, providing their own equipment and food.

Another innovation concerning the army may have occurred during the wars with the Gauls, or with the Samnites. The Gauls fought in loose open order, relying on the initial overpowering charge to break the enemy ranks, and it required a less rigid formation than the phalanx to oppose them successfully. Similarly, when campaigning in the hills and valleys of Samnite territory, the phalanx was once again at a disadvantage. In these wars, the Romans required some method of hurling missiles against a highly mobile enemy without engaging them in the sort of close battle where the soldiers of the phalanx could use the long spears and considerable weight to overpower the enemy. It was probably these combined experiences that generated the change from the hoplite phalanx to the looser formation of the maniples. Though it is a subject that is fraught with controversy, this may have coincided with the introduction of the *pilum*, the javelin or throwing spear. In the phalanx there would not have been the physical space for the soldiers to throw their spears, but

in the looser formation of the maniples, the javelin would be more easily employed, and its use would facilitate attacks on mobile enemies who could not be engaged by the phalanx.

There were also some developments in the political sphere, brought about because of the need for continuity of command, for more personnel to carry out the increasing number of simultaneous tasks, and for government of new territories at a distance from Rome. These innovations included the creation of the pro-magistracy, the development of alliances, and the establishment of colonies.

The creation of the pro-magistracy was a response to specific circumstances, but was far from being a temporary measure, and eventually became a normal procedure of government. Until the late Republic, the two consuls usually spent their year of office at the head of the armies on campaign, and were usually recalled when their consulship expired. On occasion the Senate could vote for an extension of the term of office if it was deemed necessary. The appointment of the new magistrates would still go ahead as planned for the year, while the retiring consul ceased to be one of the eponymous annual magistrates, but was still authorized to act with the powers of a consul. The first authentically recorded instance of this procedure occurred in 326 BC when the Senate voted an extension of command (*prorogatio imperii*) to the consul Quintus Publilius Philo, whose term of office was due to expire at the very moment when he was about to capture the city of Naples. The Romans understood that it would jeopardize the whole enterprise to substitute a new commander who was unknown to the troops, and who was not fully aware of the military situation and would have to be thoroughly briefed. Rather than recall Philo, the Senate granted him the powers of a consul (*imperium pro consule*) without actually re-appointing him consul, so that he could still command the army but was not involved in the current government of Rome. The powers of a praetor could also be extended in the same way, by the grant of *imperium pro praetore*. The establishment of the pro-magistracy was a useful device that separated the annual magisterial office on the one hand and its function and power on the other, and as Rome expanded and took in more and more territory, it had the advantage of increasing the number of available personnel to carry out administrative tasks at Rome, to govern the provinces, and command the armies. In the later Republic the consuls and praetors customarily remained in Rome during the tenure of their office, and then at the end of their term they were usually appointed to another task, designated by the Senate. This was their *provincia*, which originally denoted any tour of duty, including repair of roads, care of the woods and forests, administration

of the food supply or whatever was deemed the greatest priority. When Rome absorbed territories outside Italy, and required personnel to govern them, the word *provincia* was originally applied to the tour of duty for the governor, and then eventually to the actual territory. Most commonly, as the Republic developed, the retiring consuls and praetors were appointed as governors of the territorial provinces, as proconsuls or propraetors.

In less than thirty years after the conclusion of peace with the Samnites in 290, the Romans very quickly extended their control over the rest of Italy. They had developed useful tools to enable them to do so, and more important, these tools also enabled them to maintain their pre-eminent position. It is one thing to conquer, and quite another to survive long enough to establish successful administrative systems in conquered territory. Roman expansion has been viewed in different lights, depending on the era and context in which various scholars studied the problem. The current distaste for imperialistic dominance, largely based on the experience of horrendous wars of the last hundred years, naturally tends to colour the modern interpretation of the Roman Republic and Empire. The emphasis nowadays is on the less savoury aspects of Rome, on militaristic dominance and oppression, as Roman annexation became a habit, eventually extending beyond Italy and the Mediterranean. But there were benefits as well as obligations in belonging to the Roman commonwealth, and dominance was never total, obliterating all trace of native languages, local laws and government, festivals and religious practices. Treaties of alliance usually preserved local customs, and there was little Roman interference in local government. The allied cities were allowed considerable autonomy, and Romanization was voluntary rather than forcibly imposed. Military needs were always of prime importance to the Romans when entering into alliances or any agreements with other states. Whether the alliances were imposed on defeated cities or tribes, or whether they were formed in peaceful circumstances with an exchange of mutual benefits, all the allies were under obligation to fight for Rome in the event of a war. On the other hand the allied cities or tribes could appeal to Rome for help if they were attacked.

One of the most important methods of controlling and protecting newly acquired territory was the establishment of colonies, which served the purpose of finding settlements and land allotments for surplus population from Rome and eventually from other cities, and also of guarding strategic points and protecting routes, though it has been questioned whether they should be interpreted as military settlements established purely for this purpose. Livy called the early

colonies both barriers and gateways. The very early colonies of the late fourth century BC consisted of Roman citizens who retained their full voting rights, as the settlements were planted within Roman territory. In the fifth and fourth centuries Latin colonies were set up on the edges of Latium, and the population was probably drawn from different groups of people, who all became citizens of their particular colonies. The colonies were for the most part autonomous, self governing except for foreign policy and relations with other cities, which was firmly controlled by Rome. Sometime later, the establishment of Latin colonies was extended to other areas outside Latium, but this title does not mean that the settlers were all ethnic Latins. It indicates that they were of Latin status (*ius Latii*), which conferred specific rights and obligations. The main obligation was to provide troops to fight alongside the Roman legions, but there were compensations, in that they were afforded Roman protection if they were threatened, and citizens of Latin colonies were allowed to intermarry with Romans (*conubium*) and to trade with them (*commercium*). If they settled in the city of Rome, Latins acquired Roman citizenship.

Thus there were four different status groups within the Roman system, comprising full citizens with voting rights in Rome, who were allowed to stand for election to the Roman magistracies; then there were Roman citizens with *civitas sine suffragio*, which gave them various rights and privileges, but they were not allowed to vote or to stand for election to magistracies in Rome. A third category comprised the citizens with Latin rights. Last of all there were the allies, whose rights and obligations to Rome were more or less uniform but differed in detail according to their circumstances, except for the fact that all allies were expected to contribute troops for the army.

As the Samnite wars ended in 290 BC, the machinery for government and control of a much wider area than Latium was already in place. Rome was poised to take over the rest of Italy. There was a long way to go before the establishment of an Empire, but Rome was coming to the notice of the world beyond the Italian peninsula. Within the next few years she would become an important player in international affairs.

Strong Rivals: The Republic Meets Foreign Enemies 290–201 BC

It is of tremendous advantage for modern historians that for the period after the Samnite wars the sources are much more reliable than for the preceding centuries, and the chronology of political and military events, though far from perfect, is not quite as confused. The heroic mythology of the early Republic gives way to more sober history, and properly chronicled events and more sharply defined personalities begin to emerge, probably because the first historian of Rome, Fabius Pictor, could rely upon the living memory of his contemporaries, and perhaps utilize more complete official records.

The Roman world of the third century BC was involved in almost constant warfare, first with neighbouring Italian tribes and then with foreign enemies. The first half of the century was a period of endemic unrest, while the tribes and emergent states in Italy fought each other for a variety of reasons, but mostly because of population pressure and the need for more cultivable land, or for the acquisition of portable wealth. Allegiances changed rapidly in Italy. The Romans and the Italian tribes formed alliances and used the manpower furnished by their allies to combat some of their enemies, and then just as easily they allied with their former enemies and fought against their erstwhile allies instead. These chaotic shifting alliances ceased less than thirty years after the defeat of the Samnites, by which time Rome had finally brought all of central and southern Italy under her control. Scholars estimate that between 338 and 264 BC, Roman territory increased from about five thousand square kilometres to an area more than five times as large. Polybius, writing in the second century BC, was amazed that it had taken such a short time to extend Roman control over the whole peninsula. It is misleading to label the process the unification of Italy, except in the sense of bringing the various tribes under Roman rule. There was no absolute unity or uniformity in Italy, even during the Empire. Romanization was not enforced, and except in so far as Latin was universal for administrative purposes, the allied cities and tribes continued to speak their own languages, to worship their own gods and to carry on their own government within the wider Roman framework. Ethnic and cultural diversity was never totally stamped out in Italy.

For nearly fifty years after the victories over the Italians, the

Romans fought major wars against the Carthaginians, the first of which nearly, but not quite, brought Rome to its knees. The seventeen years of warfare with Hannibal, on Italian soil, was devastating but did not result in the annihilation of the Romans, largely because of their own grim resolve not to give in, and because the extra military manpower furnished by the Italians enabled the Romans to sustain several catastrophic defeats and to fight wars simultaneously on more than one front, in Italy, Spain, Macedonia and Africa. At the end of the third century BC, Rome emerged stronger than ever, as a dominant power in the Mediterranean world. The success of the Romans was due to several things, among them the effectiveness of their political and military institutions, their flexibility in adapting the old forms to new uses, their intransigent refusal to accept defeat, their pragmatic and unsentimental ruthlessness on the one hand and on the other their readiness to share the spoils of war and land with their allies in return for co-operation in military affairs.

Politics in Rome

Politically the Romans still struggled against the possibility of dominance by one man. The governing body was still the Senate, where the knowledge, experience and initiative of individual senators combined for the corporate benefit of the state, but there were dangers when some senators gained tremendous power. The main reason why certain families or individuals started to dominate arose from the fact that the people tended to vote perpetually for the men in whom they had confidence, especially in times of crisis, so that those who had won victories or solved social and political problems proved more popular than others. Accomplishments in war and politics tended to run in families, so a *de facto* ruling coterie of influential clans emerged where the family name alone could ensure success at the elections.

At the end of the fourth century BC, the senator Appius Claudius had caused a major disruption to the smooth functioning of the state by trying to hang onto his powers as censor after his term of office expired. The censorship was not an annually elected post, and was held for eighteen months. Nothing at all is known of Appius Claudius before he was made censor in 312 BC, but he was presumably an illustrious ex-consul, since the office of censor was the highest and most prestigious in the state, usually the culmination of a long and successful career. In keeping with the Roman collegiate system, there were usually two censors, but in the case of Appius Claudius, the influence of his colleague was nullified. One of the functions of the office was the reform of the senate, a task which Appius Claudius

embarked on with enthusiasm, filling the Senate with men of his own choice, while ousting those of whom he did not approve, and by-passing suitable candidates who might otherwise have become senators. He even brought the sons of freedmen into the Senate. This was shocking enough, but another son of a freedman, who acted as secretary to Claudius, was allowed to hold a magistracy. This went against tradition and offended the upper classes.

With a finger in every pie and possessed of grandiose designs, Appius Claudius instigated massive public works, such as the road and the aqueduct named after him. The Aqua Appia brought water to Rome from the Sabine Hills, and the Via Appia connected the city with Capua. Had there been railways in Rome he would certainly have made the trains run on time. He reformed the voting system to give the poorer people more power, removing them from the single group into which they were all compressed, where their vote counted for very little, and distributing them among all the voting tribes, so that their voting powers counted for more. He appeared to be a man of the people, but he was not trying to institute a democratic form of government because he was not really interested in the welfare of the lower classes, except in so far as their gratitude for the benefits he brought them would engender loyalty to him and buy him votes. His example would be followed by several demagogues in the later Republic. At the end of his term of office, Appius Claudius refused to lay down his powers, extending them for as much as four years according to some sources. His plans for Rome were too ambitious for the constrictions of a single term of office, so he tried to adapt the system to his own needs. Much later, Gaius Julius Caesar would face the same problem of long term plans requiring a corresponding long term continuity of power, and would go about achieving it in similar fashion. Unlike Caesar, however, Appius Claudius evaded assassination, and in his old age he still went on to play a part in the politics and wars of Rome.

In order to combat the accrual of personal power as exemplified by Appius Claudius, laws were passed which clearly illustrate what had been happening in Roman political life. It was made illegal to hold more than one magistracy at a time, and a law was passed to ensure that no one could become consul for a further term until ten years had passed. Although it was possible to extend the powers of the consul after his term of office had ceased, by the procedure known as *prorogatio imperio*, the procedure was used less often, in case certain men adopted the habit of angling for an extension of their powers.

In the second decade of the third century BC, the old rivalry between the plebs and patricians finally petered out. Several plebeian

families had already been ennobled and had gained political prestige and powers, and ceased to be representative of the wider cause of the plebs in general, who were perennially oppressed by debts and poverty. At some point between 289 and 286 BC there was some sort of trouble when the plebs went on strike again, the principal cause being the problem of debt. A plebeian called Quintus Hortensius, about whom nothing is known, was made Dictator and empowered to sort out the problems. He passed a law (*lex Hortensia*) which solved the problems and also brought an end to the struggle of the orders between plebs and patricians, but it is not at all certain exactly how this was achieved. The *concilium plebis* was formally recognized but by no means granted sovereign powers. This political assembly perhaps attained greater influence than it had previously enjoyed, but it could not direct policy or make laws. The Senate still governed the state and the magistrates framed all proposals, to which the *concilium plebis* could merely say yes or no. 'Power to the people' never achieved more than this in Rome, despite the machinations of Appius Claudius and the passage of the *lex Hortensia*. Chronic debt remained a problem, and the old division of plebs and patricians was commuted into a similar one between rich and influential and poor and ineffective.

The Conquest of Italy

In northern Italy the first signs of trouble in which Rome was involved started when the Gallic tribe of the Senones, who had settled north of Picenum, attacked the city of Arretium (Arezzo). The Romans agreed to relieve the city, but initially met with defeat by the Gauls. True to form, they rallied, assembled another army, and in turn defeated the Senones, severely enough to force them to make peace and cede their territory, which was added to the *Ager Gallicus* in 283.

Other Gallic tribes watched as this occurred, and while they were not altogether sympathetic to the Senones or wished to take up their cause, they realized that the same fate might await them, and determined to resist Rome. The Boii decided to make common cause with the Etruscans, who also wanted to shake off Roman control and welcomed the extra manpower that the Gauls could provide. By 280 they too had been defeated by the Romans, in a battle near Volsinii. The Etruscans were not yet ready to lie down in complete submission, but had their own internal problems, in the form of a dissident populace in several cities struggling against the rule of their aristocrats. The Romans always preferred to deal with elite groups, or ruling classes, and agreed to help the Etruscans reassert aristocratic control. When the disturbances were quelled, the Romans took over some Etruscan territory and planted a colony at Cosa, which was not

precisely the result that the Etruscans had wished for. They rebelled, but the only result was the destruction of the city of Volsinii and an end to Etruria as an independent territory in 265.

By this time Roman control of Italy was complete. While the struggle between Etruscans and Romans was playing itself out in the north, trouble had been brewing in the south. The Italian tribes such as the Lucanians and Bruttians were locked into sporadic warfare with the Greek colonies which had been established there for centuries, partly to siphon off surplus population from mainland Greece. Independent to a fault, the Greek cities of southern Italy had not coalesced and had no concept of belonging to an overall Greek community, except perhaps in the cultural sense. They were frequently hard pressed by the Italian tribes, among whom the principal aggressors were most often the fierce Lucanians. In the time-honoured tradition, the usual ploy was to turn to Greece itself for assistance. The King of Sparta, Archidamus, rescued the colonies from the Lucanians, but was unfortunately killed, then it was the turn of King Alexander of Epirus, who defeated both the Lucanians and Bruttians. The trouble was that he did not return to Epirus and leave the newly rescued colonies to themselves, but decided that they would all be better off if they could be welded together with himself as ruler. He was killed in 330 BC. Next, Cleonymus of Sparta was brought in against the Lucanians, and Agathocles of Syracuse fought the Bruttians. Everything unravelled when Agathocles died, and then one of the major Greek colonies, the city of Tarentum took the lead. This was one of the most successful cities, with control of the best harbour in southern Italy and rich agricultural land producing lots of grain in the hinterland. Wealth and status enabled Tarentum to help other cities. The Romans and Tarentines were known to each other, and entered into a treaty probably in the mid-fourth century BC, one of the terms of which was that the Romans should not sail their warships within a certain distance of the harbour of Tarentum.

The Tarentines were not all-powerful, however, and when the city of Thurii was attacked they could not help, so Thurii asked for assistance from the Romans, indicating how far the reputation of Rome had travelled. The Lucanians and Bruttians were duly defeated, and then as a precaution against further attacks, the Romans placed a garrison in Thurii. It may have been sound military sense, but it upset the Tarentines, especially when the Romans started to form alliances with other Greek cities. Next, and even worse, they established a colony in Tarentine territory and, contrary to the terms of the treaty, they sailed their warships into the Gulf of Tarentum. The Tarentines attacked the ships, and threw the garrison out of Thurii. War with the

Romans was a daunting prospect, so the Tarentines asked another King of Epirus for help. This was Pyrrhus, an accomplished soldier with a taste for adventure. He arrived in about 281 BC and remained at large in Italy and Sicily for most of the next decade. He came fully equipped with the Macedonian style phalanx, clouds of cavalry and archers, and something the Romans had never seen before, namely elephants trained for battle. When the two armies met at Heraclea, the elephants contributed heavily to the defeat of the Romans, but although beaten the Romans had given a good account of themselves.

Pyrrhus followed up his victory by invading Latium, and sent his envoy Cineas to offer terms. The Senate, spurred on by Appius Claudius who was now old, venerable and blind, rejected the terms because, as Appius reminded the senators, Pyrrhus was unlikely to make a treaty and then cheerfully go home. While he was still in Italy, there could be no peace. Another battle was fought at Asculum in Apulia, and the Romans were defeated again, but they had inflicted tremendous damage on Pyrrhus's army. The king remarked that any more victories like that one, and he would be finished, thus ensuring his lasting fame in the modern phrase 'a Pyrrhic victory'. The Romans had been badly mauled, and it was said that they were considering backing down and accepting peace terms, but were saved by the Carthaginians, who came up with an offer of alliance and cash. The Carthaginians were afraid that Pyrrhus, who had been asked to aid the Sicilian Greeks, would prove extremely detrimental to Carthaginian trading interests if he decided to intervene.

He did. He may have been influenced by his restless quest for adventure, and the more practical consideration that Sicily was a fertile land producing quantities of grain, and possessed good harbours. The Greek cities were constantly menaced by the Mamertines, a group of mercenaries from Campania who had been originally hired by King Agathocles of Syracuse to augment his troops. When the King died, no one was interested in employing the mercenaries, much less paying them, so they turned feral and seized Messina (modern Messina), which they used as a base for expeditions of plunder and pillage of any towns and settlements within their reach.

The Mamertines were not the only threat to the Sicilians, who hoped that Pyrrhus would rid them of the Carthaginians as well. From 278 to the beginning of 275 BC, Pyrrhus took on the dual task and succeeded in ejecting the Carthaginians from the whole island, except for Lilybaeum. The wily Sicilians had no intention of allowing Pyrrhus to become their next overlord, so they said thank you and goodbye and made a separate peace with Carthage. Pyrrhus, now redundant in

Sicily, returned to Italy in the spring of 275. The Romans had taken advantage of the respite afforded by Pyrrhus's absence to recoup their losses and raise more troops. The contribution of their allies enabled them to gather sufficient manpower to face Pyrrhus again with more confidence, especially as they had learned a lot from him and put their knowledge to good use. When the armies clashed at Beneventum, the general Manius Curius Dentatus managed to turn the enemy's war elephants back into their own ranks, a significant factor in the defeat of Pyrrhus. The King decided to withdraw altogether, but placed a garrison in Tarentum before he left Italy. His adventuring was ended when he was killed in Greece in 272. The Greek cities were left without a leader, and even Tarentum could not take on the role of protector. The Pyrrhic garrison surrendered to Rome, and Tarentum became an ally like other Greek cities.

Rome was now free to concentrate on tidying up and securing control of southern Italy. Rebellious tribes were subdued, the Samnites gave up lands, colonies were founded, the Lucanians surrendered Paestum, and the Bruttians relinquished their forests. The Romans always recognized and exploited whatever was useful to them, but they also shared some of the benefits with their allies, at least at this stage. With the whole of Italy under Roman control, each city or community in separate alliance and contributing manpower and war material for the protection of the whole, Rome was in an extremely strong position. For the first time since the foundation of the Republic the Romans could imagine themselves on a par with Carthage, Macedonia, Syria and Ptolemaic Egypt. In the course of the next two centuries Rome would absorb them all. The first contest was with Carthage.

The First Punic War

Carthage was at least as old as Rome, having been founded probably in the eighth century BC by the Phoenicians, who had reached a more sophisticated and advanced culture than the early Romans. The Phoenicians were seafarers whose trade networks extended beyond the Mediterranean, and their North African colony of Carthage likewise depended on commerce for its livelihood. The Romans called the Phoenicians, including the Carthaginians, the Poeni, hence the wars with Carthage were called the Punic wars, as per the Latin term.

The city of Carthage was administered and organized in similar fashion to Rome, in that the Senate was the governing body, with a smaller group whose task was to prepare business for the meetings, and an assembly of the people who elected the magistrates and the generals. The two chief magistrates were called *suffetes*, who presided

over the Senate, and whose responsibilities included all religious, judicial and financial functions of the state. As in Rome, groups of aristocratic families had emerged, regularly squabbling with each other for political pre-eminence, and also, as in Rome, the status of the ruling class was based on wealth, but Carthaginian wealth derived from sea-borne commerce, whereas Roman wealth derived from land and agriculture, which highlights the differences between the two cities. This is not to infer that the Carthaginians did not engage in agriculture, nor that the Romans were strangers to the sea and trading activities. Just as the war with Hannibal was beginning, Gaius Flaminius passed a law that limited the number of cargo ships owned by Roman senators, so clearly trade was an established part of Roman life by the end of the third century BC. In military affairs, the greater emphasis in Rome was on land-based armies, and in Carthage the emphasis was on naval strength. While Rome levied its own citizens and allies to form their armies, the Carthaginians employed their citizens as crews for their ships and for their armies they bought in mercenaries when necessary, so their troops were composed of Africans, Spaniards, Greeks and some Italians from southern Italy. Provided that they received their pay and fair treatment, these mercenary armies fought very well for Carthage.

Rome and Carthage were already acquainted, allegedly having drawn up their first treaty at the end of the sixth century BC., and their second at some point in the fourth century, but whether this was at the beginning or the end of the century is disputed. In 279 when Pyrrhus was careering around Italy and Sicily, the Carthaginians offered help to Rome, largely because they hoped to draw Pyrrhus away from their commercial interests in Sicily, not being overly concerned about what he might do to the Romans in Italy itself. In all treaties, commercial considerations were of paramount importance to Carthage.

The first clash between the two cities came in 264. It did not start out as a direct confrontation, but Rome answered an appeal from the Mamertines of Messina in Sicily, for help against Hiero, King of Syracuse, who attacked them in 265. The Mamertines had enjoyed nearly twenty years of brigandage against the Greek cities, especially Syracuse, so most of the inhabitants of Sicily no doubt thought that they deserved everything that they got from Hiero. The trouble was that the situation was not as straightforward as it seemed, because the Mamertines had also asked the Carthaginians for help, who had responded by installing a garrison in Messina. The Romans were fully aware of this when they debated whether or not to get involved in the war, because it would mean that they would be fighting not just

Hiero, but Carthage too, a much stronger power. From the Roman and the Carthaginian point of view, the conflict was nothing to do with the poor defenceless Mamertines who needed help, but about control of Messina and the Straits named after the city, between Sicily and Italy. The Romans construed the possible Carthaginian seizure of Messina as a threat to the security of Italy, a concept most commonly dismissed by modern scholars as a feeble excuse for Empire building. Another consideration, for Roman senators as for Pyrrhus, was the fact that Sicily was fertile and an abundant source of grain. It may be the case that the Romans were planning ahead, prompted by an acquisitive urge for food and wealth, but sometimes governments do not act according to sober reality, finding themselves overtaken by perceived threat, and so they make pre-emptive strikes on that basis. The Carthaginians may have had no interest whatsoever in an invasion of southern Italy, but they possessed the strongest naval force in the Mediterranean, and if they wished to do so they could make life very difficult for the coastal cities by perpetual hit and run raids. Worse still, if they were to decide that the control of both sides of the Straits of Messina would be beneficial to their trading ventures, and accordingly made a permanent settlement in Italy, the Romans would probably find it more difficult to dislodge them. Better to stop them in their tracks before they even thought of it.

Before the Romans decided to embark on a war outside Italy, the matter was brought before the people's assembly, though it is not specifically recorded which of the assemblies was approached. The people would be primed accordingly, and voted for the war. A levy was called for two legions under one of the consuls, and the army set out for Messina. Part of the force sailed into the harbour there, which encouraged the Mamertines to eject the Carthaginian garrison, because it seemed that an alliance with Rome was now the better option. The war might have ended there, but the Carthaginians asserted themselves and made an alliance with Hiero of Syracuse. Just as Rome was suspicious of the Carthaginian designs on Messina, Carthage was suspicious of Roman intentions in Sicily, especially since Rome had just gobbled up all of southern Italy, converting all the cities and communities into Roman allies.

If the Romans wanted to pursue the war now, it would mean fighting Syracuse and Carthage. Typically they attended to one enemy at a time. In 263 they raised another army and concentrated their efforts on Hiero and the Syracusans, who, after being mauled by the Romans during their first attacks, swiftly decided that they were up against a stronger force than they could muster, and laid down their arms. Hiero allied with Rome against Carthage.

The Romans were now strong enough to challenge Carthage over control of Sicily. They started by attacking Agrigentum, where the Carthaginians had placed a garrison. It fell in 262, and the Romans enslaved the survivors. There could be no clearer indication of Roman intentions to oust the Carthaginians from Sicily, but it was also clear that while Rome was supreme in fighting on land, Carthage was supreme in fighting at sea. The Romans had been aware of the importance of naval power since the end of the fourth century BC, when they had appointed two officials, the *duoviri navales*, to direct operations, but they relied upon their coastal allies, the *socii navales*, to provide ships and crews. The warships that sailed into the Gulf of Tarentum would be provided by the allies, perhaps part of their modest fleet of no more than twenty triremes. In a trireme, each man operated one oar, and the oars were grouped in banks of three. The much more powerful quinquereme had a single bank of oars with five men to each oar, but the Romans had not yet felt the need for these ships. When they met the Carthaginians at sea the Romans changed their minds.

By 260 BC, the Romans felt ready for naval warfare, with a new fleet of a hundred quinqueremes and some twenty triremes. The story goes that they modelled their ships on a captured Carthaginian quinquereme, but the same story is told once again in connection with the blockade of Lilybaeum when the Romans captured the quinquereme of a famous blockade runner. There may have been some characteristics that were new to the Romans, but the shipbuilders of the Italian coasts would be sufficiently well acquainted with warship design to be able to produce the vessels of Rome's first large fleet. The speed and scale of the achievement was truly impressive. A supreme effort was made to build ships and find crews, and by the time they met the Carthaginians at the battle of Mylae in 260 BC, the Romans had assembled their fleet, commanded by the consul Gaius Duilius. They had also invented a grappling hook that allowed them to draw enemy ships closer and then board them, so that they could employ their soldiers as if they were fighting on land. This innovation helped the Romans to win their first naval victory.

Encouraged by their success, the Romans began to over-reach themselves. They decided to carry the war into Africa, and in 256 BC they assembled a very large fleet and thousands of men under the consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Manlius Vulso Longus. When the Carthaginian fleet sailed to intercept them, the Romans won another naval victory at the battle of Ecnomus off the Sicilian coast. They lost twenty-four of their own ships, but sank or captured nearly a hundred of the Carthaginian fleet. Regulus now sailed for Africa, where he was

so successful at first that the Carthaginians were ready to make peace, but on hearing the terms that were to be imposed on them they decided that they had nothing to lose by continuing the war. They called in the services of Xanthippus from Sparta, who thrashed the Romans and took Regulus prisoner. This was a severe disgrace, which the Romans found hard to accept, entering into legend to explain it away. The strange tale of Regulus emphasizes the stern and virtuous intractability of the Romans. The Carthaginians allegedly sent him back to Rome to deliver their terms, with the solemn promise that if he could not persuade the Romans to make peace, he would return to Carthage for judgement. When he arrived in Rome, Regulus argued against making peace, and dutifully returned to Carthage and execution.

The Roman fleet took a battering from a storm when the remnants of Regulus's troops were rescued from Africa. They lost many ships and what was left of the army, but within a couple of years they were active in Sicily again, with the Carthaginians bottled up in Drepana (modern Trapani) and Lilybaeum, near the modern town of Marsala. The Roman attempts to besiege Lilybaeum and blockade it from the sea dragged on for years, because the Carthaginians could expertly navigate through the shoals outside the harbour and could keep Lilybaeum supplied. The blockade of Drepana fared no better, since the commander, Publius Claudius Pulcher, the son of the infamous Appius Claudius, failed to watch all the entrances to the harbour, so the Carthaginians came out and attacked his fleet from the rear. It was said that Claudius Pulcher brought the defeat on himself, because he had ignored the omens and offended the gods. He was told that the sacred chickens on board ship refused to eat, and he should not engage the enemy, but he declared that they would drink instead and threw them into the sea. He was prosecuted for treason and died shortly afterwards. The situation was made even worse when what remained of the Roman fleet was destroyed in yet another storm.

In 247, when the war had been going on for several years, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca, took over in Sicily and began to turn the tables on the Romans. He occupied the fortress of Eryx, took every opportunity to harass the Roman armies in Sicily and also raided the Italian coast. By 242 BC, the Romans were almost exhausted. They were bankrupt, short of manpower and needed yet another fleet. There were no resources to build one, so the senators decided to use their own funds to pay the bills. When the new ships were ready, the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus took command.

Catulus attempted to cut the supply lines of the Carthaginian citadels of Drepana, Lilybaeum and Eryx, by blockading them from the

sea, but he was wounded and had to relax his attention while he recuperated. He used his recovery period to put into effect two aspects of warfare that the Romans rather neglected, training and intelligence gathering. He set about training his sailors in naval fighting, and found out as much as he could about Carthaginian military and naval dispositions and procedures. Consequently, when the Carthaginians put to sea in spring 241 BC with supplies for their Sicilian garrisons, Catulus was ready for them. Despite the strong March winds which threatened to wreck the Roman fleet, Catulus risked a battle off Aegates (modern Aegusa) not far from Lilybaeum, because he realized that he would never have such an opportunity again. The Romans sank about fifty Carthaginian ships, captured seventy, and took over 1,000 prisoners. The victory finally put an end to the war. It had lasted for twenty-three years.

Between the Wars

As part of the peace terms, Rome gained control of Sicily, and a large indemnity was imposed on Carthage that would help the Romans recoup some of the costs of the wars. The Carthaginians were in no condition to argue or carry on hostilities, because they now faced a severe military problem at home. Their mercenary armies had not been paid and were unlikely to see any cash while Carthage was in such a weak condition and had been deprived of the Sicilian ports so vital to commerce. The mercenaries naturally agitated for fair treatment and finally started a rebellion which the Carthaginian commander Hamilcar Barca took three years to quell. The Romans lent assistance to the Carthaginians to combat the mercenaries. They could have sat back to watch as the Carthaginians went under, but at least Carthage was an organized state and well known to the Romans, whereas if the city was taken over by a band of rampaging, unscrupulous mercenaries, this would require a different approach and probably a fresh war to eradicate them.

At about this time, the Romans were handed Sardinia on a plate. The Carthaginian garrison troops were finding it difficult to keep the natives under control, and were not receiving any help from home. They appealed to Rome for assistance. The Romans politely refused at first but, when the revolt of the Carthaginian mercenaries was over, they changed their minds. The troops sent from Carthage to help the original garrison soon joined with them in asking once more for Roman intervention. This time the Romans accepted the challenge. The Carthaginians attempted to recover control of Sardinia, a natural reaction since Sicily was already lost, but the Romans converted these efforts into an act of aggression against themselves, and declared war

on Carthage. Since they were certainly not ready to fight another war with Rome, the Carthaginians backed down. They surrendered Sardinia and Corsica as well, and agreed to pay yet more cash as indemnity. On this occasion, hostilities were averted.

Both the Romans and the Carthaginians were occupied with their own affairs for most of the next two decades. From now onwards the Romans were increasingly drawn into foreign wars in order to protect the interests of weaker states which appealed to them for help against their oppressors, and then against other neighbouring states which felt threatened by Roman interference, even though Rome did not annexe territory at this stage and maintain a permanent presence in lands outside Italy. The first hostilities began after the death of King Agron of the Illyrians, in 231. Agron had formed an alliance with the King of Macedon, and had welded the tribesmen of the Adriatic coast into a nascent state, for which the Roman name, when the area became a province, was Illyricum. After the death of Agron, his widow Queen Teuta pursued his aggressive policy of attacking the cities of the western coast of Greece, and by means of robust piracy and raids she also threatened the Greek colonies of Italy. In the guise of protector of the Greeks, Rome went to war in 229, combining a strong fleet and army to operate on land and sea, to put a stop to Teuta's raids. The Queen was compelled to give up the territories that she had taken over, and the Romans awarded some of them to the rulers who had helped them in the war, such as Demetrius of Pharos, who was confirmed in his own territory and gained more besides.

After about three years of comparative peace, the Romans fought a defensive war with the Gallic tribes who had settled on the south side of the Alps, in the area known as Cisalpine Gaul. Two tribes joined with Rome against a coalition of four other tribes, which included the Boii and the Insubres. The two consuls for 225 each raised an army, one stationed at Ariminum to watch for the Gauls as they came south, and the other sent to Sardinia in case the Carthaginians used the opportunity to regain the island while Rome was preoccupied in the north. The consul at Ariminum heard that the Gauls had by-passed him and gone headlong for Etruria, so he followed as fast as possible, and while the tribesmen were making their way back northwards, laden with booty, the other Roman army from Sardinia disembarked and managed to form up ahead of them. A great battle was fought at Telamon, with the Gauls disastrously trapped between two armies. They gave a good account of themselves and one of the Roman consuls was killed, but in the end the tribesmen were almost wiped out. The Romans spent the next few years campaigning against the Boii and Insubres, and then subduing the

inhabitants of the whole area south of the Alps. By 219, only the Ligurians remained outside Roman control in northern Italy.

Just as the wars with the Gauls were ending, trouble broke out again in Illyricum. Demetrius of Pharos proved to be a turncoat, joining forces with Antigonos Doson, the new and vigorous King of Macedon, who embarked on an expansionist policy from 222 BC onwards, managing within a startlingly short space of time to take over nearly the whole of Greece. Sheltering under his alliance with Antigonos, Demetrius attacked some of the communities of Illyricum that had been taken under Rome's wing, and in order to protect them the Romans mobilized for a war, labelled by modern historians the second Illyrian war. There had been no treaties or formal alliances between the Romans and the various cities or communities under Roman protection, and probably no obligation other than a promise to go to war on their behalf, but strong powers just across the Adriatic menaced more than the Illyrian communities, so it was in their own interests that the Romans made war. By 219 BC the threatened cities were liberated, and Demetrius was forced to flee to Macedon, where Antigonos had been succeeded by the new king, Philip V. Having achieved what they set out to do, the Romans went home. They left the situation as it had been before the war and did not annexe Illyrian territory. They made no incursions into Macedon, but Philip V strongly resented their interference, biding his time until he was strong enough to strike back.

While the Romans were engaged in these various wars, the Carthaginians were quiescent in Africa, but were steadily gaining power in Spain. After quelling the revolt of the mercenaries, in 237 BC Hamilcar Barca turned his attention to Carthaginian possessions in Spain, where he hoped to revive the fortunes of his native city and compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. The Carthaginians had once controlled large areas of Spain, but a combination of opposition from the inhabitants of Marseilles, who were not tolerant of competition in trading ventures, and incursions by the native Iberians, had whittled Carthaginian acquisitions down to a handful of the old Phoenician cities, principally Gades (modern Cadiz), the centre of trade with the west.

Hamilcar has been accused of using Spain as a base for raising and training an army that he intended to use against the Romans in the future, and of instilling into his more famous son Hannibal a deep-rooted loathing of Rome. This is the Roman legendary interpretation to explain their long struggle with Hannibal. After the Carthaginian defeat in 241, Hamilcar may not have harboured any such intention of opening further hostilities with Rome. He required an army to protect

the Carthaginian cities against the native Iberians while he exploited the wealth of the country, not least the silver mines which produced vast quantities of precious metal to boost the depleted coffers of Carthage and perhaps his own private funds too. He and his family assumed princely status in Spain and, as long as he did not use his power against Carthage itself, the government there acquiesced. Hamilcar was still bringing the cities of Spain back under Carthaginian control in 229 BC, when he was accidentally drowned while laying siege to one of them. He had three young sons, the eldest of whom was Hannibal, aged about eighteen, not yet old enough or experienced enough to fill his father's place. Instead, Hamilcar's son-in-law Hasdrubal took over, founding another city, New Carthage, or Cartagena, which functioned as a supply base for his troops.

The inhabitants of Massilia were increasingly alarmed at the growing powers of Hamilcar and his successor Hasdrubal, and appealed to Rome. As a result, the Romans sent an embassy and came to an arrangement with Hasdrubal. They proposed that Spain should be divided by the River Ebro, and the Carthaginians should not interfere in the lands to the north of it, but were free to act in the area to the south, despite the fact that the Massilians dwelt there and depended on their trading connections for their livelihood. After promising to help and then ignoring the interests of the Massilians, the Romans went on to make nonsense of the agreement by entering into an alliance, probably without the formality of a treaty, with the city of Saguntum, which had appealed to them for assistance. The city lay south of the Ebro, in Hasdrubal's sphere of influence, so it was clear that the Romans did not feel obliged to obey the rules that they laid down for other people.

If Hasdrubal had lived longer it is possible that he would have found a way of accommodating the Romans, but he was assassinated in 221, and his power passed to his brother-in-law, Hamilcar Barca's eldest son, Hannibal, now in his twenties. When Saguntum, allied to Rome, was attacked by a Spanish tribe allied to Carthage, the scene was set for another conflict between the two great powers, sparked off by their satellites, and cultivated by the reluctance of either of the major powers to compromise. The Romans sent an embassy in 219 BC to protest at the attack on Saguntum. Hannibal referred the matter to Carthage, and during the consequent delay, he mobilized to blockade Saguntum. After eight months the city fell to him. Despite their original protests, the Romans did nothing about it. This encouraged Hannibal to go even further, deliberately crossing the Ebro into the forbidden northern zone. This time the Romans did react. The second Punic war had begun.

The Second Punic War 218–201 BC

Rome prepared by raising two armies for the consuls of 218, hoping to wage war outside Italy. The consul Publius Cornelius Scipio set off overland for Spain to deal with Hannibal, and the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus embarked for Sicily, a staging post on the way to Africa where he would deal with Carthage. In the event the Roman plans were thwarted before they had been put into practice. Their intention of attacking the Carthaginians on their own territory was a perfectly sound strategy, but Hannibal had the same idea, and had already marched towards Italy before the Romans knew he had mobilized. Scipio heard the news when he arrived at the River Rhone, by which time Hannibal had already crossed the river and was preparing to tackle the Alpine passes. Scipio failed to bring him to battle to stop his progress into Italy, and had to make new plans. He decided not to abandon the Spanish campaign, entrusting the conduct of the war to his younger brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio. As consul he had the legal right to bestow praetorian powers on Gnaeus Scipio, so that he could command the armies. The intention was to keep the Carthaginians in check in Spain, and especially to prevent Hannibal's brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, from raising more troops and bringing them to join Hannibal. The consul then took part of the army intended for Spain, and marched into Italy along the coastal route, chasing after Hannibal and hoping to get there first, but when he arrived he learned that the Carthaginians were through the Alps and had defeated the tribe of the Taurini, around modern Turin. The Gallic tribes of northern Italy who had been recently defeated by the Romans were willing to join Hannibal, so the new recruits for his army made up for the losses in crossing the Alps. Scipio finally engaged him in battle at the Ticinus (now called Ticinino) near Pavia. It was Rome's first defeat, one of several that Hannibal inflicted on them during his fifteen year sojourn in Italy. The consul Publius was wounded in the battle, allegedly rescued by his young son, also called Publius Cornelius Scipio, who was destined for greater fame in the near future. The Scipios and their followers had to take refuge at Placentia (modern Piacenza), one of the colonies founded after the recent battles against the Gauls.

The consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus hurriedly returned from Sicily, and joined Publius Scipio. They engaged Hannibal again at the Trebia, but lost the battle and a great number of soldiers. As soon as he had recovered from his wounds, Publius Scipio left for Spain to join his brother Gnaeus, where they scored some successes against the Carthaginians over the next few years. In Italy, the new consul for 217, Gaius Flaminius, fared no better against Hannibal. During his earlier career, Flaminius had antagonized many senators. He had been

consul in 223, and had commanded the army in the battles against the Gauls, but at most stages of his career he had faced senatorial hostility and manoeuvres to deprive him of office. Fearing that there could be opposition that might deprive him of his command, he left Rome in a great hurry, without observing the proper rituals. His actions approached sacrilege, so he had offended the gods, which is what the Romans said when the news arrived that he had been defeated and killed along with 15,000 men at the battle of Lake Trasimene.

It seemed that no one could stop Hannibal, who had scored a hat-trick in three victories in a very short time. A new strategy was required, since pitched battles were clearly not the answer. After the disaster of Lake Trasimene, the middle-aged Quintus Fabius Maximus was made Dictator. He was elected by the people instead of being more properly appointed by one of the consuls, but Flaminius was dead and the other consul nowhere near Rome, so the Romans compromised and found other legal forms of making him Dictator. The office had not been employed for some time, but these were dangerous times. Two legions were raised, but Fabius used his troops to harass the Carthaginians, keeping them on the move and denying them supplies, refusing to risk a major battle. The Romans nicknamed him the Delayer, *Cunctator* in Latin. His method was correct, but it was a long term plan that would render no rapid results, and it was difficult for the Romans to sit back and take no action when lands around them, especially in Campania, were being devastated, farms destroyed and population killed. Impatience won the day, and the people agitated for the appointment of Fabius's second in command, Publius Minucius Rufus, as a general in his own right. This meant he could command troops, which he immediately committed to battle without proper reconnaissance of the area and Hannibal's dispositions. Fabius had to rescue him.

The consuls for 216, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, reverted to engaging Hannibal in battle. A massive recruitment campaign was undertaken to raise new armies, with which the consuls faced Hannibal at Cannae (modern Canne) in August 216. It was not even ground of their own choosing, and the large armies they commanded did not necessarily afford them superiority. One major defect in the Roman passion for collegiality was that each consul commanded on alternate days, a procedure that allowed each individual to put into operation his own particular plan, whether or not it conflicted with that of the other consul. There was clearly no previously agreed strategy. Aemilius Paullus was the more cautious of the two consuls and would perhaps not have risked battle, but on the fateful day Varro was in command and chose to fight.

Hannibal put his lighter armed Spanish troops in the centre, and his more heavily armed African troops on the wings, with instructions that the men in the centre should gradually withdraw after the battle had started, as though they were being steadily beaten back. This drew the Romans forward out of their lines and into the trap. They found themselves enveloped by the soldiers on the wings of Hannibal's army, and the final blow fell when the Roman cavalry units on their own wings were driven off, allowing the Carthaginian horsemen to ride round their rear, enclosing them completely. There was no room to manoeuvre as the Romans were crushed together, so tight that they could not use their weapons. It was said that they fought with their nails and teeth at the end. Nearly the whole army was annihilated, but not quite all the men died. Some of them escaped, and Hannibal took some prisoners, perhaps a few thousand. He tried to persuade the Romans to ransom them, but Roman pride could not countenance this disgrace and they refused.

The battle of Cannae was the greatest disaster that had ever befallen the Romans. Some junior officers such as Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the consul, and Fabius Maximus the son of the Dictator, had escaped the slaughter of Cannae and tried to rally the remnants of the troops at Canusium, where they learned that Terentius Varro had survived. The defeated consul sent word to the Senate that his consular colleague Lucius Aemilius Paulus was dead, and that most of the soldiers were killed or captured. Varro had with him about 10,000 men, or the strength of about two legions out of the enormous numbers that had been raised, 80,000 according to some sources, but the figure is disputed. Exact truth as to the numbers that were originally raised could hardly clarify or obscure the fact that Cannae was a disaster of epic proportions. The Roman had lost so many men that it stretched resources to breaking point, and for a short time, Rome was at the mercy of Hannibal's army. But he did not try to take the city. For one thing he had no siege engines and therefore could not conduct an all out siege. He could have tried to blockade the city and starve the Romans out, but if he managed to take Rome he would then have to obliterate it or hold it, and with the small number of troops at his disposal he could not afford to tie any of them down in garrisoning Rome. His way of war depended on mobility and flexibility. Besides, Rome was by now a cohesive federation so, even if the city fell, he would still not be master of the Romans. He had been in Italy for two years but had not succeeded in detaching Rome's earliest allies. The Gauls of the north and the Bruttians and Apulians of the south, only recently absorbed into the Roman world, were disaffected and therefore sympathetic to him, and he had either conquered or received the submission of other recent

allies, but unless he could win over the core of the Roman federation he would have to take each city one at a time.

The Romans held their breath for a while, but then began to repair the damage as far as possible. They recruited and armed 8,000 slaves with the promise of freedom if they fought for Rome, but they did not attempt to meet Hannibal himself in a pitched battle. Instead they concentrated on reconquering their allies who had gone over to the Carthaginians, the most important being Capua, a city almost as large and influential as Rome itself. Its loss was a bitter blow for the Romans. For these campaigns the Romans employed smaller forces, with Fabius Maximus in command of one of them, and generals who would not rush headlong into battle in command of the others.

The war in Italy slowed down to a few comparatively minor actions, while other theatres of war were more lively. Hannibal's victory at Cannae still failed to shake the loyalty of the Latins, but it did encourage other interested parties to make overtures to him. In 215 Philip V of Macedon proposed an alliance, which the Romans discovered when their fleet patrolling the Ionian sea captured a ship with a Carthaginian passenger who carried the text of the treaty. It was vital to stop Philip from arriving in Italy to join Hannibal, so the Roman fleet played its part in patrolling the seas, and supporting the Greeks who were persuaded to ally with Rome and attack Philip on land. The Aetolians, the Spartans and the Pergamenes kept Philip occupied while the Romans attended to other spheres of the war.

As well as fighting in Italy, the Romans had to maintain a military presence in Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily to ward off Carthaginian attempts to reconquer the islands. There was a severe setback in 215–214 when Hiero of Syracuse died and was succeeded by his son Hieronymus, who eventually changed sides and allowed the Carthaginians to take over the city. The Roman fleet patrolled the seas around Syracuse but the Romans had to wait until they were in a position to attack in strength on land. The general who finally did take Syracuse, Claudius Marcellus, had been on his way to Sicily as praetor in 216, but was recalled after the disaster at Cannae and spent the next couple of years clearing up, restoring order and retaking Casilinum, one of the cities of Campania which was under Hannibal's control. In 214 he set off once again for Sicily, this time as consul, and in 213 began the siege of Syracuse in earnest. It took him two years to take the city, where Archimedes contributed to the defence by his invention of the 'claw', a war engine imperfectly understood in modern times, but which was said to have lifted the Roman ships out of the water and dunked them back in again. The trick, therefore, would be to keep well away from the sea walls of Syracuse, which is

what all defenders of walls ultimately desire. In 211, Syracuse fell to the Romans. Marcellus tried to prevent a massacre of the inhabitants, but during the proceedings, Archimedes was killed allegedly while studying designs for some unknown engine or mathematical problem, which he asked the soldiers not to disturb. Over a hundred years later Marcus Tullius Cicero went to look at his tomb and found it somewhat dilapidated. In Rome, he could scarcely avoid seeing all the art treasures that Marcellus shipped back from Sicily.

Although the war in Sicily was not entirely over when Syracuse fell in 211, it was a step forward, and in the same year the rebellious city of Capua was retaken by the Romans. During the siege of Capua, Hannibal had not attempted to relieve the city by directly attacking the besieging force, but he tried to frighten the Romans into withdrawing their troops by marching to Rome itself. He camped a few miles from the city and then rode up to inspect one of the gates, the Porta Collina. There were skirmishes outside the city walls, but nothing serious occurred and Hannibal went away. According to Livy, he was discouraged because it was clear that the Romans did not intend to recall the army from Capua, nor would they divert the latest levies which were destined for Spain. But the most persuasive news, from Hannibal's point of view, was that the lands around Rome were being sold to raise much needed funds, and somebody had bought the whole area where the Carthaginians were camped, for the normal price.

The recapture of these two major cities of Syracuse and Capua was fortunate, because the Romans were enabled to release seasoned troops for the war in Spain where, after an auspicious start, things were not going well. When Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio took command in 218, he had managed to stabilize the situation north of the Ebro, and then in the following year his brother Publius joined him after he had been wounded at the battle of the Ticinus. It now remained to try to wrest control of the southern areas of Spain from the Carthaginians, who were weakened by the diversion of some of their troops to North Africa, because Carthage was under attack by the Numidian tribesmen under their prince, Syphax. The greatest fear was that the Carthaginians might raise another army and despatch it to Hannibal in Italy, but temporarily this possibility was averted when the Scipio brothers defeated the Carthaginians in a battle in 216 or possibly 215.

The tables were turned when the revolt of Syphax was quelled in Africa and more Carthaginian troops arrived in Spain, assisted by a Numidian cavalry contingent under their chief Masinissa, of whom the Romans would hear much more later on. From 214 the Carthaginian commander was another Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, who brought the

Romans to battle in 211. The Scipio brothers had split their forces, and were defeated separately. Both were killed. The Romans were now back to the old status quo, in control of the lands north of the Ebro, where the remains of the army were collected by one of the surviving officers. The Senate appointed the praetor Gaius Claudius Nero to command the northern part of Spain in 211–210. He did not attempt to reconquer the rest of Spain, probably because he was preoccupied in restoring order, but he was accused of being too cautious and very quickly replaced. He proved his worth three years later, when commanding his consular army in Italy in 207.

The commander who was sent out in place of Nero was Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Publius Scipio, and the nephew of Gnaeus Scipio, both of whom had been killed in 211. He was only twenty-five years old and, though he had served in the army with distinction, he had no political experience. He had been aedile, but except for this post he had not held any of the other requisite magistracies that would qualify him for election to the consulship, and in any case he was too young. At the time of his appointment to Spain he was not in any office at all, and therefore ranked as a *privatus*, or private citizen. It was all very irregular. In order to command the armies in Spain, he would need to be elevated to the rank of consul or proconsul, and would require the bestowal of *imperium*, all of which was arranged legally by the *comitia centuriata* where a special law was passed to grant him proconsular powers. The Romans were rapidly becoming expert at getting round their own legislation when necessary, yet still keeping more or less within the law.

Scipio arrived in Spain in 210. His first task was to restore discipline and boost morale, then he spent some time training the troops and gathering information about the country, the geography, the people and the dispositions and habits of the enemy. In this way he learned that at Cartagena, which was protected on the south side by the harbour and on the north side by a lagoon, there was access to the city at low tide when the water level of the lagoon dropped, and it was possible to wade across it to the north wall. In 209 Scipio decided to try to take the city, because it was an important supply base, with a larger harbour than any of the other Carthaginian coastal cities. Besides, it was the point from which Hannibal had begun his march into Italy so it would be a significant gesture to capture the city. Scipio set up a three-pronged attack. The main force approached directly from the camp to the main gate, and the fleet under an officer called Laelius attacked from the harbour. Another smaller force was instructed to cross the lagoon as soon as the water level dropped, and attack the north wall. The defenders there were fewer because the

main defensive effort of the Carthaginians was directed to the Roman attacks on the gate and from the harbour, so the Romans were able to surmount the walls facing the lagoon, drive off the opposition and use the wall walk to approach the main gate, which was then attacked from two sides. The city was captured, and shortly afterwards the citadel was surrendered.

When the news of the victory arrived at Rome, it may have lifted spirits somewhat. The burdens of fighting the prolonged war, on several fronts simultaneously, were becoming worryingly severe. Shortage of men and money, and even of food, had to be remedied somehow. In the same year that Scipio set out for Spain, eighteen of the Latin colonies made strenuous efforts to meet their quotas to provide troops and declared that they would be willing to make any sacrifice, but twelve of them declared themselves unable to furnish any more men. The senators contributed from their own funds to provide ships and crews to keep the war effort going, but it was not enough and in 209, in the same year that Cartagena fell, the Romans had to dip into their reserves, built up for three decades from the 5 per cent tax levied on the value of slaves when they were freed. Food supplies were running low because fields and farms had been destroyed, and during the fighting even the ones that were left intact could not be farmed. The harvests from Sicily were not reaching Rome while the war was pursued there, so the Romans purchased grain from Egypt in 210.

The war in Spain was approaching its end. Scipio defeated Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca, who then set off in 208 with his remaining forces to join Hannibal in Italy. During the early stages of the war, reinforcements for Hannibal spelled disaster for the Romans, but by this time Hannibal's army had dwindled in size and, although he had persuaded several of the anti-Roman cities and Italian tribesmen to join with him, he had not managed to recruit sufficient numbers of them to keep his force up to strength. Scipio therefore allowed Hasdrubal to march away unmolested, and concentrated his energies on the Carthaginian forces that were left in Spain, under Hannibal's youngest brother Mago, who was defeated at the battle of Ilipa in 206. Carthaginian power in Spain was broken for ever and Scipio returned to Rome. In less than a decade, the whole country was annexed and made into two provinces, called Hispania Superior and Ulterior, or Nearer and Further Spain, in 197.

As Hasdrubal was making his way to Italy, Hannibal inflicted another blow on the Romans. At Venusia (modern Venosa) his Numidian cavalry discovered both the consuls for 208, Claudius Marcellus and Crispinus, on an ill-advised reconnaissance, and killed

them both. The consuls for 207 raised more men and took command of two armies, Marcus Livius Salinator proceeding northwards to await the arrival of Hasdrubal from Gaul, and Gaius Claudius Nero to Bruttium to face Hannibal, who started off northwards as soon as he heard that Hasdrubal was in Italy. Claudius Nero shadowed him but did not attack. Then he had an enormous piece of luck when his troops captured messengers with a letter from Hasdrubal, informing Hannibal where their armies should meet in Umbria. Claudius Nero had been censured for inactivity in Spain in 210, but he more than made up for it now, by leaving some troops to watch Hannibal and then hastily setting off with most of his army to march 50 miles a day for five days to join Livius Salinator at his headquarters at Sena Gallica (modern Senigallia) south of Ariminum (modern Rimini). The two consuls caught up with Hasdrubal at the River Metaurus, and wiped out the army, killing Hasdrubal in the process. The energetic Claudius Nero wasted no time in marching back south, setting off that same night. The first news that Hannibal heard of the disaster came when Nero's troops hurled Hasdrubal's head into his camp. Hannibal probably knew now that ultimately his venture could not succeed, but he remained at large in Italy for another three years. The wonder is that he had been able to sustain his army for so long, keeping them enthusiastic enough to continue to follow him, and not letting them starve. His abilities as a commander far outshone that of most of the Romans who faced him, but while he fought against them he also taught them a lot.

Now that Carthage was deprived of Spain and its resources, and had not been able to regain Sardinia or Sicily, the time was ripe for the Romans to strike at Carthage itself. Scipio urged this course of action when he stood for election to the consulship for 205. Fabius Maximus opposed the plan, and the Senate refused to grant him troops or resources, but agreed that he could undertake the expedition provided that he raised an army of volunteers. There was no shortage of men who were anxious to strike a blow against the Carthaginians, and they had great faith in Scipio as a general, so he rapidly raised his army and set sail for Africa from Lilybaeum in 204.

The likely success of the expedition had been underlined, probably in 205 when the Romans consulted the Sibylline Books, a collection of oracles which had been part of Roman religious culture since at least the fifth century BC. Whenever there was a crisis, the Senate could authorize a consultation, and prophecies were usually found that provided the answer to the problem. In this case the prophecy stated that if a foreign enemy invaded Italy he would be defeated if the Romans imported the goddess Cybele and her religious

cult into the city. This corroborated a prophecy from the Delphic oracle, so arrangements were set in motion to bring Cybele to Rome. She was an important mother-goddess, from Asia Minor. She was also a nature goddess, and was usually depicted in her chariot drawn by lions, or with lions on either side, or occasionally with a lion sitting on her lap like any domestic cat. Her main attributes were protection of people in wartime, and the cure of diseases. The people of Rome, still threatened by Hannibal on their own ground and with an army about to engage in war in Africa, evidently required reassurance on the grand scale. The Senate obliged by bringing the statue of Cybele from Pessinus in Phrygia in 204, and installing her in the Temple of Victory on the Palatine Hill. It was a good investment. In the following year Hannibal was recalled to Carthage.

When Scipio landed in Africa he was opposed by the Carthaginian army reinforced by their Numidian allies under Syphax. The Romans promptly put the city of Utica under siege and the Carthaginians marched to its relief. Scipio moved off, placed the army in winter quarters and waited. There were discussions between the two armies about making peace, but in spring Scipio went on the offensive and won the battle. Another Carthaginian army was raised with Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax in command, but when they met the Romans at the battle of the Great Plains they were defeated again. Syphax ran for home but was captured and sent to Italy. Scipio now called in a new ally. While he was still in Spain he had fought against another Numidian chieftain, called Masinissa, who was allied to the Carthaginians at the time, but was won over by Scipio after the victory at Ilipa in 206. This chieftain was set up in the place of Syphax, and as an ally of Rome he brought reinforcements for Scipio's army, principally his cavalry forces.

The Carthaginians made overtures for peace, and during the truce that followed Scipio dictated terms, but both sides knew that if Hannibal was ordered to come home the peace terms would be meaningless. Since this was precisely what Scipio wanted to bring about, he waited and did nothing, certain that Hannibal would be recalled and the war would begin again. Hannibal left Italy in 203, and as soon as he arrived the Carthaginians attacked first, breaking the truce. The story goes that Hannibal asked Scipio to meet him, which he did, in an open space with their respective armies camped at some distance away. They conversed in Greek, but what they talked about is not known, except perhaps the inevitability of the coming battle. The two armies met at Zama in 202, where victory was not a foregone conclusion for Scipio. He ordered the Romans to leave gaps between their ranks and allow the Carthaginian elephants to charge

through them, and he placed Masinissa and Laelius in command of the cavalry on the wings. Hannibal stationed his Numidian cavalry opposite Masinissa and the Carthaginian horse opposite Laelius. During the battle the Romans drove all the enemy cavalry off the field, and if they had kept on going in pursuit of the Carthaginians the battle may have turned out very differently. Fortunately for Scipio they stopped, turned around, and charged the rear of Hannibal's army. It was all over for the Carthaginians. Hannibal escaped and turned up later at the court of the Seleucid King Antiochus the Great in Syria.

The Romans were able to dictate peace terms, by which Carthage was disarmed completely. All the war elephants and all the warships except ten triremes were to be given up and, more importantly, the Carthaginians were not to make war on anyone without the approval of Rome. Carthage had to pay another large indemnity, sent hostages to Rome and was reduced to the area of the city itself and the immediately surrounding territory. All other territorial possessions were to be surrendered. As a sort of insurance policy, Masinissa was confirmed as ruler of his own territory on the borders of Carthage.

Scipio was at the zenith of his career and justifiably took the victory title Africanus. His subsequent history was less glamorous and his political enemies, led by Cato the censor, eventually brought him down.

After the Wars

During the course of the third century BC, Rome had undergone several changes, emerging at the end of the century as the strongest power in the Mediterranean world. The Romans would soon be drawn into the struggles between the states of the Hellenic east, but Greek culture was not entirely alien to them, since they had been exposed to it via the Etruscans for some time, and during the various wars they had met at first hand the Greek colonies of the Italian coasts. After the first Punic war many of the Greeks of southern Italy arrived in Rome, some as slaves of the wealthy Romans. Others became teachers of the sons of the wealthy and found ready acceptance. Greek became a second language to many of the ruling class in Rome and the first historian of Rome, Fabius Pictor, produced his books in Greek. The author of the first play to be performed in Rome, at the end of the first Punic war, was Livius Andronicus from Tarentum. The Greek poet Ennius was brought to Rome in 204 by Cato, and during the war with Hannibal the comedies of Titus Maccius Plautus were performed, based on Greek themes, but Romanised and Latinised for the better appreciation of the audience. Perhaps the most famous was *Miles Gloriosus*, performed in 204 BC. Greek art made its first appearance

when Marcellus conveyed to Rome many statues from Sicily. At the beginning of the second century BC, architecture in Rome flourished, greatly influenced by Greek styles.

Roman society had changed too, by the end of the century. There were now considerable numbers of men among the citizen body who had not been born in Rome, nor even in Italy. Some of them perhaps started out as slaves, as for instance when the 8,000 slaves were recruited for the army after the battle of Cannae, with the promise of freedom if they fought well and survived, though of course freedom and citizenship are not the same thing. The city was also packed with refugees from the countryside, where farms and lands had been devastated.

It is to Rome's credit, and a tribute to the loyalty of the Latin allies, that Hannibal was never able to prise them from their allegiance, even when they were exhausted and had seen their lands destroyed. Outside Latium Hannibal captured some of the allied cities by force, and the states or tribes that he did manage to win over were usually those of recent conquest by Rome, on the principle of last in and first out, still discontented with Rome and not yet reconciled to the loss of total independence. These included the Gallic tribes of the north of Italy, and the Bruttians in the south, who presumably thought that Hannibal would defeat the Romans and then they would be free again. The most disappointing defection was that of Capua, which was retaken by the Romans and brutally punished, as was the city of Tarentum. The inhabitants of both cities were either killed or sold as slaves, and the terrible example was noted by other states.

The Roman army and its commanders had learned a great deal from the battles of the third century BC. After the Samnite wars, a more flexible military formation was adopted in place of the rigid phalanx, which had proved unwieldy in hill country. The army was now organized in more manoeuvrable sections called maniples, which literally means 'handfuls' of men. The long spear and the round shield (the *clipeus*) of the phalanx were abandoned, the shield being replaced by an oval version that the Italian allies had been using for some time. It is not certain whether it was at this time that the *pilum* or throwing spear, or more accurately javelin, was introduced in place of the long spear, but significant factors about the new manipular formation include the fact that it was now more convenient to engage the enemy at a distance with some kind of missile, and that in the looser formation the soldiers would have more space to throw a javelin.

It was alleged that the Romans started to follow the example of Pyrrhus in making a fortified camp each night, though it is disputed whether they really had neglected to do this in all their campaigns

until this point. There was no standing army until the very end of the Republic, but although the armies were raised each year, or whenever necessary, and disbanded when campaigns were concluded, during the wars of the third century there had been an army in the field almost permanently and a certain professionalism had been built up when men re-enlisted in different armies and fought new campaigns. Some men made a sort of career out of the army, though if they had reached the rank of centurion in one campaign it was no guarantee that they would re-enlist for the next one with the same rank. Continuity of overall command was achieved via the pro-magistracy, but it must be remembered that there was no military academy in Rome where men could learn the skills necessary to lead armies into battle. Although military manuals are not generally known until the Imperial period, there may have been some available instructive literature at this date, but apart from that, commanders were simply expected to know how to wage war, move troops from one place to another, maintain discipline, organize supplies, and deal with sick and wounded. On the whole they managed very well in the long run.

Without the contribution of the allies to their armies, the Romans would not have survived, and would probably have been defeated by Hannibal after Cannae. The potential manpower of the Roman armies, consisting of Romans and allied troops, was phenomenal, a fact that was perhaps not realized by Rome's enemies in the first half of the third century BC. This was highlighted when Pyrrhus sent his envoy Cineas to Rome, with an offer of peace. The terms that Pyrrhus offered were rejected because he did not promise to leave Italy, and Cineas, impressed with the numbers of men that the Romans and their allies could muster, reported to Pyrrhus: 'We are fighting a hydra'. According to Polybius, at the time of the war with Hannibal, detailed lists were drawn up of men who were capable of bearing arms. The statistics revealed that the Romans could furnish 250,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry, while the allies could raise a total somewhat in excess of 450,000 infantry and 47,000 cavalry. The Roman legions bore the brunt of the fighting, but without the allied contingents they would not have been able to sustain the constant warfare that characterized the third century.

The Romans began to attend to their communications throughout Italy before the whole of the peninsula was under their control. At the end of the fourth century BC the Via Appia was built by Appius Claudius as far as Capua, and by 244 BC it had been extended as far as Brundisium (modern Brindisi) on the south coast. The Via Valeria ran across the central Apennines to the Adriatic coast, and in 241 the Via Aurelia, built by Gaius Aurelius Cotta, connected Rome with Cosa,

running up the western side of Italy. The roads were needed for the easy movement of troops, but also facilitated commerce. Although Rome's trading ventures have been played down and portrayed as negligible at this period, luxury goods had begun to arrive in the city, probably from Etruscan and Greek sources. Eventually the Romans felt it necessary to pass sumptuary laws to limit the amount of these goods that a family could own. As trade developed and the Romans began to interact with the other states of Italy, and especially with the Greeks of southern Italy and the countries around the Mediterranean, coinage was introduced after the conclusion of the Samnite wars. The Greeks and Carthaginians had been using coins for much longer, but the Romans had not felt the need for coinage, using bronze by weight. One Roman pound was called an *as* (plural *asses*, nothing to do with donkeys). In 289 BC, the Romans established a mint in Rome, or at least it at this date that the first known officials are attested in charge of issuing coins. These were the *tres viri monetales* with their headquarters on the Capitol Hill, near the Temple of Juno Moneta. By the end of the third century the values of bronze and silver coins were rationalized, one silver denarius being worth ten bronze *asses*. Money changers set up businesses in Rome, and Roman coins were equated with international values.

By the end of the third century BC trade had begun to play a larger part in people's lives, with senators taking an active part. In 218 BC Gaius Flaminius passed a law that limited the carrying capacity of cargo ships owned by senators to no more than three hundred amphorae, which served as containers for oil, wine and grain. Clearly the senatorial class had taken to trading ventures eagerly enough.

Administration of the city and the allies had to be adapted to changed circumstances as the third century progressed. Commerce and warfare brought more people to Rome, and brought Romans into contact with foreigners abroad. In 242 BC the Romans appointed a new official, the *praetor inter peregrinos*, literally the praetor over foreigners, whose original duties may have been of a military nature, but by the end of the third century BC his duties concerned disputes between Romans and foreigners, or between two foreigners in the city of Rome. The most important administrative change, with far reaching consequences for the Republic and Empire, was the acquisition of the first provinces and the methods developed to govern them. When the Romans took over Sicily at the end of the first Punic war, they tried to govern by the usual methods that they applied to some of their allies, by fostering relations with the elite ruling class and allowing them to administer the area themselves, within the parameters set by the

Romans to satisfy their own requirements. At first the same methods were applied to Sardinia and Corsica when both islands came into their possession, but within a decade or so the Romans realized that direct administration was less cumbersome and gave them what they wanted more easily.

The name that was applied to each of the new territories was *provincia*, which did not originally denote a geographical area. The term derived from the tour of duty that magistrates undertook during or after their term of office, and could embrace all sorts of task such as attending to the roads, the management of forests, or anything that required attention. The government of Sicily, and Sardinia together with Corsica, was regarded as a tour of duty and the same name *provincia* was applied to the task, which eventually became firmly attached to a territory. In order to provide officials to undertake the government of the new provinces, two extra praetors were created in 228 or 227 BC. The consuls could not undertake the government of the provinces along with their other duties, the principal one being command of the armies, and the creation of extra consuls would compromise the collegiate principle as well as establishing too many high-powered individuals. Praetors on the other hand were subordinate to the consuls and could, theoretically at least, be kept in check. As Roman control extended over more provinces, corruption, extortion and exploitation were not far behind.

At the end of the third century BC, Rome was equipped with the nascent administrative machinery to govern an Empire, and all the characteristics of the later Republic, good and bad, were already in place.

World Power: Rome Begins to Dominate 201–133 BC

The city of Rome, in the second century BC, was becoming more cosmopolitan, comprising an even larger racial intermix than the three main tribes that made up the population of the early city, with definite leanings towards the Hellenistic world, as attested in literature, art and architecture, and even in language, with certain words borrowed from Greek and Latinised. The Romans had broadened their horizons. They had always been aware of the countries around the Mediterranean through diplomacy and trade, but during the half century after the end of the second Punic war, the Romans gradually extended control over many of them.

At first, conquest and absorption was not an established ambition. Despite their reputation for a dynamic acquisitive urge, if not rabid Imperialism, the Romans did not actively seek to annexe territory for about six decades after the defeat of Hannibal. Polybius says that the Romans intended to annexe Greece as soon as the war with Hannibal was over, but if this was true, the Romans took a long time to put their alleged plans into effect. They were occasionally asked to intervene or assist in the affairs of countries outside Italy, to repel an invader or stop the ruler of one state from oppressing another. They usually responded, sometimes after sending someone to investigate the circumstances, gathered an army, fought the battles and then went home. The wars of the third century BC had concerned the west but now, in the second century, Rome was drawn into conflicts to protect states and communities which they called 'friends' in the east. In several cases, protection of friends involved the Romans in further conflicts with the states bordering on the territory of their friends, because these neighbours were upset by what they saw as Roman interference, and potential threats to their own livelihoods.

The Romans had been acquainted with the Greek world for a long time via the Etruscans and the Greek colonies of the coasts of Italy, but now for the first time they met Greeks in the flesh in their homelands, and tried to get along with them. By the second century BC Hellenistic culture, from Hellenes, the name by which the Greeks called themselves, had spread over much of the eastern Mediterranean. After the death of Alexander the Great in 323, the generals of his immediate entourage seized much of the territory that

he had conquered and created kingdoms for themselves. Ptolemy took the corpse of Alexander to Egypt and installed it in a splendid tomb in Alexandria. Egypt became a Hellenistic kingdom under a succession of rulers called Ptolemy, until the last of their line, Queen Cleopatra VII, died when Alexandria fell to Octavian in 30. Seleucus, another of Alexander's generals, took over the kingdom of Babylonia, and eventually northern Syria, where he founded the city of Antioch in 300 BC. The Seleucid empire was vast, stretching from modern Turkey to Iran and into central Asia. By the second century BC the area under the control of the descendants of the Seleucids had shrunk, but was still worthy of the label empire, centred on Syria. The Ptolemies and the Seleucids occasionally fought for control of Palestine, but that was not yet a cause for concern to the Romans until they had extended their Empire to include the eastern provinces. These large and powerful kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, together with Macedon, dominated the eastern Mediterranean, surrounded by smaller states whose inhabitants, ever vigilant for encroachment or insult, squabbled with each other. Freedom and independence were jealously guarded, and even when confederacies were formed there was no long-lived leading state which could be said to guide the policies of the confederacy. To become a friend of one state almost automatically meant becoming an enemy of some other state. This lack of unity made it easy for Rome, eventually, to divide and rule in Greece.

For the first half of the second century BC Rome showed no interest in taking over territory across the Adriatic, but tried to impose certain standards of behaviour that were compatible with Roman military and trading interests, and with keeping the peace. Freedom and independence continued unopposed by the Romans, provided that Rome's friends and Rome itself were not threatened in any way. That could be a matter of interpretation, of course, but in general Roman expansionist policies did not begin until after many years of diplomatic and military activity designed to preserve the harmonious relations that Rome desired. From the second half of the second century, specifically after 146, some states lost their independence, passing from semi-free status under Rome's wing, to absorption under Rome's thumb.

The states in the Roman protectorate, such as Illyricum after the first war with Philip of Macedon, were not treated in the same way as the allied cities in Italy, which were bound to Rome by treaties outlining mutual rights and obligations. The connections with the friends of Rome were much less formal, so there was little or no entanglement in the legal niceties of a treaty which would have obliged Rome to intervene if the protected state were attacked. The

Romans could monitor the situation and decide whether or not to take up the cause. The promise of assistance was usually honoured, but it remained suitably amorphous, so that it was much easier for the Romans to utilize the member states of the Aetolian confederacy when necessary, and then abandon them when it was felt more prudent to do so, without troubling their collective conscience about it.

The Second Macedonian War

While Hannibal was still at large in Italy, the Romans had come into conflict with Philip of Macedon, who had proposed an alliance with the Carthaginians. The enemies of Philip, notably the Aetolians, assisted the Romans, and the first war ended in 205, with lenient terms for Macedon. In 200, war with Philip broke out again, because the King had tried to take over the Illyrians and prise them away from Rome, and was also suspected of aggressive designs on areas further afield. The people of Rhodes, and King Attalus of Pergamum, sent envoys to Rome with rumours of an impending alliance between Philip of Macedon and Antiochus the Great, the ruler of Syria, who were preparing a joint attack on Egypt.

These movements did not comprise a direct threat to Italy, but the Romans sent ambassadors to Philip with the ultimatum that he should not make war on the Greeks or Illyrians. War would be declared if he refused. He did refuse, so war was to follow, but here the senators, who recommended war, came up against an unforeseen problem. The Roman people did not want to campaign in foreign parts on behalf of other states, and said so in the *comitia centuriata*. This public assembly did not possess the authority to formulate policies, but could say yes or no to proposals put to it by the Senate, and it voted a categorical 'no' to a war with Philip of Macedon. The attitude of the people indicates how exhausted the Romans were after the long struggle with Hannibal. They had fought on more than one front for several years during the war with Carthage, perfectly willing to send armies to Spain because there was a threat to Italy if the Carthaginians were allowed to expand their control there, and accrue sufficient wealth and manpower to send assistance to Hannibal. They had condoned the first war against Philip of Macedon to prevent him from allying with Hannibal. This time, however, the trouble did not seem to concern Italy, and the Romans thought that they already had a surplus of widows, fatherless children and grieving parents, far too many to justify going to a peripheral war only a few years after the peace with Carthage.

The Senate, not wishing to overstep the confines of the law by overruling the assembly, revised its presentation and tried again,

converting Philip and his ambitions into a direct threat to Rome, and the war into a just one, a ploy that was to be used throughout Rome's history to represent the Romans as the injured party and the enemy as the guilty one. This time the *comitia centuriata* voted 'yes'. In 200 the consul Sulpicius Galba set out to make war on Philip, assisted by the Aetolian confederacy and troops from Pergamum, Rhodes and Athens. Little progress was made at first, until the consul Titus Flamininus took over in 198. Within a short time he had flushed Philip out of Epirus, and arranged a meeting with him proposing terms, but the sticking point was Thessaly, which Philip would not give up, and he still held the fortresses of Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias. The war started again.

Flamininus's term of office as consul was due to end, and one of the consuls for 197 should have replaced him, but in Rome two tribunes proposed that his command should be extended. This device to extend command, called *prorogatio imperii*, had been used before, exchanging the actual consulship for the powers of a consul. It was a logical step when a commander was in the middle of a war, but the employment of tribunes to propose such measures was to become an over-used political device in the future.

Philip of Macedon and Titus Flamininus faced each other in Thessaly in 197 at the battle of Cynoscephalae, which means Dog's Head, named after the shape of the rocks in the hills where the opponents met. The battle was timely, because Antiochus the Great was marching to assist Philip but had not yet reached him. It was a complete Roman victory, proving the superiority of the looser formation of the Roman army over the compact phalanx of the enemy, which as the Romans themselves had discovered, was formidable on smooth ground but lost cohesion in more broken country. The victory put an end to Philip's ambitions for the time being, and stopped Antiochus in his tracks. Peace was declared, and Flamininus ignored the pleas of the Greeks for revenge on Philip. The terms were crippling enough, entailing surrender of all Philip's territories in Greece and Illyricum, surrender of his warships, and the payment of an indemnity. In 196 Philip became an ally of Rome.

The historian Polybius records the explosion of joy at the Isthmian games in 196 when Flamininus famously explained to the Greeks that henceforth they were free of the domination of Philip of Macedon, and under Roman patronage they were free to govern themselves. Flamininus was immediately mobbed and nearly killed in the enthusiastic reception of his speech. The Roman troops were withdrawn, but it would never be the same again for the Greeks, although they did not yet know that.

While the Romans fought the war with Macedon, other Roman armies were fighting the Gauls in northern Italy, principally the Boii and Insubres, and the Ligurians. From 198 to 191 this war dragged on, and at its conclusion 40,000 Ligurians were transplanted to the south of Italy. Even if the numbers are exaggerated, the fact that there was room for the tribesmen on the devastated lands and abandoned farms of the south, gives some indication of the extent of the devastation that occurred during the war with Hannibal, who based his army there for much of his stay in Italy.

The Aetolians & Antiochus the Great

Not long after the battle of Cynoscephalae, Antiochus the Great, King of Syria, still hopeful of reconstituting the once extensive empire of the Seleucids, resumed his efforts to expand his territory, this time without an alliance with Philip, but with an even better excuse for invasion because the Aetolians, who were disappointed with the lack of rewards for their assistance to Rome, invited him to Greece as liberator. The Aetolians had hoped for extra territory and financial gains from the war with Philip, and perhaps thought that other Greeks were as disgruntled as they were themselves, but when Antiochus appeared, no one greeted him as liberator. The Romans could not tolerate the presence of Antiochus in Greece and went to war again. The consul Acilius Glabrio won a victory for Rome at Thermopylae in 191, but this did not put an end to the war because Antiochus refused to accept the terms offered him. The next Roman consul sent against him was Lucius Cornelius Scipio, who was in nominal command of the army. The real commander was his more famous brother, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, officially acting in an advisory capacity. Africanus had been consul in 194, and had fought against the Gallic tribes in the following year. In 190 when it was clear that Antiochus had lost a battle but was not yet defeated in the war, Africanus was the logical choice of commander but, since the law dictated that there should be a gap of several years between consulships, Africanus was not eligible for election, and could not command the army. His brother Lucius successfully stood for the consulship instead, and was awarded the command. Ironically, in the entourage of Antiochus there was a famous refugee, Hannibal, who had been exiled from Carthage, so the two generals found themselves ranged opposite each other again, though neither of them was in command of the armies that they accompanied.

The Romans were assisted by troops from Rhodes and Pergamum, and it was Eumenes II, the new King of Pergamum, whose timely action tipped the balance for the Romans at the battle of Magnesia, in

Lydia. Eumenes led his horsemen against Antiochus's heavy armoured cavalry and forced them back into their own ranks, then he led another attack on the exposed flank of Antiochus's phalanx. The victory, late in 190 or perhaps in January 189, ended the war. The Romans took the states of Asia Minor into their protection, and rewarded the kingdoms of Rhodes and Pergamum with extra territories from Antiochus's domains. It was said that the Romans also demanded from Antiochus the surrender of Hannibal, but the King would not co-operate, and helped his famous guest to escape.

There were short lived sequels to the war, the first when the Aetolians refused to accept the terms of unconditional surrender, and carried on fighting alone. A Roman army under Fulvius Nobilior besieged and took their fortress of Ambracia, which was surrendered. The Aetolians accepted peace terms and became allies of the Roman people, with the obligation to support the Romans against their enemies. In the following year Prusias, King of Bithynia, where Hannibal had taken refuge, resumed his war on Pergamum, with Hannibal as general. This war had been going on intermittently for several years, whenever there was an opportunity to take territory from Pergamum. In 205 Prusias had invaded when Attalus of Pergamum was in Greece, assisting the Romans against Philip of Macedon. Thwarted on this occasion, seven years later Prusias succeeded in detaching some territory from Attalus's kingdom. After the battle of Magnesia, the Romans instructed Prusias to return the territory that he had gained to the new king, Eumenes. This merely provoked further attacks, with Hannibal aiding Prusias. There was a battle at sea, which Hannibal won, but the Bithynian victories were short-lived. The Romans intervened, winning the war in 182. Eumenes recovered his territory, and the Romans once again demanded the surrender of Hannibal. This time there was no opportunity for escape. The great Carthaginian general took poison.

In Rome, the Scipio brothers, the victors of Magnesia, fared little better. Lucius was accused of accepting bribes from Antiochus, which sounds highly unlikely, and Africanus was also accused of financial skulduggery, the details of which are obscure. The charges were brought by Cato the Censor, who had fought at the battle of Thermopylae, and had been forming an anti-Scipionic party in Rome. It says much for the strength of Cato's following that charges were brought at all, but there was no conviction in the courts. Nonetheless, Africanus left the city for his estates in Campania, and stayed there until his death. Thus both the victor and the vanquished at Zama tasted the bitterness of rejection by their own people, and death in exile from their native cities.

The Third War with Macedon

The next few years after the defeat of Antiochus the Great were relatively peaceful except for a revolt in Sardinia, which occupied the Romans from 181 to 176. It was not an unusual pattern after conquest and the creation of a province, when the next generation fought to regain the independence that their parents had lost. The people of Sardinia proved rather exceptional in continuing to resist for the next seventy-five years, and always resorted to banditry, assisted by their mountainous landscape. The Romans clung to the island because it provided grain and minerals.

Developments in Macedonia attracted Roman attention when it became obvious that Philip V was not content with his lot as an ally of Rome. He had been forced to relinquish territory that he claimed after the war with Antiochus, and now held a grudge against Rome for stifling his ambitions. Rome required stability in his kingdom but not development or expansion, so Philip bided his time and concentrated on rearmament and the accrual of wealth. He died before he could put it to use, but his son Perseus continued in the same tradition of covert hostility to Rome. Having succeeded to the wealth and manpower built up by his father, Perseus cultivated the other Greek states who were not happy with the Romans and started to make the ones that were friends of Rome feel very insecure.

It took the Romans until 172 to begin to check him. They had already determined on war, but went through the motions of sending an embassy to make various demands that Perseus could not meet without giving up his autonomy, so war was a foregone conclusion. However, in the eyes of their own people at home and in the eyes of the other Greeks, the Romans had been seen to observe the proper diplomatic forms, somewhat like consultations in the modern world, where meetings are held and closely documented, the people who take part have their say, and then the original plans go ahead anyway.

The war began in 171, but nothing much was achieved until the consul Aemilius Paullus arrived in 168. He already had experience of the problems of the Greek states and their jealousies and rivalries, having been a member of the commission sent out to organize the settlement of the area after the defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia. His first task on arrival was to perk up the army that had been achieving very little for three years, and then he could concentrate on bringing Perseus to battle, which he achieved at Pydna in Macedonia in 168. The Macedonian phalanx at first repulsed the Romans, but in advancing so far the soldiers could not keep close together, and anyway the sun was shining in their eyes and they began to break up. The Romans saw their opportunity and destroyed the phalanx using

their short swords. The victory was not a foregone conclusion, and Paullus said afterwards that he always shuddered and broke into a cold sweat whenever he thought of the Macedonian phalanx advancing on his troops.

The Macedonian state was now divided up into four Republics, monitored but not annexed by Rome. A resurgence of power such as Philip and Perseus had achieved could never occur again. Perseus himself was captured and died in Rome as a prisoner, despised and maltreated, to Rome's discredit. Many other prisoners were taken to Rome who had probably had no hand in the war, but who were under suspicion. About 1,000 Achaeans were transported to the city, ostensibly to answer the charges of instigating or engaging in anti-Roman activities. They were not returned to their homelands for some time, so they became in effect hostages to ensure the good behaviour of other Greeks. Fortunately for historians and archaeologists, one of these Achaean captives was the historian Polybius, who was made a client or dependant of Scipio Aemilianus. This Scipio was the natural son of the victor of Pydna, Aemilius Paullus, but as a young child he was adopted by Publius Cornelius Scipio to continue the Scipionic family line. When Polybius wrote his history of Rome, he made all due reference to the Scipio family, especially Africanus, who was Aemilianus's adoptive grandfather.

Rome's relationship with Greece was undergoing a change. The balance of power had shifted when Macedonia was subdued and then broken up, so the Greeks were no longer threatened with domination by the Macedonian kings, but they soon realized that they had exchanged the threat of domination by Macedon for the very real domination by Rome. The Greeks began to murmur, and the Romans grew more and more suspicious. They had been capably and loyally assisted by the Rhodians in the wars against Macedonia, but the Romans chose to forget this when the Rhodians tried to mediate between Perseus and Rome. The Romans took offence and forced the Rhodians to give up territories in Asia Minor, and then added insult to injury by establishing a free port on the island of Delos. Trade was the main support of the Rhodian economy, which was now ruined by Roman intervention. The Romans dealt out similar high-handed treatment to Eumenes of Pergamum, who had also helped them in the war against Perseus, and they attacked the towns of Epirus and enslaved large numbers of the inhabitants. The freedom of the Greeks, declared with pomp and ceremony by Flamininus less than thirty years earlier, was now revealed as an illusion. The Greeks thought that they could continue as before, governing themselves and fighting each other as they wished, in total independence. The Romans

interpreted freedom rather differently. It meant dependence on Rome and obedience to Roman wishes, in effect clientship and unconditional loyalty.

The Roman perception of the world that surrounded the Mediterranean was also changing. The victory at Pydna and the subjugation of Macedonia taught the Romans that war could be profitable. They no doubt knew this already, but the wealth that poured into the city from Macedonia made it possible to remit the property tax on Roman citizens in Italy (*tributum civium Romanorum*) from 167 onwards. Within another two decades the Romans started to acquire territories overseas, and revenues flowed into the capital.

Spain, Africa & Greece

The inhabitants of the areas recently subjugated by the Romans did not lie down and give in without a struggle. In the two Spanish provinces, rebellions went on for years, hard fought with escalating cruelty on both sides. Several people since the Romans have tried to subdue the Spaniards and found that it is not as easy as it looks, the country itself being a prominent factor in the embarrassment of the aggressors, and the hardness of the natives being another. Supply of food and war material was always a problem to the Romans in Spain, epitomised by a statement of a much later monarch, Henri IV of France, who said that Spain is a country where large armies starve and small ones are defeated.

The first signs of trouble appeared in both provinces at about the same time. In 155 the Celtiberian tribes in Nearer Spain and the Lusitanians in the Further province raised separate revolts. The Lusitanians were defeated by the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba in 151, but in pursuing the remnants of the tribes Galba lost many of his troops. In 150 he resorted to treachery, promising a treaty with the tribes and then turning on them. Many were killed, and the rest were sold into slavery. Among those who escaped was a shepherd called Viriathus, or more correctly Viriatus, whose name entered into Roman history because he waged a successful eight-year guerilla war against the Romans after the massacre in 150. He may have learned, and would perhaps have been surprised, that in the following year a tribune in Rome, supported by Marcus Porcius Cato, had proposed that Galba should be brought to trial for his betrayal of the Lusitanians. But in the end, Viriatus would not have been surprised when the senators closed ranks and Galba escaped condemnation. Such a blatant miscarriage of justice only served to underline the callous attitude of the Romans to the Lusitanian tribesmen. Not much is known of Viriatus between 150 and 147, but by then he had

emerged as leader of the Lusitanians, and he managed to weld his own people and the Celtiberians together, operating in guerrilla actions in both Spanish provinces. In 140 he defeated a Roman army under Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus, and made peace, but even though the arrangements were ratified by the Roman people, in the following year the Senate reneged on the peace settlement, allowing the new commander Gnaeus Servilius Caepio to resume hostilities. Viriatus was betrayed by one of his own men in the pay of the Romans, and after his death resistance collapsed. The Lusitanians surrendered in 138.

While the wars in Spain were dragging on, the Carthaginians were revitalizing their commerce. It was all they had left since the terms of the peace treaty with Rome at the end of the second Punic war removed their capacity to make war in any part of the world unless the Romans approved. Even though Carthage had been utterly defeated, fear and loathing of their former enemy had not been eradicated from Roman collective consciousness. The recent example of Philip V of Macedonia and his rapid resurgence to political and military power did nothing to allay the suspicion of the Romans that the renewal of Carthaginian trade and the subsequent wealth that it brought could so easily lead to the same result. The alliance between Rome and the Numidian chief Masinissa served to keep Carthage down, since the Numidians constantly raided Carthaginian territory, but by the terms of their treaty the Carthaginians were not allowed to fight back. On several occasions an appeal for assistance was sent from Carthage to Rome, and each time a commission of enquiry was sent to Africa, but ended by condoning Masinissa's actions. In 153 the elderly Marcus Porcius Cato was included in the group of Roman senators who were sent to investigate the latest dispute between Carthage and Masinissa. Cato saw how wealthy and potentially powerful Carthage had become, and on his return to Rome, whenever he spoke in the Senate, no matter what the subject was, he always ended with the words '*Carthago delenda est*', meaning Carthage must be destroyed.

The Carthaginians were in an impossible position, and in 151 or 150 they fought back and attacked Masinissa. Unfortunately they were defeated, and it was more unfortunate still that the Romans interpreted the hostilities as a warlike act. An army was despatched to Africa to remove all Carthaginian war material and siege engines. At first the Carthaginians complied with everything the Romans demanded of them rather than go to war, but they were being deliberately pushed into a corner which, one way or another, involved their annihilation. The Romans had promised to spare the lives of the

all the Carthaginians and to allow them to continue to govern themselves, but now came the ultimate demand. The old city of Carthage was to be abandoned, and a new one built at least 10 miles from the coast. A city that relied on trade across the Mediterranean clearly could not survive under those circumstances. The Carthaginians decided that they had nothing to lose, and went to war in 149, the year in which Cato died. They had to manufacture weapons, since the Romans had seized their war equipment. The story goes that the Carthaginian women donated their long hair to make the torsion springs for the catapults, with which the Carthaginians defended their walls. The third Punic war had begun.

One of the officers in the Roman army fighting against the Carthaginians was Scipio Aemilianus. He was not yet politically important but he possessed two powerful names, those of his father Aemilius Paullus and his adoptive family of the Scipios. He was not eligible for any of the higher magistracies, so when he returned from Carthage to Rome his aim was to stand for election as aedile. The Scipio family would be able to muster a large following of clients and friends who could work on the susceptibilities of the Roman populace, who were soon agitating for the election of Aemilianus to the consulship. There was the precedent of Aemilianus's adoptive grandfather, Scipio Africanus, and the added pressure of a war against Carthage that had been started two years before and was not going very well. The Carthaginians were fighting for their lives, and had proved more effective than the Romans anticipated.

Scipio Aemilianus soon gained the upper hand. He defeated a Carthaginian army and put the city of Carthage under siege. The Carthaginians were outnumbered and ran out of food, so the fall of the city was a foregone conclusion, but not before they had made the Romans fight for every building and every inch of ground. Anyone who survived after the Roman victory was enslaved, the city was utterly destroyed and the agricultural land sowed with salt. The days of Roman intervention followed by a peace settlement and the withdrawal of troops were over. The territory formerly ruled by Carthage was annexed and named the province of Africa.

In the same year, 146, the Romans also destroyed Corinth. Two wars in Greece had started almost simultaneously with the Carthaginian war, in 149, when anti-Roman feeling reached a new peak. The Achaeans who had been taken to Rome in 168 after the battle of Pydna were finally allowed to return home in 151. Their opinion of Rome had not improved in the intervening years and their homecoming inflamed the rest of the Achaeans. Before they organized themselves to defy the Romans, a pretender to the Macedonian throne

called Andriscus turned up with the claim that he was the son of Perseus, and quickly took over the old kingdom, drawing upon the hatred for the Romans who were seen as oppressors. The first Roman attempts to stop him met with defeat but, in 148 at Pydna, Andriscus was defeated by the praetor Metellus. The previous arrangements whereby Macedonia had been divided into four republics had not prevented the populations from uniting against Rome, so the whole area was annexed.

Watching the developments in Macedonia, and knowing that the Roman forces were spread over a wide area since they were also at war with the Spanish tribes and with the Carthaginians, the members of the Achaean confederacy decided that the Romans would be too preoccupied with other battles to notice if they engaged in military action of their own. They put an end to their dispute with Sparta by attacking, defeating and absorbing the whole state. There was some diplomatic wrangling while the Romans protested and issued warnings, which the Achaeans ignored, and all the time the hatred of Roman domination was spreading to other Greek states. Finally the consul Lucius Mummius was sent out with two legions. The leader of the Achaeans, Critolaus, risked battle and was defeated and killed. The Achaeans tried again and Mummius defeated them a second time at Leucopetra in 146. In the rest of Greece, Metellus, the general who had put down the Macedonian revolt, squashed any remaining embers of rebellion. In order to underline the power of Rome and make an example that would be crystal clear to other cities, Corinth was treated in the same way as Carthage, completely destroyed, looted for its portable wealth and art treasures, and the inhabitants enslaved. The events of the year 146 indicated clearly to the rest of the Mediterranean world that Rome had progressed from disinterested protector of friends to dictator of terms, and brutal oppressor if the terms were not met.

Meanwhile the war in Spain was not yet over. The Celtiberians raised revolt again in 143. Most of the tribesmen surrendered to the consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus when made a sudden attack on them, but the die-hards held out, using the town of Numantia as their stronghold. The Romans sent another commander, Quintus Pompeius Aulus, who blockaded Numantia through the winter and made peace in 140, but typical of the attitude of the Senate to the Spanish tribes, the terms were not ratified and the war continued. The next commander, Gaius Hostilius Mancinus, never reached the stage of making peace, but managed to get himself surrounded, and gave in, surrendering with his army of 20,000 men in 137. One of the officers in his army was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, whose father had treated the

Spanish tribes well, and was remembered with gratitude. The Numantines would negotiate only with Tiberius, and in the end they let the whole army go free, but without any of their equipment or possessions. In Rome, there was outrage that a Roman army had surrendered. The Senate decreed that Mancinus should be sent back to Numantia and left to the mercy of the rebels, but the rebels were not interested in killing him.

The war against the Celtiberians was becoming an embarrassment, calling for special efforts to bring it to a conclusion. Although the situation was not as dire as the war against Hannibal had been, and there was no direct threat to Rome itself, it was considered that it was time to call in the top man, Scipio Aemilianus, the general who had finished the war against Carthage in 146. He was elected to the consulship for 134, despite the legislation only recently passed to prevent men from holding the office for a second time. When he arrived in Spain he spent some time instilling discipline into the soldiers who were very demoralized, and clearing the camps of all unnecessary personnel, including the slaves of the officers and men, and the camp followers that inevitably clustered around any army. He also recruited local tribesmen to swell the ranks of his army. Then he put Numantia under siege. He built a stone wall and ditch all around the site, with towers at regular intervals, and a series of camps for the soldiers, to the eventual distress of the Numantines and the gratification of archaeologists who have studied the remains of siege works and his camps with their internal layouts, to elucidate how the Roman army operated in the middle of the second century BC. The layout suggests that the army was still organized in manipular formation, not yet by cohorts, which had appeared by Caesar's day.

There were some skirmishes in which the Romans did not always emerge unscathed, but Scipio accomplished his main aims of cutting off the supplies to the Numantines, and detaching the other Spanish tribes from their allegiance and preventing them from rendering assistance. In the end the Numantines were starved out, and sold as slaves, in 133. Peace of a sort came to Spain at last, on Roman terms. A commission of ten senators was sent out to reorganize the whole country.

The Price of Success

The wars of the second century BC stretched manpower resources and revealed some problems. Twelve Latin cities had reached the point of exhaustion during the war with Hannibal and had been unable to provide any more recruits, but even after the departure of the Carthaginian army, some of the allies found it difficult to reach their

quotas of manpower because many of their menfolk had migrated to Rome. The allied cities themselves agitated for the return of their citizens, and in 187 and 177 some of the Latins who had settled in Rome were sent back to their places of origin. Some men were expelled because they had obtained or claimed Roman citizenship by fraud, which indicates that citizenship was worth having.

In the war with Carthage in the third century BC the Romans had been fighting for survival, and the citizens and allies had responded with a will, but military service in the foreign wars from 200 onwards was not popular. The property qualification for service in the army had to be progressively lowered to find more recruits, but the qualification had been set in the first place to produce men who were wealthy enough to provide their own military equipment. If poorer men were recruited they had to be equipped at state expense, or occasionally by the general who was raising an army. When Scipio took command in Spain he assembled many of his own clients and some volunteers, but no new consular army was raised for the Numantine war. On two occasions, in 151 and 138, the call to arms had been resisted, and the tribunes had lent political support to the resistance. Service in the Roman army, particularly in Spain, had become onerous and unrewarding.

Adult males in Rome and allied cities were eligible for call-up for sixteen years of their lives, and had to serve for six campaigns, after which they were classified as veterans. Although there was no standing army at this period, there was an army in the field somewhere in the Roman world for most of the time, so a sort of professionalism grew out of continued service. Some men made a career out of the army, voluntarily re-enlisting for different campaigns, not necessarily with the rank that they had held in previous campaigns, but with accumulating experience that could be handed on.

A short time after the first provinces were established, the high-handed treatment of the provincials by some of the governors, who regarded their term of office as an opportunity for making their fortunes by fair means or foul, created the need for a legal mechanism to make reparations. The provincials could send delegations to the Senate to complain about a governor's behaviour, and the case would be taken up in Rome. At first such offences were investigated and tried before the people's assembly. In 171 the notorious extortion of money from the inhabitants of the Spanish provinces was the subject of special legal proceedings, but there was no systematic way of dealing with rapacious governors. The problem did not fade away, and extortion grew to such proportions that eventually, in 149, the tribune

Lucius Calpurnius Piso passed a law concerning the recovery of money, or the monetary value of goods, that had been illegally extorted from the provinces. As a result of this law a special permanent court was established, the *quaestio de pecuniis repetundis* (the term *repetundae*, always in the plural, means specifically the recovery of extorted money). This court is generally considered to be the first permanent one in Rome, on which other later courts were modelled. It was always accessible, and a coterie of experienced lawyers developed, always on hand to prepare the case for prosecution. Fifty senators formed the jury, with a praetor in charge of proceedings. Taken at face value, the provincials were well protected, but in practice the condemnation of venal governors was rare. The lesser offences were probably ignored by the provincial population, because they were discouraged by the prohibitive expense involved in going to Rome and the time taken to reach a verdict, so it was probably only the worst cases that ever reached the courts. Then there was the solidarity of the senatorial order, and the reluctance of individual senators to pass the verdict of guilty on men whom they knew, and to whom they were probably either indebted or even distantly related by means of dynastic marriages. Besides, each senator might govern a province himself one day, and would probably rely upon making a profit from his tour of duty. It was regarded as a privilege, and some men began to run up debts in campaigning for office, in the hope of being able to settle them if they obtained a province.

One of the most pressing problems of the first half of the second century BC was the question of land. It was a perennial concern, with antecedents in the previous century, and repercussions in the next. The public land (*ager publicus*) had been won by conquest and was theoretically open to all Roman citizens, and after 338 when the Latin League was dissolved, it was available to the Latins as well. There had been disputes from the earliest times about how the land should be used, whether it should be distributed to the poorer classes, or leased to the wealthier citizens who would pay rent, providing an income for the state. With the passage of time there had been successive encroachments on the public lands and large estates had grown up at the expense of the small farmers. Two attempts to limit the size of individual holdings to 500 *iugera* (about 140 hectares or 350 acres) had failed. The first was in 367 when the Licinio-Sextian laws were passed, and the second attempt occurred at some time between 201 and 167, when the limit was once again set at 500 *iugera*, indicating that the previous laws had been ignored and farmers had expanded their holdings. The number of animals that could be grazed by one farmer on the public pasture was limited to 100 cattle, and 500

smaller grazing animals such as sheep and goats. The repetition of these laws illustrates the constant growth of larger holdings encroaching on the public land, often by rich senators whose estates were truly vast.

The land question was bound up with service in the army. The majority of the soldiers were drawn from the small farmers, so if the numbers of farmers declined so did the availability of recruits. When the Romans were fighting their neighbours, raising an army on an annual basis, conducting the campaign and then disbanding the troops so that the soldiers could go home for the harvest, the system worked well enough. It was likely that in those days the levy did not include all the eligible manpower, so that there would be some of the younger men as well as older farmers who remained at home and looked after the farms. The expansion of Rome necessitated foreign wars and longer continuous periods of service, so some of the soldiers would remain under arms for longer, and a greater number of men would be levied at one time, especially when the Romans were hard pressed. For several years, for several reasons, fewer men could stay on the farms.

The decline of the small farms can be attributed to several causes, in addition to the increased exploitation of military manpower. The spread of the *latifundia*, the enormous landed estates of the wealthy, is usually blamed as the chief cause of rural depopulation, but there were other contributory factors. The enforced absence of the soldiers, combined with the death rate during the various wars, and the devastation caused by Hannibal's long sojourn in Italy, meant that some farms were abandoned altogether. The occupants migrated to the towns, and most especially to Rome, where the urban mob swelled in proportion to the decline of the rural population. Many of the soldiers who completed their service with the army came home to find their farms non-existent, run down beyond repair, or purchased by the wealthy landowners whose enormous estates swallowed up the small farms. The introduction of slave labour on the great estates enabled food to be produced more cheaply, and the import of cheap foreign grain and foodstuffs eroded the potential profit from growing crops at home, so even if some of the farmers had managed to hang onto their holdings and make a living, eventually the competition forced them out. These unfortunate people also migrated to Rome, and to the smaller Italian towns and cities.

In 173 the Senate gave one of the consuls the task of investigating the holdings on public and private lands and establishing boundaries between them, because private owners had encroached on public land and now regarded it as their own by right, to pass onto their heirs.

The only result of the investigation was that a mere 50,000 *iugera* of public land were purchased from the occupants, and the rest remained in the hands of the wealthy landowners. About thirty years later, the Senate once again started to worry about the decline of the small farmers, the numbers of landless men thronging the city of Rome, and the lack of recruits. It was suggested that the public land should be redistributed to the dispossessed in small allotments, so that the landless men could go back to farming, providing a modest propertied class that would also furnish recruits for the army, and at the same time Rome would be emptied of potential troublemakers. The proposals never came to fruition because redistribution of the land for the dispossessed in Rome entailed the eviction of the men who were already there, the *possessores*, who by now regarded the lands as their own. This was not a recent settlement, since some of the farmers had been farming there for several generations, and any legal requirement that they may have had to pay rent to the state had been lost in the mists of time. But what discouraged the investigators most was the fact that many of the landowners who had taken over public land were senators, well-connected, stupendously wealthy, politically powerful, socially influential and in control of the courts. It was a thorny problem. In 133 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus entered office as tribune, determined to solve it.

Reforming Zeal: The Republic Comes of Age 133–83 BC

The tribunes of the plebs entered office in the December prior to their year of office, before the consuls took up their magistracies in January of the following year. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was just one of the tribunes whose tenure began on 10 December 134 for 133. He was to launch proposals for reform which allegedly had been instigated by his observation of the sorry state of the Italian countryside and the farmers who tried to scratch a living from it, all of which he witnessed while he was on his way to the wars in Spain. That was not the only problem that occupied him, for there was much in Rome that was in need of reform by the latter half of the second century BC.

After the wars with the Carthaginians and the Greeks, culminating in the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146, Roman attitudes changed. Expansion had not been the main aim of Roman foreign policy until then. Spain was taken from the Carthaginians and the Romans held onto it to keep the Carthaginians out and to exploit the resources of the two newly created Spanish provinces, but there was a considerable price to pay before the whole country was pacified. In the eastern Mediterranean, wars were fought, peace was made, with or without a treaty, and then the soldiers went home. For a short time it was possible to deal with cities, states, tribes or confederacies by playing one off against the other, which obviated the need for direct Roman control until situations got out of hand, then an army would be sent, the problems sorted out, not necessarily to the advantage of the non-Roman participants, and then in most cases the Romans withdrew. After 146, instead of making administrative arrangements and going home, the Romans lost patience and started to annexe territory, administering it from Rome via provincial governors.

As the Romans changed their perceptions of countries outside Italy, and entered on a phase of deliberate expansion, there was also a detectable change in attitudes at home. Selfishness set in, privileges were jealously guarded, and where there had once been willingness to share the benefits of conquest, booty and recently acquired lands, with their allies, the Romans began to ration the rewards and privileges that had hitherto been accorded to the Italians. Although the old struggle between the patricians and the plebs was no longer relevant,

there was still no lack of dissension among the Roman populace at all levels. The senatorial class was dominated by a handful of influential families whose members were continually elected to high office, and formed an almost impenetrable network of alliances with other families, by marrying off their sons and daughters in arranged liaisons in order to gain the best possible political and financial advantages. The social and political standing of prominent senators was made all the greater by the client system, whereby vast numbers of people from all walks of life were bound to the head of the family, for mutual support and benefits. Hosts of clients would turn up at the senator's house in the mornings for an audience, probably being set specific tasks for which they were paid in one way or another. A senator might support and finance the careers of aspiring young men in politics or in business, or simply support the heads of poorer families, in return for which these men would become part of the senator's *clientelae*, bound closely to him, and turning out with him in public. A senator's worth was judged by the magnitude of the crowd of clients he could muster when he attended meetings or processed through the Forum.

This network of clients around a senator was augmented or supplemented by another group, or class, of men whom the Romans called *equites*, usually translated into English either in the literal sense of knights because of the connection with horses (from *equus*, plural *equi*, the Latin for horse), or alternatively as the middle classes. Neither of these terms is exact, but there is no suitable equivalent term that conveys the rank and position that these men held. Originally the *equites* were connected to the army, operating as horsemen, as the name suggests. The censors chose a group of young men who would qualify for the gift of the 'public horse', or a mount provided by the state, accompanied by money for the upkeep of the animal. The system survived throughout the Republic, but at the same time the description *equites* began to be applied to a wider group of men, embracing those who served as mounted warriors, and then it was also used to distinguish the class of men who were not senators. So the equestrian order, as it is described in modern books, could include wealthy sons of senators who would eventually enter the Senate, and a whole range of business men, landowners whose wealth derived from agriculture, equestrian tax collectors, merchants and the like. Some of these equestrians were closely bound to senators by dint of running their business enterprises for them. Since senators were forbidden to engage directly in trade, and their ownership of large cargo vessels was severely restricted by a law passed at the end of the third century BC, from this time onwards, if not before, the equestrians stepped in to run the businesses, working for senators as agents or *negotiatores*. With the extension of Roman control over the

countries around the Mediterranean, the equestrians also spread into these areas, until there was hardly a city or a port which lacked Roman equestrians engaged in trade or business.

The senators and equestrians derived considerable benefit from the wealth that flowed into Rome as territorial expansion by conquest brought in vast spoils of war and indemnity payments from the defeated states. Some of this timely enrichment of the state was used to finance further wars, but it did not trickle downwards to the benefit of the poorer classes, because prices rose, more food was imported and slaves worked the large estate farms, all of which made it an uphill task for the small farmers to make a living because they did not receive a sufficient return for their produce. The drift to the towns and cities affected the Latins and the Italian allies as well as Rome, but the problem of the urban poor in Rome was endemic, and showed no sign of abating. Dissensions began to widen into conflicts. The senators despised the urban poor and strenuously denied them political power, the urban poor resented the rich land-owning senators, but also despised the allies and objected to any suggestion of allowing them equal rights, and the allies were disaffected with all the Romans because of their increasingly unfair treatment. The Romans did not pay tax after 167, while the allies continued to contribute money and manpower, but after the 170s they no longer shared in the distribution of land and booty even though they had been fighting on Rome's behalf. One of the main strengths of the Roman system of alliances had been the mutual obligations and benefits that both parties shared. Lack of full Roman citizenship had not seemed so disadvantageous when the allies received their rewards, but now there was an imbalance. The Romans were better off, so citizenship with its privileges was more desirable, and in some cases it was deemed worth risking the penalties for claiming it fraudulently.

Politicians could take up any one of the causes of discontent and make mileage out of agitation on behalf of the particular groups who were affected by the problems. The age of dominant political and military personalities began, starting with Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, followed by Marius, Sulla, Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar. As the problems worsened, in addition to fighting their enemies and sorting out the squabbles between their Greek neighbours, the Romans started to fight each other.

Tiberius Gracchus

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was a member of the plebeian nobility, so his origins entitled him to stand for election as tribune, from which office patricians were excluded. Tiberius was well connected. His

father, also called Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, had been consul twice, always a great distinction in consular families, and had reached the pinnacle of his career when he was made censor in 169. Tiberius junior was born probably in 163, though the date is not certain. His mother was Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Hannibal, and his wife was the daughter of Appius Claudius. With family connections such as these, not many of his contemporaries considered it likely that Tiberius would set out to disrupt the state. Modern historians are divided as to his motives, some saying that he genuinely wanted to improve the welfare of the poorer classes and to solve the problems caused by the drift to the city, while others insist that he was nothing but a demagogue who used his programmes of reforms to further his own career.

His proposals for reform included a law that would redistribute parcels of the public land to the urban poor, by making it illegal for any individual farmer to hold more than 500 *iugera* of such land. Farmers who were already in occupation of the public land could keep this much land rent free, and were allowed an extra 250 *iugera* for each child, up to a maximum of four children, which would provide an estate of 1,500 *iugera*, approximately 900 acres. The rest of the public land was to be allocated to landless farmers in small parcels of 30 *iugera* each, which they were not allowed to sell.

Although the proposed law would entail evictions from the land, Tiberius tried to accommodate the farmers who had been settled there for some time without disrupting them too much, allowing them to remain on the land without paying rent to the state, but many senators had cultivated vast estates, and would have to down-size. Not only that, but the three-man commission that was to be set up to redistribute the land had the last word on which lands were to be given up, and it was possible that the commissioners would earmark some of the most productive acres that would have to be relinquished. Besides, no matter how fertile the land was, all the existing farmers would have put time and money into establishing crops, particularly perhaps olives, which take about ten years to start to yield a profit, and vines. The loss of these crops would rankle, to say the least. Opposition to Tiberius's bill was unavoidable.

Resettlement on the land would alleviate the problems of the urban poor in Rome, but modern scholars have questioned whether the 30 *iugera* allocation would provide a group of farmers with the relevant property qualification to provide recruits for the army, so the only result, not an inconsiderable one, would be to reduce the size of the Roman mob. There were other considerations about reallocating the land. Families who possessed nothing to start with would need

gifts or loans to be able to set up. A small plot that could be successfully farmed with only one or two family members would probably not produce enough to make a profit, and would not provide all of the everyday needs of each family, who would need some profit, in whatever form, to exchange for other goods. Another problem was that not all the urban poor would make good farmers, just as the later settlement of time-served veterans on the land failed to solve all their problems, and the drift back to Rome started again. The clause forbidding sale of the 30 *iugera* allotments would not prevent a family from returning to the city, and so the land that had been wrested from previous farmers might be abandoned.

Despite these potential shortcomings, the proposed law was supported by the public, as most land bills were whenever they surfaced in Roman politics. The opposition came from men who might lose lands, and principally from the Senate. Since tribunes possessed the right of *intercessio*, or veto, on proposals of any kind which threatened the interests of the populace, the senators approached one of the other tribunes to ask him to use his veto to block Tiberius's bill. The tribune Marcus Octavius accordingly did so when the bill was presented to the assembly. This was a contradiction of the original purpose of the tribunician veto, since the land law was intended to benefit the people.

Tiberius reacted by bringing the meeting to a close and then trying to persuade Octavius to withdraw his veto. When he met with failure, he proposed that Octavius should be deposed from his office, and he asked the assembly to vote on the issue. It was agreed, and Octavius was physically manhandled and removed from the meeting, despite the fact that tribunes were supposed to be sacrosanct while in office and therefore anyone who injured Octavius was theoretically subject to penalties. Then a new tribune was elected to replace him. The content of the land law now became rather less inflammatory than the methods that Tiberius used to force it through.

The commission of three men to put the land law into effect was allowed to assemble, consisting originally of Tiberius, his brother Gaius Gracchus and his father-in-law Appius Claudius. The personnel changed later on, but the work still went forward, hindered by lack of funds because the Senate refused to allocate them more than a token amount. Tiberius was not defeated on this score, because money was available from a particular bequest to the Romans, which was nothing less than the entire kingdom of the recently deceased King Attalus of Pergamum who died in 133. Tiberius took the matter to the *concilium plebis*, the council of the plebs, to divert some of the money to the land commissioners so that they could carry out their tasks. The cash flow

resumed, and the commission's problems were eased, but the senators rounded on Tiberius, accusing him of accepting royal insignia from Pergamum, and intending to make himself king.

Perhaps the matter would have ended there and the land commission would simply have gone about its business, but Tiberius announced that he was going to stand for election as tribune for a second term in 132. A law had been passed in the 180s making it illegal for anyone to seek re-election to the same office until ten years had elapsed, but this may have concerned only the praetorship and consulship. The fact that Tiberius flouted one or two laws did not upset the senators quite so much as the habit of laying everything before the people's assemblies and carrying through his legislation without reference to the Senate. Although the Romans conducted business in the name of the Senate and the People of Rome, it was the Senate that framed and formed policy, not the people. In anticipation of Tiberius's future proposals, the Senate decided to block him before he could start. At the elections, while people were still voting, Tiberius was removed as a candidate. None of this adequately conveys the build up of violent feelings towards him in the Senate.

The next day, Tiberius gathered his considerable crowd of supporters, 3,000 according to some sources, and occupied the Forum in readiness for the meeting of the assembly. Tiberius was now being portrayed as a tyrant. It was no longer a matter of opposition to the policies that he had pushed through, but fear that he might take over the state. One of the senators, Scipio Nasica, who happened to be *pontifex maximus* or chief priest, argued that Tiberius should be killed. The consul, Publius Mucius Scaevola, refused to authorize such a momentous action without a trial, but feelings were running high, and Scipio Nasica won the day, leading the senators out to confront Tiberius and his supporters. In the ensuing riot, worthy of the name battle, Tiberius was killed along with many of his followers. Their corpses were thrown into the Tiber, and therefore denied proper burial. The rest of Tiberius's supporters were rounded up and executed.

What had happened far outclassed the fratricide upon which Rome was founded. The Senate had the power to negotiate, to discuss Tiberius's proposals, to meet him half way and find a suitable compromise, to find some other method of removing the landless men from Rome, such as the foundation of colonies. If no agreement could be reached after sober discussion, the senators had the power to bring Tiberius to court by means of some legal fiction if necessary. No one in Roman politics was ever shy of bringing trumped up charges against a man who was considered to be a troublemaker. Instead the

senators chose appalling slaughter in the city itself. Their attendants had brought clubs and weapons with them to the meeting, and the senators themselves picked up pieces of smashed seats and benches and used them on Tiberius's supporters. It would have been small comfort to the bereaved families that an enquiry into the events was set up as soon as everything had calmed down, and Scipio Nasica was quietly packed off to Pergamum at the head of a commission of five senators while the kingdom was taken over in accordance with the will of King Attalus. Nasica never returned to Rome.

Foreign Wars & Roman Expansion 135–121 BC

The absorption of the kingdom of Pergamum was not a simple matter of imposing a Roman administrative system and collecting the taxes. King Eumenes, the predecessor of Attalus, had an illegitimate son called Aristonicus, who entertained designs on taking over the kingdom for himself. He rallied the people and promised freedom and equality for everyone, and managed to defeat a Roman army that was sent against him, led by Licinius Crassus, who was killed in the battle. The consul for 130, Marcus Perperna, took command and in turn defeated and killed Aristonicus. It took the next four years to pacify and organize the kingdom, which was converted into a new province called Asia, with some of the original territory near the eastern borders given away to local rulers, but these lands were not as fertile as the rest of the province and would not have yielded a great return for the cost of administration. The new province on the shores of the Aegean Sea provided a stepping stone for Rome to monitor events in the east and to expand further if necessary, but above all it was very wealthy, and therefore unfortunately fell victim to greed, as a province where governors and tax collectors could line their pockets, pay all their debts and still come home as rich men.

From 135 to 132 Roman armies were fighting in Sicily, where a serious and well organized slave revolt had started, led by Eunous, a Syrian slave who called himself King Antiochus and set up his capital in the area of Henna. It was estimated that about 70,000 slaves joined the revolt, either under Eunous or in independent actions. Some of Eunous's associates took over Agrigentum, and others captured Tauromenium (modern Taormina), Messina and Catania. The Romans under Calpurnius Piso had to recapture the towns one by one, and it took the best part of three years to do it.

In the north, the people of Massilia were harassed by the Gallic tribes, principally the Saluvii, and finally appealed to Rome for military assistance, which arrived under the consul Fulvius Flaccus in 125. The campaign was continued under the consul for 124, Gaius

Sextius Calvinus, who defeated the Ligurians and took the main Saluvian settlement at Aquae Sextiae (modern Aix-en-Provence), which the Romans fortified and occupied. The route from Italy to the Rhone was now under Roman control, but as usual, when the Romans took over territory, the nearest neighbours felt threatened and made aggressive noises. Roman occupation of Ligurian and Saluvian territory triggered an alliance among the Arverni and Allobroges, settled on each side of the Rhone. The Romans asked them to hand over any Saluvians who had taken refuge with them. The result was war, ending in defeat in 121 of the Allobroges by the proconsul Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, and of the Arverni by the consul Fabius Maximus. Throughout the hostilities, the Aedui, settled north of the Arverni, remained pro-Roman.

Massilia remained free, but the rest of the territory of southern Gaul from the Alps to the Pyrenees was now under Roman control, as a province called Gallia Transalpina. Travel from Italy into Spain was facilitated by the Via Domitiana, named after its builder Domitius Ahenobarbus. A colony of Roman citizens was founded at Narbo Martius, which became the capital of the province under Augustus when its name was changed to Gallia Narbonensis.

Gaius Gracchus

Ten years would elapse before Tiberius's younger brother Gaius followed in his footsteps and stood for election as tribune for 123. He had been quaestor in Sicily for two years, where he had been overtly resistant to the opportunities for lining his own pockets. Like his brother Tiberius he stood for another term as tribune for 122, but unlike his brother he was elected without opposition. Gaius was a brilliant speaker, convincing and persuasive, and he had some senatorial supporters, one of whom was Fulvius Flaccus who had been consul in 125, and now against all precedent was elected tribune along with Gaius.

As tribune for two years, Gaius Gracchus passed laws that set in motion a series of reforms, but no proper chronology can be established because it is not certain to which year his individual laws belonged, so they are usually all described together. Probably among the first of Gaius's laws was the one aimed principally at Publius Popillius Laenas, who had been responsible for executing Tiberius's supporters. The new law stated that no capital trials should be held unless such proceedings were first approved by the assembly, and anyone who executed or exiled a citizen without such a trial would himself be subject to trial by the assembly. Having established the law, Gaius brought Popillius Laenas to trial and succeeded in exiling

him.

Some of Gaius's proposals were probably derived from the unfulfilled plans of Tiberius Gracchus. The work of the original land commission had been allowed to proceed, and since land bills that offered allotments to the poor were always popular, there was probably no shortage of applicants for the allotments, though Roman census figures show that the citizen population had risen from 318,828 in 130 to 394,736 five years later. Some scholars consider that the rise in population must be due to settlement on the allotments of public land, but this is difficult to prove or disprove, since the census included Roman citizens of eighteen years and upwards, so in part the increase could have derived from an upsurge in the birth rate and an increase in infant survival.

Gaius made some alterations to the land law via another bill which imposed rents on new allotments, and he removed some of the public land from redistribution. He also developed a programme for founding new colonies, some on lands in Italy including those of Capua and Tarentum, and abroad he proposed the foundation of another colony at Carthage, where the land confiscated by Rome would be allotted to settlers. The colony was to be called Junonia, and 6,000 settlers were allocated 200 *iugera* of land, amounting to about 130 acres.

The establishment of these colonies would help to reduce the numbers of poor in the city of Rome, and for those who remained Gaius passed a law to provide them with cheap grain, which the state would purchase just after the harvests, put into store in warehouses built in the city, and then distribute it every month to the people, who would pay a standard fee that was cheaper than the market price. In theory, riots caused by a shortage of food would be avoided in Rome, and no one should be completely destitute.

Gaius and his late brother Tiberius had pinpointed a number of grievances among the people, and they had also observed or listened to the problems of the soldiers. Recruitment was becoming gradually more difficult because fewer and fewer men possessed the property qualification, even though it had been lowered more than once. With foreign wars taking men far away for long periods, service in the army was unpopular, and Gaius's legislation reveals some of the reasons. It may have been Tiberius who thought of these measures but it was Gaius who enacted them, making it illegal to recruit soldiers of less than seventeen years of age, and removing the requirement for the men to pay for their clothing and equipment issued by the state. This in turn probably indicates that even if the men possessed the relevant property qualification for army service, some of them could not afford

to bring their own equipment. Gaius may also have passed a law to reduce the length of military service, though this is not proven.

Extortion of the provincials had scarcely abated, necessitating another law to try to ensure that the men responsible were tried and condemned. Only a few sections of Gaius's law *de repetundis* are known, but it allowed the allies to bring a charge against the men who had stolen money or property. Another of Gaius's concerns was the fact that the jury courts were dominated by the leading senators, who were less likely to condemn one their own order. Gaius disrupted this monopoly by placing the equestrians in charge of the court juries, but the details of how he did this are not clear. The struggle for the control of the courts was a perennial problem and went on for some time, back and forth like a game of tennis. Forty years or so after Gaius Gracchus, Sulla would put the courts back into the hands of senators, and a short time after Sulla's death, Pompey the Great and Crassus were elected consuls and reinstated the equestrians in control of the courts.

So far the legislation of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus had done very little for Rome's allies, save for the laws outlined above that gave them some redress against extortion. It seems that Gaius had plans for conferring Roman citizenship on all the Latins, and a limited franchise to the Italian allies, perhaps in the form of Latin rights. It was a topical theme, one that inevitably brought trouble in its wake. In 126 the tribune Marcus Junius Pennus passed a law to remove all non-Romans from the city of Rome, which indicated that the grant of citizenship was further away than ever. Exasperated by the refusal of the Romans to grant citizenship to the Latin allies, the inhabitants of Fregellae raised revolt, but the only result was the siege and destruction of the town. The hopes of the allies were revived in the following year. During his consulship in 125, Gaius's supporter Fulvius Flaccus had proposed that citizenship should be given to Latins and the Italian allies, or if the allies did not wish to be incorporated into the Roman state, then they should be given the right of appeal against the actions of Roman magistrates, which to some communities was more important than the right to vote in the Roman elections. The Senate circumvented these suggestions by sending Flaccus off to fight against the Saluvii who threatened Massilia, so the scheme had to be abandoned.

Among the senators and the people of Rome, the thought of enfranchising the Latins and enabling the allies to vote, however greatly their influence was to be limited, always provoked great opposition. There were many more Latins and allies than there were Romans, so senators feared that their own influence would be diluted,

and likewise the Roman people did not want the allies to share in their privileges.

After Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus left Rome to attend the foundation of the colony at Carthage, the Senate produced a counter-measure of their own, in the form of another tribune, Marcus Livius Drusus. As tribunes, Gaius and Fulvius ought not to have left the city, but perhaps the Senate authorized their absence because it suited them to remove the trouble makers while they rallied. During the interval, the senatorial agent Livius Drusus played to the gallery, dangling fantastic promises before the people of Rome and seducing them away from Gracchus. He proposed the foundation of twelve colonies that would be sufficient to resettle over 30,000 people. With regard to the allies, he avoided the citizenship question, and proposed an alternative that would not offend the jealous Romans, and would keep many of the allies happy. Only three years earlier, Fulvius Flaccus had highlighted the fact that citizenship with full voting rights was not necessarily the main concern for some of the Latins and allies, but avoidance of arbitrary treatment by magistrates, or at least the right of legal redress against such treatment, had more appeal. Livius Drusus latched onto this, proposing that Latins serving in the army under Roman officers should be immune from flogging.

When Gaius and Flaccus returned to Rome, they had lost the support of the people, and their enfranchisement bill came to nothing, either because it was vetoed by Livius Drusus or because the assembly voted against it. But the Italian allies would not forget that they might have come close to a greater equality with the Romans.

Gaius's end was more or less a duplicate of the fate of his brother. He stood for re-election for a third term as tribune in 121. Once again it was not so much a question of what he had done, but what he might achieve in another twelve months. A smear campaign ensured that he was not elected. He probably had no designs on ousting the entire Senate or taking over the state, but his laws were collectively anti-senatorial, so from the senators' point of view he had to be stopped. The opportunity came when Gaius and his followers turned up for the assembly when an important bill was to be presented, and a man was stabbed. Unfortunately he was a member of the staff of the consul Lucius Opimius. The Senate summoned Gaius and his friend Flaccus to appear at a meeting next day, but they stayed away. The consul Opimius was empowered to secure the safety of the state, by decree of the Senate. This procedure was eventually termed *senatus consultum ultimum*, or the last decree, a useful device allowing armed force to be brought in as a last resort. Gaius and Flaccus then went off to the Aventine Hill and armed their entourage, while Opimius gathered an

armed band of his own, with some archers from Crete who were staying near Rome. In the ensuing attack Flaccus and Gaius were killed. As with Tiberius's supporters, many of Gaius's followers were executed.

The enormity of what had been done, twice in just over ten years, did not endear the Senate to the people. A new division was created in Roman public life. Henceforth the politicians who worked on behalf of the people, or used the assemblies to further their own careers, were labelled the *populares*, while the groups who sided with and worked via the Senate labelled themselves the *optimates*, or the best men. The two categories were not rigid or permanent. Some men could change camps, and then change back again, according to the political climate they found themselves in and where the best chance of promotion lay. The conflict was to last until the end of the Republic, but unfortunately the violence shown initially by the senators was only the beginning. Worse was to come in Rome.

Gaius Marius

Gaius Marius was elected to his first consulship in 107, during the war with the African ruler Jugurtha, King of Numidia. Marius's entire career derived from success in war, and he was the first man to hold seven consulships in all, an unprecedented number in the Republic. Marius's plebeian ancestors came from Arpinum (modern Arpino) but not one of them was distinguished in any way. Marius was the first man in his family to reach the consulship, so he was a *novus homo*, or a new man in Rome, looked down on by the aristocracy whose illustrious forebears had been elected to the consulship for many generations. Marius's career owed much to the patronage of the Caecilii Metelli, a very distinguished and widespread aristocratic family, but he was a late starter in politics. He had served with Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia in Spain, alongside an ally of the Romans, Jugurtha, the grandson of Masinissa of Numidia. The two were to be opponents in the war in Africa some years later. Having served in the army, Marius turned to politics, backed by the Metelli. He was thirty-four when he was elected to the junior post of quaestor in 123, when Gaius Gracchus was tribune. Marius had been elected tribune himself in 119. In 115 he was one of the praetors in Rome, and then propraetor governing Further Spain. When he returned from his province, he married Julia, sister of Gaius Julius Caesar. In 100 BC Julia and Marius would become the aunt and uncle of the younger Gaius Julius Caesar, who would make more of an impression on Rome than Marius ever did.

When the war with Jugurtha broke out in Africa in 112, an

opportunity opened up for Marius to display his military talents. Jugurtha was not in direct line for the succession as King of Numidia, but had been adopted by King Micipsa, the son and successor of Masinissa. Micipsa already had two sons of his own, Hiempsal and Adherbal. When Micipsa died in 118, Jugurtha quickly removed Hiempsal by assassination, but Adherbal escaped from an attack made on him and fled to Rome for help. The Senate decided to split the kingdom into two parts, Jugurtha ruling the western half and Adherbal was given the more fertile eastern half. Within less than six years, Jugurtha turned on Adherbal, despite the advice of the Romans, finally capturing him at Cirta (modern Constantine) and having him murdered, in 112. The Romans became more deeply involved because Jugurtha also massacred the Italian business men and traders who had settled in Cirta. Two consuls fought against Jugurtha without result and eventually Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was given the command in 109. Marius was made one of his legates, as was Publius Rutilius Rufus, who like Marius had served under Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia. During the African campaign, if not earlier, Rufus and Marius became mortal enemies.

Metellus was successful in two battles and he captured some cities, but these actions did little to bring the war to an end. Marius's ambition probably had not been noticed among the influential Metelli, until he asked for leave from the African campaign to return to Rome in 108 for the consular elections for 107. Metellus was incredulous and advised him to wait, for which perceived insult Marius bore him an eternal grudge. If it was a surprise to Metellus, it was the culmination of carefully laid plans on the part of Marius. For some time he had been preparing the scene in Rome through his followers who were drumming up support for him, which was just as well since he had only six days in Rome to canvass in person. He was duly elected consul, and set about persuading the Senate to remove Metellus from the command of the army in Africa, and to install himself in his place.

When he was confirmed in his command, he began to recruit more soldiers to fill the gaps in the army in Africa. This was not the usual levy to raise new legions, but to augment the troops already there, and the numbers of men were not very large. Marius found the men he wanted by asking for volunteers, and departed from tradition by accepting men with little or no property, known as the *capite censi*, or men who did not possess enough property to qualify for service and who were lumped together in one voting century so that their political power was nullified. Such volunteers had been used before when there were emergencies and a shortage of manpower, and in any case the

property qualification had been lowered to the point where the state provided the necessary clothing and equipment, as shown in Gaius Gracchus's legislation relieving the soldiers of the duty of paying for it. There was considerable sense in recruiting able-bodied men who were willing to serve in the army, but it was always considered that men with property would have greater loyalty to the state, and besides they would have something to come home to, whereas men who had no land to farm and no income would require assistance that the state was not willing to give. The most dangerous precedent, one for which Marius is eternally blamed, is that the poorer classes would be more loyal to their commander than the Senate and people of Rome, and when they were discharged they would be dependent on the commander for rewards and settlement. Such a commander, with troops at his beck and call, would then be in a very powerful position, able to dominate the Senate and people by sheer force. Within a very few years after Marius's recruitment campaign, this is exactly what happened, but the blame cannot be laid entirely at his door. The lengthening campaigns in foreign countries, and the need for continuity of command surely contributed to the growth of loyalty of the soldiers to the commanders whom they served for several years, and the unresponsive Senate, which regularly ignored the needs of their returning armies, merely emphasized that loyalty, because the commander was the one person who could arrange for land settlements, reimbursement of some kind, or alternative employment for veterans. If they could not be granted plots of land, the next best thing for soldiers who were to be discharged was another war, preferably one which offered portable wealth and profit.

Marius's quaestor in Africa was Lucius Cornelius Sulla, an impoverished aristocrat of few scruples, decisive, clever, ambitious and ruthless. Though Marius possessed undoubted military talents it was through Sulla's intrigues that the war was finally ended, when he persuaded Jugurtha's father-in-law Bocchus, who was fighting alongside Jugurtha, to hand over the self-made king to the Romans. Bocchus was King of Mauretania, and after his co-operation with the Romans, he was also confirmed as ruler of part of Numidia which Jugurtha had originally ceded to him in return for his help. There was to be no Roman annexation of Numidia, as long as the borders with the province of Africa were secure.

While the war with Jugurtha was going on, a much greater danger to Rome was playing out in the north of Italy. Two Germanic tribes which the Romans called the Cimbri and Teutones had started to move, and their wanderings disturbed other tribes who fought each other and the Romans as well. Great battles were fought by the

Roman armies to try to stop the tribesmen from entering Italy, and in each case the Romans were defeated, losing vast numbers of men. In 105, at Arausio (modern Orange), the two Roman commanders allowed their personal animosity to interfere with the campaign. Quintus Servilius Caepio, a blue-blooded aristocrat who had been consul for the previous year, would not co-operate with Gnaeus Mallius Maximus, a *novus homo* like Marius. It was said that this lack of co-operation and co-ordination led to the defeat of the Roman army. The tribesmen killed probably 80,000 men, the worst disaster since Hannibal defeated the Romans at Cannae. This calamity occurred as Marius was winding up his campaign in Africa, before coming home to celebrate his triumph, and even though he was not in Rome to stand for the elections, the people chose him as one of the consuls for 104. This was not strictly legal, but since it was a dire emergency, the illegality was overlooked or reconciled by some means. As soon as he could, Marius marched north, to find that the Cimbri and Teutones had passed through southern France and were heading for Spain. That gave him the time to rest and train his armies. Some of the credit for this is due to Publius Rutilius Rufus, who deserves more recognition for this training and preparation than he has received. Rufus was consul for 105, and had managed to collect the army together and build up morale after the terrible defeat at Arausio. He had started to train the soldiers by means of a physical fitness and arms drill regime that was based on the training programmes of the gladiator schools. According to Sextus Julius Frontinus, the author of *Stratagems*, Marius liked what he saw and adopted the same methods.

There was no sign of the tribesmen for some considerable time, but since the danger was not yet over, the people elected Marius consul for 103 and again for 102, so he was allowed time to reform the organization of the army and develop it into a cohesive and effective fighting force, ready for the return of the Cimbri and Teutones. It is not absolutely certain that all the changes in the army were put into effect by Marius. Even if the reforms were all his own work, they may not have come about all at once, and may not all belong to this period while the Romans waited for the Cimbri and Teutones to reappear, but clearly the two year respite would have offered a great opportunity to rethink the organization and operation of the army, while the soldiers were kept busy with their training and fitness programmes.

It may have been Marius who instigated the change from manipular formation to a different one based on the cohort, the normal organization of the Imperial legions. At Numantia, the layout

of Scipio's camps suggests that the manipular formation was still in use, but by Julius Caesar's time, the cohort system had replaced it. The cohort formation was not entirely new, snatched out of thin air according to Marius's imagination. During the war with Hannibal, three maniples had been lumped together to form a cohort, and there is some slight evidence that this had also been done in Spain, but it was not a permanent arrangement, and there may have been variation in the size of the cohort at this early period. Standardization came later. In the fully fledged system, there were ten cohorts to each legion, each comprising six centuries of eighty men, commanded by a centurion. The problem is that no source from any period states how many men there were in a legion, so it is possible that Marius's centuries contained 100 men, which means that each of his legions would be, 6,000 strong, but this must remain in the realm of speculation. Another problem is that there is as yet no evidence of a cohort commander in any of the legions, from Marius's time to the end of the Roman army, so the most important officers in the field were the centurions.

Marius retained the three-line formation of the old style army, with four cohorts in the first line and three cohorts in each of the second and third lines. He is credited with the introduction of the *pilum* with the special softened metal in the shaft, so that when it plunged into an enemy shield, it bent and dropped down, making the shield too unwieldy to use. Since he would be fighting a highly mobile army of tribesmen, Marius aimed at a comparable mobility, stripping down his army to bare essentials, banishing the oppressive clouds of camp followers and hangers-on, and limiting the number of wagons. The soldiers had to carry everything themselves, including their equipment, entrenching tools, rations for at least three days, and pots and pans for cooking. They called themselves Marius's mules, but mostly in good humour and with a sense of pride, not grievance. They shared a strong sense of corporate identity and purpose, enhanced by their new single legionary standard, the eagle, carried by the *aquilifer* in the front rank when the legion marched into battle. When not in use it rested in a shrine, a religious icon of tremendous importance. It was a disgrace to the legion if it was lost in battle. Before Marius adopted this one potent symbol the legions had carried five animal standards. The eagle had always been one of them, but in addition there were the wolf, the boar, the horse and the man with a bull's head. These five symbols are reminiscent of the five classes of the early Roman army, but they possibly indicate even earlier origins deriving from a more primitive tribal era.

The Cimbri and Teutones reappeared in Transalpine Gaul in 102,

and Marius marched to intercept them before they could attack Italy. He defeated the Teutones at Aix-en-Provence, and was elected consul for the fifth time for 101. He then had to march to the assistance of his consular colleague, Quintus Lutatius Catulus, whose army had been mauled by the Cimbri and pushed back from the eastern Alps into Italy. Marius finally caught up with the tribesmen at Vercelli, where he defeated them in the high summer of 101.

As the hero and saviour of the Roman people, Marius was elected consul for a sixth term for 100. The unprecedented continuity of annual consulships, rather than an extension of his command with proconsular powers until the tribesmen had been defeated, reflects his popularity in Rome. Somehow the Romans condoned the successive terms of office, circumventing the laws that set a limit of ten years between consulships, and also the legal requirement for the consular candidate to be in Rome in person at the time of the elections. The only other option would have been the appointment of Marius as Dictator, but there was supposed to be a six month limit on the tenure of the office, a feature that was soon to be overturned by Sulla. But the powers of the consuls were more limited than those of the Dictator, and at the time of the emergency the Romans required a trusted army commander, not a politician with supreme power.

During his consulship of 100, Marius fell sharply from his position of saviour and military hero. He was not a successful politician, and because he associated with the wrong sort of people he was almost dragged down with them. Initially his associates appeared to be useful and above board, but it all degenerated into chaos and yet more civil strife. The association stretched back to the African campaign, when the volunteers from Rome fought for Marius against Jugurtha. After their service in the army, they required a reward which would prevent them from drifting back to Rome, penniless and potentially troublesome. The tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus had ushered through the necessary legislation to grant allotments of 100 *iugera* to the time-served soldiers in Africa in 103 so, at the successful conclusion of the wars with the Cimbri and Teutones, Marius required the same magic formula that Saturninus had provided for the African veterans, to enable him to settle his soldiers of the recent wars on plots of land. Since Saturninus was tribune for an additional term in 100 when Marius was consul, and Saturninus's friend Gaius Servilius Glaucia was praetor, it seemed like the perfect partnership.

Saturninus proposed bills for the settlement on the land of soldiers and Roman citizens, but included in his proposals much wider implications. The well-worn question of citizenship for the allies was also bound up in his schemes, though not quite so overtly as it was in

the programme suggested by Gaius Gracchus. There had been several armies in the field besides Marius's in the north of Italy, notably in Greece and Sicily, so Saturninus included them in his scheme, proposing that lands in those countries should be awarded to the time-served soldiers. Several colonies were to be founded, and land allotments were to be given to Romans citizens in Cisalpine Gaul, but the colonies were presumably not limited to Romans, because there was a clause allowing Marius to bestow citizenship on a limited number of settlers, indicating that some of them at least were intended to be allies. The people of Rome reacted badly to the extension of citizenship to the allies because it threatened their own superior position, and the senators were in agreement with them. The meetings of the assembly did not go well. Saturninus decided to underline his point by bringing in some of Marius's veterans who had a vested interest in seeing the necessary laws passed. They lined the assembly area to keep out hostile voters, and there were some episodes of fisticuffs in which the soldiers were the winners. This in itself was bad enough, but apart from the use of physical force to push through his legislation, Saturninus used moral pressure on the senators by forcing them to swear an oath to uphold the laws that he had passed. They were given five days to do this, and they all did so, grudgingly, except for Quintus Metellus, who packed up and left Rome when Saturninus moved to have him exiled.

Marius was in a difficult position, having attached himself to a monster that he could not control. The use of his soldiers to enforce the passage of laws was something he had probably not foreseen, and it made him doubtful whether the laws passed in this way could be valid. Eventually Saturninus went too far and Marius was thrown into the arms of the Senate. When Saturninus stood for re-election as tribune for 99, he also tried to obtain the consulship for Glaucia. Marius had to make a decision, either to support his erstwhile colleague, or to try to block him. As consul, Marius presided over the elections and he rejected Glaucia as a candidate, so Saturninus proposed a law to overturn this judgement. Meanwhile, his followers turned into vicious thugs and killed one of the other candidates. In the face of complete disorder the Senate passed the last decree to allow the consuls to look to state security. Marius managed to persuade both Saturninus and Glaucia to surrender to him along with several of their entourage. He promised them that there would be no executions, herded them into the Senate House and locked them up. Unfortunately emotions were out of control as they had been in the days of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, and someone had the bright idea of entering the Senate through the roof. The mob that had gathered removed the tiles and climbed in. Saturninus, Glaucia and their

friends were beaten to death.

The power of the tribunes was escalating out of control, prompting violent reactions in the city. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus had used the assemblies to pass their laws, deliberately by-passing and undermining the Senate, but they had not forced the senators to swear oaths to uphold their laws, nor had they brought in armed force to persuade the voters to do as they were told. It was very embarrassing for Marius, who left Rome in the year after his consulship, insisting that he was on a religious quest in the east.

The Social War

The patience of the Italian allies, still waiting for some definite sign that they would be granted Roman citizenship, finally snapped when the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus was killed as he was leaving his house through a crowd of people who had gathered to meet him. Livius Drusus was the son of the man of the same name who had undermined Gaius Gracchus by putting forward wide-ranging proposals about land settlement and the citizenship question. In 91, as tribune, the younger Livius Drusus picked up more or less where his father had left off, by proposing solutions to several problems at once, including the land distribution, the supply of grain to the poor in Rome, the control of the courts and Roman citizenship. His programme included further distribution of public land to poorer citizens, the foundation of colonies to relieve population pressure, the reinstatement of the system that Gracchus had set up for the storage of grain for sale to the poor who remained in Rome and, perhaps the most radical of all, Roman citizenship for the Latins and the Italian allies. This went further than Gracchus had suggested, since in his proposals the Italians would have emerged in a less privileged position than the Latins and the Romans. As for control of the courts, Drusus compromised. The senators should be put back in control of the jury courts, but three hundred equites were to be upgraded to join the Senate.

At first Drusus's proposals seemed reasonable, then after a short interval in which the senators and people could think it through, the objections began. As usual, the distribution of land affected existing landholders, who were understandably unhappy about the possibility of being evicted in favour of the poor. The equites as a class would not be helped by having 300 of their number added to the Senate, and the loss of their control of the courts far outweighed the distinction for the chosen few. As for the allies, they had been watching the proceedings in Rome with interest, but had started to prepare for yet another disappointment by joining forces. Disappointment duly arrived. First

the consul Lucius Marcius Philippus successfully countered Drusus's proposals by invalidating them. Then Drusus was assassinated in 91.

The allies not only mobilized, but set up a separate state of their own, based at Corfinium. One of the prime instigators of the revolt was Quintus Poppaedi Silo, a man of the Marsi, a tribe which was one of Rome's early opponents at the beginning of the Republic. Hence the Social war has two alternative names, one derived from the term *socii*, meaning allies, and another the Marsic war, derived from the Marsi.

The rebels renamed the city of Corfinium, calling it Italica, signifying a shared purpose if not total agreement. The new state had a Senate and appointed magistrates. Coinage was issued with their legends in Oscan, the most common language among the Italian allies. All this suggests long term planning, not simply a hasty meeting when Drusus was killed and the citizenship question sank back into obscurity. More important than their organization of a new state, the rebels mustered an army of about 100,000 soldiers willing to fight for their rights. This was not the kind of army that the early Republicans had sometimes faced, but a military force perfectly acquainted with the latest Roman fighting techniques.

This federation of several allied cities was a development that the Romans had probably never anticipated, since each ally was bound to Rome and was forbidden to join with any other state. Fortunately for the Romans, Poppaedi Silo was unable to achieve complete unity among the Italians. The Latins could not be persuaded to join, nor could the Greek states of southern Italy, and among the Italians there were many states which kept clear of the war altogether. Even within the areas where communities joined the Marsi and the new state, some of the populace remained loyal to Rome.

The war began in 90, and the rebel allies scored some successes. They gained control of Campania, Apulia and Lucania. Some of the Etruscan cities had not yet joined the revolt, so some of the rebels aimed for their territory north of Rome, in the hope that the rest of the Etruscans might join them. Hastily the Romans made political moves to stem the rebellion. A law was passed by Lucius Julius Caesar in 90, offering Roman citizenship to the Latins and to allied cities which had not taken part in the fighting. This grant of citizenship had at last been squeezed out of the unwilling Senate and people of Rome, and it meant that the Romans could now rely upon the faithful Latins, the Etruscans, the Umbrians and the Greek states of the south.

Citizenship grants now tumbled out of Rome like confetti. In 89 it was offered to the Italians provided that they applied for it within

sixty days, and the communities of Cisalpine Gaul were enfranchised by Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, who was consul in the same year. He also arranged for the Transpadane Gauls, settled on the north side of the River Po, to receive Latin rights. He was able to bring the war to an end in the north by a combination of diplomacy and fighting, and in southern Italy Lucius Cornelius Sulla mopped up the rebels. The war petered out in 89, except for a few troublesome cities which aimed at the higher goal of freedom from Rome and total autonomy. The city of Nola was one of them, and Sulla put it under siege.

Although some of the hostilities engendered by the Social war rumbled on for a few years, the fighting was much reduced by 88 because the offer of citizenship proved more tempting than continuing to fight and thus the cohesion of the rebels was undermined. Another type of cohesion took its place as those cities which had retained their systems of government under the Roman alliance now started to reorganize themselves along Roman lines. There was no coercion on the part of Rome to put this into effect, but it was encouraged, and the fact that the allies could vote in Rome and stand as candidates for the magistracies no doubt fostered the increasing Romanization of the Italian communities. As Romanization progressed, so did the use of Latin, which gradually took over from other Italian languages, until much later they were reduced to novelties and the preserve of Roman scholars and antiquarians.

The Rise of Sulla

Between his service under Marius in Africa and his appearance in the Social war, Lucius Cornelius Sulla had risen to the rank of urban praetor in 97, an office which he was said to have achieved by wholesale bribery of the electorate. As propraeor he had been assigned to the province of Cilicia, but was also entrusted with a diplomatic mission of installing Ariobarzanes as King of Cappadocia, which he achieved without going to war, probably in 95. He returned to Rome in 92, somehow escaping unscathed from a charge of extortion. In 88 after fighting in the Social war as a legate, he was elected consul with Quintus Pompeius Rufus as colleague. The two of them joined their families together when Sulla's daughter Cornelia married the son of Pompeius. In rounding off the Social war, Sulla's army was still engaged in the siege of Nola, but there was a greater command awaiting Sulla. There was to be a war against Mithradates VI, King of Pontus. The Senate had awarded this prestigious appointment to Sulla after Mithradates had started to expand his territory aggressively. He controlled most of the territory around the Black Sea. Since 121 he had ruled the northern part of Cappadocia,

and clearly had designs on the rest of it, which he annexed along with Bithynia while the Romans were embroiled in the Social war. Bithynia lay on the borders of the kingdom of Pontus to the east and the Roman province of Asia to the west, which made the Romans nervous and rightly suspicious of what the next moves of Mithradates might be. The King was persuaded to withdraw, but then the Romans, on the same principle that they had adopted with the Numidians and the Carthaginians, encouraged the King of Bithynia to raid Pontus.

Within a very short time in 88, Mithradates took over Bithynia again and then the province of Asia, where he was not altogether unwelcome. The Roman tax gatherers had ruthlessly squeezed money out of the provincials, and Romans and Italians alike were sufficiently hated for the inhabitants of Asia to obey the orders of Mithradates to massacre them all in 88. Then the Italians on the island of Delos were killed by Archelaus, who was going to Athens on behalf of Mithradates. The Athenians had declared for the King of Pontus because they thought that he would rid them of their unpopular government that the Romans had installed. Mithradates had now gained control of most of Greece, and his troops were heading for Macedonia and Thrace. He had to be stopped, and Sulla was the man chosen by the Senate to do it.

At this point, Marius re-entered Roman politics. He teamed up with the tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus, who was to introduce a bill relating to the recently enfranchised allies. Although the allies were now all citizens, their electoral powers had been curtailed by the expedient of putting them all into a handful of voting tribes, which may have been part of the traditional thirty-five tribes, or newly created extra tribes tacked onto the normal system. By this arrangement the allies would scarcely have a political voice, whereas if they were distributed evenly among all the tribes their influence at the polls would be much greater. It was symptomatic of the jealous attitudes and the resentment of the senators and the people at having to share citizenship with the allies. The situation became a recurrent bone of contention and grist to the mill of the tribunes. The first to take it up was Sulpicius Rufus in 88, immediately after the Social war, with the proposal that the allies should be allocated to all the thirty-five tribes.

The fierce opposition to his bill may have surprised Sulpicius, and he looked round for support. At the same time, Marius required something that only the tribunes could obtain for him, and that was the command against Mithradates. For the second time, Marius allied himself with a tribune. Sulpicius resorted to violence to force through his legislation and tacked on two more bills: one to depose the consul

Pompeius Rufus, and the other to switch the command against Mithradates from Sulla to Marius.

Marius presumably did not expect Sulla to lie down and meekly allow his command to be taken from him, but he may have been surprised at Sulla's tactics. At Nola, Sulla commanded an army of six legions, which he was to take to the east for the war against Mithradates. The soldiers were loyal to Sulla and keen to fight in the east, so when officers arrived to take command on behalf of Marius, they did not waste words. They killed them. Sulla then marched on Rome, intending to take over the city. It was an unthinkable enormity to do so. Returning generals were obliged by law to lay down their commands at the boundary of the city, the *pomerium*, and their soldiers were to be dismissed. Crossing the *pomerium* under arms was simply not done. But Sulla did it. Only one of his officers came with him. The rest of them refused to involve themselves in breaking the law or in fighting their fellow Romans.

Marius and Sulpicius were not ready for this development. Sulla had a hard time in entering the city but, despite the resistance by the populace, Marius was defenceless, not having anticipated the need for troops in Rome. Sulpicius, Marius and his son the younger Marius, had to leave the city in a hurry, along with a few of their supporters, because the Senate, cowed by the presence of armed force, acceded to Sulla's wish to have each of them declared *hostis*, which made them all enemies of the state. As outlaws they were denied food and shelter, and anyone could kill them without fear of punishment. With the persuasive influence provided by his army, Sulla annulled all the legislation passed by Sulpicius. He reinstated Pompeius Rufus to the consulship, and awarded himself the command in the war against Mithradates. The cancellation of Sulpicius's laws also meant that there was to be no distribution of the enfranchised allies among the thirty-five voting tribes.

Having obtained all that he wanted for the time being, Sulla removed the army from the city, sending it back to Campania to await departure for the east. Meanwhile, Sulpicius had been killed, and Marius and his son were making their way separately to Africa. There were veterans there who would be grateful to their old commander for arranging their settlement on plots of land. On the way to Africa Marius survived some hair-raising near death experiences which allegedly involved hiding in a marsh and then having to face a would-be executioner, reminding him of who he was and what he had achieved. No one wanted to be responsible for killing Gaius Marius. In view of what happened two years later, it might have been better if someone had despatched him at this juncture, because he would then

have died with his reputation intact.

Sulla left Rome in the hands of the new consuls, Lucius Cornelius Cinna and Gnaeus Octavius. They were not partisans of his, but when he asked them not to interfere with his legislation while he was absent, they readily agreed. Once Sulla had safely departed, Cinna then set about doing the exact opposite of what he had promised. He revived the proposals to distribute the allies through all the voting tribes, and met with opposition from his fellow consul and some of the tribunes. In Italy, factional strife began between Marius's supporters and those of Sulla. When Cinna started to gather supporters from among the allies, the Senate declared him *hostis*, so now he had nothing to lose, like Marius, who returned from Africa, joined forces with Cinna and started to recruit soldiers in Etruria. The Samnites, who had not succumbed to the offer of citizenship in the Social War and were still ready to fight, also joined Marius and Cinna. Slaves were recruited with a promise of freedom as a reward. The two outlaws descended on Rome and took the city, at the end of 87. In the disturbances, the consul Octavius was killed. Marius was eager for revenge, and for a short time there was a blood-bath in Rome as his erstwhile opponents were removed. He also had to execute the freed slaves who had helped him to gain entry to the city, because they had gone on a killing spree. This episode tarnished Marius's reputation for ever. It was a sad end to an illustrious career.

Marius and Cinna then set about turning the tables on Sulla. He was declared *hostis*, as they had been, and his laws were repealed. He was deprived of his command and his property was confiscated. Marius was no longer an outlaw. On the first day of January 86, Marius entered on his seventh consulship, and Cinna on his second term, though there can hardly have been a proper election. After only a few days Marius died, and the Romans sighed with relief. The old man had changed from hero to monster, his final acts best forgotten, but in 69 his nephew Gaius Julius Caesar, who had just entered the very junior office of quaestor, arranged a splendid funeral for his aunt Julia, Marius's wife. He carried effigies of Marius in the funeral procession, disobeying one of Sulla's laws designed to prevent such displays. The people cheered the old hero.

Lucius Valerius Flaccus was made consul to fill the gap caused by Marius's death, and was sent to replace Sulla. Cinna could have authorized the distribution of the allies among all the voting tribes but did not do so immediately. The wealthier Italians were enrolled, but the poorer men had to wait until 84 for their turn.

Sulla & the Mithradatic War

Sulla's first task was to knock out Athens from the war, so he besieged the city from the autumn of 87 to the spring of 86. He forced his way into the city but lost many of his soldiers in gaining control of the port of Piraeus. Once the city was in Roman hands, Sulla marched to meet the army of Mithradates, who had used the time while the Romans were besieging Athens to move an army into central Greece. Sulla defeated the King's forces in a decisive battle at Chaeronea, and again in a second battle at Orchomenus, but Mithradates would not make peace, because he still controlled the Aegean sea and Sulla had only a few ships.

Lucius Valerius Flaccus arrived in Greece at the head of another army in 86, but he failed to take command of Sulla's troops and headed off to Macedonia and Thrace to follow the land route into the province of Asia, which Mithradates had overrun. Until he had assembled a fleet, Sulla could not cross the sea to enter Asia himself, so he remained in Greece while his quaestor Lucius Licinius Lucullus set about gathering ships. In the meantime, Valerius Flaccus had regained Macedonia and Thrace and had crossed the Bosphorus to enter the kingdom of Bithynia, but then he was killed in a mutiny, perhaps arranged by his legate, Gaius Flavius Fimbria, who took command of the army. By the middle of 85, Fimbria had defeated Mithradates and recovered some territory, but there was no follow-up and no drive into Pontus to annihilate the King. Mithradates sued for peace before he lost yet more territory, and Sulla arranged the peace with the war only half finished, because he needed to return to Rome before he was totally eclipsed. Mithradates emerged relatively unscathed, relinquishing the territory he had overrun but retaining his kingdom intact, and parting with the paltry sum of 3,000 talents and sending eighty of his ships to the Roman fleet. He could go home, lick his wounds and, like Philip of Macedon, build up another army, another fleet and be ready for another excursion into Roman territory within a few years.

Sulla spent the next months restoring order in the province of Asia. The cities that had sided with Mithradates had to pay huge sums of money, 20,000 talents, and he billeted his troops on them to keep order. The cities were already impoverished as a result of the depredations of the Roman tax collectors, followed by the demands of Mithradates. The unfortunate citizens had to borrow the money from the Roman bankers to pay the Roman general. It was not a scheme designed to win hearts and minds in Asia. Leaving a trail of considerable damage behind him, Sulla spent the winter of 84 in Greece.

Cinna & Carbo in Rome

There is a dearth of information about Cinna's activities during his serial consulships, so it seems as if he entertained no long term plans and instituted no reforms, but merely waited for fate to take him over. He knew that one day Sulla would return to Rome and there would be a day of reckoning, but he left it rather late to make preparations to meet it. In 85 he was consul for the third time, with Gnaeus Papirius Carbo as his colleague, and the two of them engineered their re-election for 84. They had started to raise an army and planned to make war on Sulla in Greece, rather than allow him to return and fight in Italy. Some of the troops had been sent to the Adriatic coast, but they were not entirely converted to the thought of a civil war, and while Cinna was trying to quell a mutiny at Ancona they killed him. Carbo recalled all the troops, determined to make a stand in Italy. Strictly he ought to have arranged for the election of another consul, since a sole consul was contrary to the principle of collegiality, but he decided to carry on alone. He did not want the complication of an election at this stage, especially since the Senate was wavering and had tried to negotiate with Sulla. After the carnage of the last few years nobody wanted a civil war, not even Carbo himself. However, in spring 83 he had no choice. Sulla had landed at Brundisium with five legions.

Commanding Generals: The Republic Under Duress 83–48 BC

The Roman Republic was about to experience the first of the civil wars that would finally signify its end and lead to the rise of the Empire. Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gnaeus Papirius Carbo split the state into two factions, preparing to settle their differences by armed combat. Foreshadowing the later civil war between Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar, the Senate made an attempt to disarm both contenders, but it was too late. There was only a slight chance that a compromise could be reached without fighting, since Sulla was aware that he was highly unlikely to be allowed to develop a political career by simply appearing in Rome as a private citizen and standing for election as consul. He tried to smooth his path by promising to honour the law to distribute the allies throughout the voting tribes, but he excluded the Samnites, who were still rebellious. His views on the question of the allies, and his previous ruthlessness in marching on Rome to gain what he wanted, did nothing to endear him to the people or the Senate, so it was all or nothing and force was the only answer. He had five legions who were trained and experienced, and above all loyal to him as commander. Carbo could muster a greater number of men, but they were not so experienced, and were probably not fully committed to his cause.

Civil War in Italy

Sulla could rely upon three allies who had been lying low during the ascendancy of Marius, Cinna and Carbo. One of these supporters was Marcus Licinius Crassus, who had escaped from the slaughter arranged by Marius and Cinna and had gone to Spain. Another was Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, who had chosen self-imposed exile to Africa. Both these men raised armies in the provinces where they had taken refuge, and then joined Sulla. Crassus may have arrived even before Sulla landed in Italy, and Metellus Pius brought his troops to add to Sulla's forces almost as soon as he arrived at Brundisium. Then a younger self-made general arrived, Gnaeus Pompeius, who had raised a legion from his clients on his father's estates in Picenum. He was about twenty-three years old, but master of his own house since the death of his father, Pompeius Strabo, four years earlier. Strabo had fought alongside the consul Octavius in an attempt to stop Marius and

Cinna from entering the city, but although he drove their forces back, he seems to have hesitated, and was accused of trying to negotiate with Cinna while at the same time working with Octavius. He may have been trying to save Rome, or simply to save himself, but shortly afterwards he died, probably of the plague which rampaged through his camp. There was no love lost between the populace and Strabo. His body was dragged through the streets by the mob and probably thrown into the Tiber, so he was not granted a proper funeral. The young Pompey escaped the massacre that Marius set in motion in Rome, though his house was trashed by Cinna's gangs, and later on he was prosecuted for misappropriating some of the spoils from Asculum, which his father had besieged during the Social war. Perhaps because of his youth and his attractive appearance, comparable to Alexander the Great, and the good references he was able to drum up, Pompey was acquitted. The fact that he then married the presiding judge's daughter need not signify underhand dealings or corruption. Ironically, one of the men who spoke for Pompey was Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, soon to become an enemy, then a victim of the man he had helped to save. After the court hearing, Pompey disappeared from view, until Sulla came home. Sulla was impressed with him, calling him *Imperator* and standing up when he entered a room. Pompey was sent back to Picenum to raise more troops, and managed to recruit two more legions. As he marched them to rejoin Sulla, three commanders loyal to Carbo and the Marian party attacked him, but he gave them all a surprise by routing them. Pompey was nobody's fool when he was at the head of an army.

Papirius Carbo and his party were also recruiting. The consuls for 83, Lucius Cornelius Scipio and Caius Norbanus, were authorized by the last decree of the Senate (*senatus consultum ultimum*) to raise armies. Sulla tried to negotiate before fighting, which placed him on the moral high ground, but then the war began when he met Norbanus in battle and defeated him. He then marched to the camp of the other consul, Scipio, and for a short time it seemed as though there might still be a chance of peace as the two men agreed to negotiate. Unfortunately, one of Scipio's officers, given the task of informing Norbanus at Capua of the likely truce, attacked and seized the town of Suessa, which Sulla had recently won, and all hope of a negotiated peace evaporated. And it was not Sulla who had struck the first blow.

At this point Metellus Scipio's troops, who had no illusions about who might win this coming war, came over to Sulla, but Metellus could not be persuaded to change camps. Since he had command of all the soldiers, Sulla considered that there was nothing to be gained by

killing Metellus, so the consul went free. He raised another army, but these men joined Sulla as well. The other consul, Norbanus, was given a chance to reconsider, but could not be won over and left Capua for Praeneste. There was a lull in the proceedings when Carbo returned to Rome and had himself elected to his third consulship for 82. His colleague was the young Gaius Marius. He was under age, and had not held the required magistracies, but his famous name carried more weight than adherence to the law.

The war affected some of the provinces as well as Italy. Lucius Philippus declared for Sulla and took over Sardinia and killed the governor, and in Africa, the anti-Sullan Fabius Hadrianus was killed in a revolt. Quintus Sertorius, a rugged individualist and dissident in all circumstances, washed his hands of the opponents of Sulla because he considered them incompetent, and set out for Nearer Spain, where he had been appointed propraetorian governor. He remained there for some years, an implacable enemy of Sulla. In Italy the opposing sides waited for spring. Carbo made his headquarters in the north at Ariminum, and Metellus Pius was sent against him, with Pompey following close behind. Sulla himself pursued the young Marius, who attacked him as he was making camp, but was eventually driven off and fled to Praeneste. Sulla left an officer to besiege Praeneste, and sent detachments of his troops by different routes to Rome, which he entered without fighting, because the opponents of Sulla had not bothered to gather defenders. Sulla left some of his veterans to garrison Rome and went in pursuit of Carbo. There was a series of skirmishes, and Pompey distinguished himself by trapping the force of eight legions that Carbo sent to relieve Praeneste. Then a more determined force arrived in the form of the anti-Sullan Samnites led by a warrior called Pontius Telesinus, but all attempts to relieve Praeneste still failed.

The Samnites decided to attack Rome to draw Sulla out. They succeeded. Sulla hastily marched to confront them, and the main battle was fought outside Rome at the Colline Gate. Sulla commanded the troops on his left wing. The enemy almost defeated him and his soldiers ran away despite his appeals, heading for the safety of the city, but they could not enter because the garrison that Sulla had left behind closed the gates, so the soldiers had no choice except to turn and fight harder. They rallied and won a hard fought battle, but the end result still hung in the balance. Then a message arrived from Marcus Licinius Crassus, the commander of the right wing, asking for orders after he had routed and chased off the enemy in a complete victory. Sulla had gained control of the city and won the war in Italy, where only a few towns still held out for another two or three years.

The Domination of Sulla

As soon as he entered Rome, Sulla called for a meeting of the Senate, which was held in the Temple of Bellona, where he calmly presented his report on the war against Mithradates, all the time accompanied by the howls and screams of the thousands of prisoners being executed by his soldiers not far from the temple. The message was clear. Sulla had started as he meant to go on.

As a firm adherent of Sulla, the young Pompey, soon to be known as Pompey the Great, rose to fame and fortune as an accomplished general. Sicily and Africa were taken over by Carbo and the Marians, two provinces which supplied grain for Rome, and therefore it was an urgent matter to regain them. Sulla appointed Pompey as commander, and despatched him to deal with his enemies in Sicily. To cement their relationship he offered a marriage alliance with his step-daughter Aemilia, persuading Pompey to divorce his first wife Antistia. A pawn in the political game, as so many Roman women were, Aemilia was pregnant by her husband Marcus Acilius Glabrio. She divorced him, as instructed by Sulla, and miscarried and died in Pompey's house a few months later.

Sulla's intention was to rationalize the career paths of senators and lay down strict rules for progression through the various magistracies, but had to make an exception in Pompey's case, since despite having been an army commander since he was twenty-three years old, the young general had never held any post that had been ratified by the Senate, and had not held any of the junior magistracies. The Senate was easily persuaded to bestow *propraetorian* powers on Pompey, despite the fact that he had not attained the praetorship. By means of this legal fiction Pompey was now equal in rank to Marcus Veiento Perperna, the current governor of Sicily and a staunch Marian sympathiser.

Pompey rapidly gained control of Sicily. Perperna left the island without a fight and Carbo, who had only just arrived from Africa, was captured and executed. When Sicily was pacified, Pompey was sent to Africa, where he eradicated Sulla's opponents and in pacifying the country he made his own administrative arrangements which included reinstating Hiempsal, the former King of Numidia. For the time being at least Pompey had secured the borders of the province of Africa, and in the process formed personal alliances with foreign dignitaries. It was Pompey's first experience of acting independently of the Senate, employing his considerable talent for administration. It was to become a habit, but his arrangements were not necessarily detrimental to the Roman Empire. After his victories in Sicily and Africa, his soldiers hailed him as *Imperator*, supreme commander, a title that Pompey was

careful to refuse with an emotional public demonstration, since it was not wise to give Sulla the impression that he intended to usurp him. The name Magnus, the Great, which the soldiers also bestowed on him, was allowed to stand, and Sulla even addressed Pompey by this name when he returned home demanding permission to hold a triumph. Sulla refused. This is the context of the famous story of Pompey's outburst, declaring that more people worshipped the rising than the setting sun, revealing his opinion of himself and his aspirations for power in the Roman world. Sulla was uncertain of what he had heard and asked Pompey to repeat the phrase, which he did. After a pregnant pause, Sulla proclaimed 'Let him triumph', probably to the relief of everyone who had heard the exchange.

The unsavoury side of Sulla's domination of Rome had worked itself out while Pompey was absent. Elimination of rivals was Sulla's first act. The proscriptions which he launched were not the last or even the worst that Rome was to see, but the indifference with which he viewed the mayhem and murder definitely does not redound to his credit. Once the names of all Sulla's victims were posted up in Rome, their lives and property were forfeit. The wealthy families were targeted for economic motives, and included senators as well as equites, in order to root out the entire coterie of each extended family and business association. Cash rewards could be claimed for murdering the proscribed men; if the murderers were slaves they missed out on the cash but received their freedom instead. There were great incentives to kill the men on the list, especially since the property of the victims was auctioned off to the highest bidder and the proceeds went to the state. Some men added extra names to the list of the proscribed simply in order to seize their property. Perhaps 500 people were killed, but there may have been many more than that because there are no reliable statistics.

One murder that was related to the proscriptions is well documented. A freedman called Chrysogonus, one of Sulla's henchmen, killed a wealthy man so that he could bid for his property at an auction, inserting his name on the list to make it appear that he had been proscribed by Sulla. Then Chrysogonus accused the son of the murdered man, Sextus Roscius, of committing the crime, and he rigged the auctions so that he obtained the property he wanted at a fraction of its value. Sextus Roscius appeared to be doomed, since his accuser enjoyed the special favour of Sulla, who had now retired but still wielded considerable influence, but the young lawyer Marcus Tullius Cicero took on the defence, laying bare the real facts of the case, and denouncing Chrysogonus. Sextus Roscius was acquitted.

With his potential enemies out of the way and everyone else

acutely aware of the consequences of opposition, Sulla embarked on an ambitious project, nothing less than a complete overhaul of the state. For this he required supreme power, unchallenged by other magistrates and especially by tribunes. Towards the end of 82, Sulla was confirmed as Dictator. Special dispensation allowed Sulla to hold the appointment indefinitely. He effected further innovations that were not the norm for the Dictatorship, taking the precaution of having all his past acts ratified and confirmed, and all his future actions authorized. His agenda included strengthening the powers of the Senate, and conversely reducing the powers of the tribunes. Since he had authorized the deaths of a large number of senators, and the surviving descendants of the proscribed were banned from holding office, there were now many gaps in the senatorial ranks. In order to fill these gaps he raised many of his loyal equites to the rank of senator. In effect he doubled the number of senators from 300 to 600, necessitating a corresponding enlargement of the Senate House. The Senate, already pliable and eager to please, was now conveniently made up of men who owed their advancement to him.

The jury courts were returned to senatorial control. Sulla revived the laws that had been designed to regulate the senatorial career path (the *cursus honorum*), preventing anyone from becoming too powerful by holding successive appointments, such as the people had bestowed on Marius, and Cinna had engineered for himself. The number of quaestors was raised to twenty, and this junior magistracy automatically involved entry to the Senate. Thereafter there was a specified progression via the praetorship, and then the consulship. There was an age limit for appointment to each post, so that no one would be able to reach the consulship before the age of forty-two, when hopefully each candidate would be mature and experienced. It was not possible to stand for election to these offices without first having held the previous ones, so the number of eligible candidates for office each year was very restricted.

For several years before Sulla came to power, the tribunate had been a source of embarrassment to the Senate, enhancing the power of the people's assemblies at the expense of the senators. From now on, Sulla intended that only dedicated men would seek to hold office as tribunes, because Sulla banned them from holding any further magistracy. The power of veto does not seem to have been revoked, but the tribunes were reduced to the position they had held in the early days of the Republic, when they could only listen at the door of the Senate and protect the plebs from exploitation or harm. Most significantly the tribunes were no longer allowed to take proposals direct to the assemblies, but had to have them all ratified in advance

by the Senate. This had been the main bone of contention in the past, as for instance when Tiberius Gracchus was able to ignore the Senate and have laws passed by the people. Ordinary people did not prosper under Sulla's regime. The grain distribution that Gaius Gracchus had instituted was stopped, and there was massive disruption when the huge numbers of Sulla's veteran soldiers were allocated plots of land all around the city of Rome.

When he considered that his work was finished, Sulla resigned as Dictator at the end of 81. Some years later Gaius Julius Caesar said that Sulla must have been mad to do so. Sulla was consul in 80 with Metellus Pius as colleague, but from then on he wanted to rest and write his memoirs. He was already feeling the effects of the illness that would finally kill him in 78. Within less than ten years after his death, most of his legislation had been abolished.

Pompey the Great

A short time before Sulla died, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was elected consul for 78. This was a man who opposed Sulla's policies despite having made his fortune during the proscriptions, and was in turn distrusted by the ex-Dictator. Sulla had made no attempt to strangulate the entire state once the whole of his reforms were in place, so all qualified candidates were allowed to stand for election, without regard for their political views. Lepidus was supported by Pompey, at least at first, but Pompey changed his allegiance when the consul fomented trouble. Lepidus's election manifesto included the restoration of the tribunate to its former position, the revival of the cheap distribution of grain to the people and, more inflammatory, the return to the original owners of lands that had been confiscated during the programme of veteran settlement. This future possibility of repossession brought the discontent about the land distribution to a head in Etruria, where displaced landowners vented their fury on the veterans who had been settled on their farms. Lepidus and his colleague Quintus Lutatius Catulus were both sent to restore order, but Lepidus joined the rebels instead. At this point Pompey the Great, who held no political office and no military command, was empowered to raise an army and turn against Lepidus, who started to march on Rome early in 77. Quintus Lutatius Catulus, already in Etruria with an army, was confirmed in an extended command after his consulship expired, and inflicted the first defeat on Lepidus, then Pompey finished him off near the town of Cosa. Lepidus escaped but died shortly afterwards.

Pompey now had an army and a plan. There was a war in Spain that had been going on since Quintus Sertorius had arrived there and

taken over the province. He had been bitterly opposed to the Sullan regime, and was still not reconciled even after Sulla's death. After a few reverses in Spain when he had been forced to flee to Mauretania for a while, Sertorius had gathered a considerable force of die-hard anti-Sullans, one of whom was Marcus Perperna, who had fled from Sicily when the young Pompey arrived to take back the island for Sulla. Sertorius had gained control of both Spanish provinces, and also had a following of native Spanish tribes, so he had carved out a personal Empire for himself that could not be allowed to continue to grow. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius had been fighting against Sertorius since he had been consul with Sulla in 80, and may have asked for Pompey to be sent to help him. At least that was probably the story that Pompey favoured. He ought to have disbanded his army after the defeat of Lepidus, but he lingered innocently and delayed, until the Senate gave in and offered him the command in Spain. Pompey's whole career was based on the same ploy. When there was a problem, he bided his time, never clamouring for an appointment to deal with it until it became so severe that the Senate could no longer ignore him. Then he blazed into action and solved it.

In confirming Pompey as additional military commander in Spain, all of Sulla's legislation to regulate senatorial careers was swept under the carpet. Pompey had still not held any magistracy, and was well below the age that Sulla had laid down for holding office, but at the instigation of Lucius Marcius Philippus he was granted proconsular powers. It was perhaps fortunate that neither of the two consuls for that year were eager to take up the command in Spain, so there could be no question of usurping their power, but Philippus made a joke about it, declaring that Pompey was being sent to Spain not with proconsular powers, *pro consule*, but *pro consulibus*, on behalf of the two consuls.

Sertorius was not to be underestimated as a military commander, nor was he likely to capitulate. Pompey had to work very hard in the struggle against him, and in 76 he was defeated when trying to relieve the besieged city of Lauron, which had declared for him and Metellus Pius. Sertorius used the ground to his advantage and trapped part of Pompey's army, while emerging unexpectedly at the rear of the rest of the troops, preventing them from helping the first group, who were slaughtered. The campaign revolved around the availability of supplies, which entailed gaining control of the ports on the east coast of Spain, and detaching Sertorius's allies from him while attracting the tribes who were not well disposed to him. At the end of the campaigning season of 75, Pompey had to write sternly to the Senate, explaining that he had now used up all his own money to pay and

supply his troops. In no uncertain terms he demanded help, or he could not be responsible for the results. He had no intention of joining Sertorius or marching across the Alps to take Rome, but he let the senators imagine the worst. Supplies arrived, but late and in niggardly quantities.

More alarmingly, Sertorius approached King Mithradates of Pontus for assistance, in the form of ships and cash. For the Romans, this action put Sertorius beyond the pale. Already in Rome there were hostile feelings towards Mithradates because he had resumed his empire-building activities, and reciprocally, Mithradates was angered by the annexation of Bithynia by the Romans when King Nicomedes died. Mithradates did not want the Romans in control of potential bases from which to attack him, and besides he aimed at control of Bithynia for himself. The consuls for 74, Lucius Licinius Lucullus and Marcus Aurelius Cotta, were entrusted with the command against Mithradates. The chronology is not fully established, but Mithradates did respond to Sertorius, sending help probably in 73, and at some point proposing an alliance, asking for officers from Sertorius's army to help train his troops to fight like Romans. Sertorius agreed to this request, but refused to recognize any of the future conquests that Mithradates might achieve.

By this time, Pompey and Metellus had gained some ascendancy over Sertorius, whose allies started to desert him. This may have occurred because Pompey and Metellus transferred their efforts from battles against Sertorius himself to the reduction of the towns and cities that were loyal to him. For the Spanish population, this Roman war, which after all had very little to do with them, had become less attractive. Sertorius was no longer able to fulfil his promises, whatever they were, or to reward them, and the consequences of staying with him to the bitter end were likely to be exactly that: bitter. Then Sertorius was assassinated by Marcus Perperna, and in turn Perperna was soon overwhelmed and captured by Pompey's troops. Pompey executed him, and burned all the correspondence that Perperna handed over to him, rather than go through it all and start a witch hunt in Rome for Sertorius's sympathisers.

Pompey remained in Spain until the end of 72, tidying up loose ends and reducing the few rebellious cities to obedience. The Spanish provinces were pacified and reorganized, in the course of which Pompey was able to swell the ranks of his clients by forging good relations with leading Spaniards. One of these was Lucius Cornelius Balbus, who was granted Roman citizenship and became the close associate and secretary to Julius Caesar. Metellus and Pompey granted citizenship to several Spanish nobles, and had these grants ratified by

the Senate.

On the way home, Pompey set up a monument in the Pyrenees, recording his successes in Spain. Then he set off for Italy with his army. His problem of what to do next had been temporarily solved, because the Senate had asked him to help Marcus Licinius Crassus in the war against the army of slaves led by the ex-gladiator, Spartacus. Pompey met about 5,000 of the slaves, the remnants of Spartacus's army who had fled north after Crassus had defeated them in Lucania in 71. Pompey claimed the credit for the victory, though most of the work had been done by Crassus.

The revolt of Spartacus was not the only slave rebellion that the Romans had dealt with, but it was a shock to the system. No one had really expected mere slaves to be able to organize themselves so successfully, much less defeat Roman armies. The episode began when less than 100 gladiators escaped from their training school at Capua in 73. Their leaders were Spartacus, from Thrace, and Crixus, from Gaul. They founded a base camp on the slopes of Mount Vesuvius, where they were joined by thousands of escaped slaves and some poor free men who had little to lose by becoming bandits and rebels. The slaves originally intended to travel northwards out of Italy and go to their various homelands, but after defeating the first Roman army that tried to round them up, they split their forces, Crixus going to the south, where he was eventually defeated, and Spartacus to the north, as far as Cisalpine Gaul, where he won another battle. Then, instead of escaping, Spartacus's group wended its way back southwards. When Crassus was given the command he raised six new legions to add to the four he was given, and moved south. It was not an easy campaign for the Roman forces, but Crassus was finally victorious in a battle fought in Lucania. Spartacus was killed and the captured survivors were crucified on thousands of crosses lining the Via Appia. It was a slow death reserved for slaves, felons and non-Romans. Roman citizens could be executed but not crucified.

Crassus's victory over slaves was not sufficiently honourable to merit a triumphal parade through the streets of Rome, but Pompey was allowed to hold a triumph, ending the parade as was customary at the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol Hill where he dedicated the spoils of war to the chief god. It was not represented as a triumph over Quintus Sertorius, a Roman citizen, but over Spain. It was a convenient way of celebrating a victory in a civil war with some pretence at good taste. Caesar was to employ the same device at the end of the later civil wars.

In need of further employment, both Pompey and Crassus presented themselves as candidates for the consulship of 70. They

were elected with scarcely any opposition, though once again Pompey's candidacy involved some special dispensation from the Senate. Crassus had held the praetorship and had reached the age that Sulla had set down for holding the consulship, but Pompey was not only under age, he was still an equestrian, not yet having become a senator. Since he had not served as quaestor or praetor, the consulship was Pompey's first magistracy, so he had no experience of the Senate. He solved the problem by asking his friend, the polymath Marcus Terentius Varro, to write a book for him explaining senatorial protocol and procedures.

Pompey and Crassus cordially disliked each other but were prepared to co-operate during their term of office. One of their proposals concerned the jury courts, which had been jostled back and forth between senators and equites for many years. The two consuls compromised, creating mixed juries of three groups: senators, equites and a group of men known as the *tribunii aerarii*, whose significance is not understood. Originally they were treasury officials, but the office had gone out of use some time ago. Apart from this, Pompey and Crassus contributed very little to the political history on the year 70, save for the restoration of the tribunate to its former powers, but even here their legislation was not as novel as it might seem, since there had been several successful and some unsuccessful attempts in the past eight years to nibble away at Sulla's laws. Pompey and Crassus merely put the finishing touches to the restoration of tribunician power.

Pompey's Special Commands

For the next three years after the end of their consulships, Crassus and Pompey disappeared from public view. Many retiring consuls went on to govern a province, but that was mundane and not Pompey's style. The only office that might have interested him was a second consulship, but Sulla's legislation forbidding re-election within ten years still stood. Another way of involving himself in politics without standing for election was to canvass on behalf of friends and once they were settled into various offices it was possible to influence policy or legislation, but Pompey was not successful at this aspect of political life. It was not until 67 that he emerged from backstage into the limelight, with an extraordinary command that gave him immense, unprecedented power.

This command was against the pirates who made travel and commerce in the Mediterranean extremely hazardous. The problem had been a long standing perennial one, but up to now only piecemeal efforts had been made to eradicate the pirates. From 104 onwards the

corn supply from Sicily and Africa to Rome had been seriously disrupted, resulting in occasional food shortages. In 102 Marcus Antonius, the grandfather of Mark Antony, had been given a command against the pirates, but he enjoyed only partial success and did not entirely eradicate them. Publius Servilius Vatia tried again in 77, taking the war to the coasts of Cilicia where the pirates controlled the inlets and harbours. In defeating the pirates he deprived them of their lands, which denied them their crops, so they turned to piracy again. Three years later in 74, the command was bestowed on Marcus Antonius, the son of the previous commander, and the father of Mark Antony. This time the failure was disastrous. Antonius lost his ships to the Cretan pirates and had to make a treaty. Quintus Metellus took over in 68 and restored control of Crete including the coasts and harbours, but the pirates were still at large, even attacking the harbour at Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber in 67. This was a little too close to home for comfort.

The tribune Aulus Gabinius presented a bill in that same year, but it is not known whether he did so before or after the pirates attacked Ostia. Pompey kept his head down in the background, but the wide ranging scope of the bill strongly suggests that the detailed planning behind it was due to him. An enormous amount of human and financial resources would be required for the task of eradicating the pirates. A fleet of 200 ships was to be assembled, and divided into squadrons under the command of fifteen legates of praetorian rank. It was of paramount importance that one man, of consular rank, directed and co-ordinated the operations. He was to have access to the treasury in Rome, and the resources of the provinces as well, and he was to exercise power over the whole Mediterranean sea with additional authority over the territory up to 50 miles inland in all provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. This amounted to a very large proportion of the resources and territory of the Roman world. No Roman general had ever held such power, although it was not to be permanent. Gabinius suggested that the command should be for three years.

Nobody was specifically named in the bill as supreme commander, but the people knew that Pompey was the man. The Senate knew it too, but objected to placing such enormous power into the hands of one man. The consul Piso was virulently opposed to the bill. He made a stirring speech to the senators, inflaming them so much that they attacked Gabinius, who escaped and made a speech of his own to the people, who then attacked Piso because in his opposition to the bill he ignored the food shortages that afflicted them. The lawyer Hortensius calmed everyone down, but he thought

that if the bill was passed it would endanger the state because it gave too much power to one man. Another senator, who was just embarking on his political career, spoke in favour of the bill. This was Gaius Julius Caesar, who had returned from his tour of duty as quaestor, serving under the governor of Further Spain. The ancient sources record that he spoke in favour of one of the bills granting extraordinary powers to Pompey without specifying which one, but it is likely to have been the bill presented by Gabinius, especially since Caesar had first-hand knowledge of the pirates. He had been captured by some of them and ransomed in 75.

One of the main objections to the proposed command, apart from its unprecedentedly large territorial extent, was the fact that so many praetorian legates would report directly to the commander and not to the Senate. Quintus Lutatius Catulus suggested that some of the praetorian commanders should operate independently, which would restore some of the control to the Senate, but it would have been at the expense of co-ordination. The suggestion did not impress the people. Catulus tried to point out the disastrous consequences if the commander of such a vast enterprise should die and leave all his subordinates leaderless. Who would lead them then, he asked. 'You, Catulus!' chorused the people. In the end, after days of political wrangling, the command against the pirates was awarded to Pompey. As soon as he was chosen, the price of corn fell in Rome. He was awarded even more powers than those included in the original bill, including 500 ships instead of the suggested 200, and twenty-four legates (some sources say there were twenty-five) in place of the original fifteen.

Pompey sprang into action and began to appoint his legates and to recruit soldiers and crews. He divided the Mediterranean into thirteen sections with a legate in charge of each one. The rest of his legates were probably given territorial commands but it is not known how or where they operated. It was clear that command of the sea would not be sufficient without the ability to operate against the pirates on land as well, all around the Mediterranean where any of the pirate ships could lurk until the Roman fleets had passed by. Within forty days Pompey cleared the western half of the Mediterranean, and the sea lanes from Sardinia, Sicily and Africa. Then he bottled up the pirates in the eastern Mediterranean. The whole operation had taken less than three months. Instead of executing the pirates, Pompey settled them on lands some distance from the sea, around cities that had declined or had been deserted. The settlements were made without disrupting the original inhabitants, and proved successful in the longer term.

Pompey's campaign was justly famous, a tremendous achievement despite the hyperbole attached to it. The menace to shipping was averted for the time being, but no one could eradicate the pirates for ever, as Pompey would have been the first to admit. He had achieved what he set out to do, but now had his sights set on higher things.

The war against Mithradates VI, King of Pontus, was not going well. Sulla had campaigned against the King and made a treaty in 85, but the war had been inconclusive and the terms were lenient. It suited Sulla to be able to return to Rome before he was completely obliterated and it suited Mithradates to abandon his plans for the time being and prepare for another war at another time. He knew that the Romans would be back at some time, and in fact the governor of the province of Asia, Lucius Lucilius Murena, kept on reminding him by making raids into his territory. There was also a Roman commander in Cilicia, ostensibly to control the pirates, but also ready and able to march against Mithradates if necessary. In 74, Lucius Licinius Lucullus was sent out as governor of both Asia and Cilicia, with the command of five legions.

For the first three years, Lucullus was successful. Mithradates advanced into Bithynia, which had been bequeathed to Rome when King Nicomedes died in 75. Mithradates besieged Cyzicus on the coast of Bithynia, but it had not yet fallen to him when the winter started, so he withdrew. At some point, probably in 73, the Roman officers from Sertorius's army in Spain may have arrived at the court of Mithradates, who promised to send money and supplies to the rebel army, in return for which favour, Sertorius's men would train the eastern troops how to fight the Romans. If the agreement was honoured, the experiment did not help Mithradates. In 72 and 71 Lucullus invaded Mithradates's own kingdom of Pontus. The King fled to Armenia and found refuge in the court of King Tigranes, who was his son-in-law. Lucullus decided to follow him there. The invasion of Armenia was a tremendous undertaking. It was not strictly within Lucullus's remit to attack the kingdom. Initially the Romans achieved a great deal. Lucullus defeated the army of Tigranes, even though it outnumbered his own, then in another battle he defeated the combined forces of Mithradates and Tigranes, who both fled. This was the turning point. The troops had been fighting non-stop for a long time and they were tired. They did not share Lucullus's enthusiasm for marching further and further into Armenia, especially as winter was approaching, and in Armenia that meant extreme hardship. Lucullus turned around, and on the way back he took the city of Nisibis further south. Within a short time, Mithradates was back in control of Pontus, and Tigranes threatened Cappadocia. The troops began to feel very

discontented. They had fought hard, won battles, and now they were as far away from a satisfactory result as they had been at the outset.

At Rome too, faith in Lucullus was waning. For the senators and equestrians, one of Lucullus's most annoying habits was his fair handed treatment of the inhabitants of the population of Asia. He had put a stop to Roman abuses, which upset the tax gatherers, and he had helped to restore the fortunes of the cities which had been impoverished by having to raise the money for indemnity payments after the last Mithradatic war. The people of the province of Asia had set up statues to him and invented a festival called the Lucullea. All this was construed in Rome as damaging Roman and Italian business interests. The province of Asia was detached from his command. Next, he lost Cilicia which was given to the consul Marcius Rex, who would not send any assistance when Mithradates and Tigranes attacked Asia and Cappadocia. The whole of the eastern command was now dismantled and everything was in an almost irretrievable mess.

In 66 the tribune Gaius Manilius proposed that Pompey should take over in the east, to sort out the provinces and take command of the war. Lucullus was left high and dry, and remained an embittered enemy of Pompey for the rest of his life. He had almost defeated Mithradates but everything had been ruined by the machinations of the politicians in Rome. It is perhaps unfair to put all the blame upon Pompey for the downfall of Lucullus, but no one doubted that he wanted the command, or that the campaign against the pirates was just a preliminary. On the other hand, he was the best man for the job, as shown by his eventual success.

Although there was some opposition to Manilius's bill, for the same reasons as before, because it bestowed too much power on one man, this time several senators spoke in favour of it. Marcus Tullius Cicero, who was aiming eventually for the consulship, spoke for it and published his speech afterwards, *De Imperio Gnaei Pompei*. The bill was passed, and when Pompey heard the news he indulged himself in a short melodramatic moment, complaining about how the needs of the state never gave him any rest. Then he contradicted what he had just said by bursting into action. Manilius's law allowed him to take over from the provincial governors of the eastern provinces, to appoint his own legates, to make war as and when he saw fit and to make peace and to conclude treaties. These were not the usual prerogatives of provincial governors or military commanders, but Pompey had clearly put a great deal of planning into his eastern campaign and had worked out what powers he would need to conduct it. One thing he forgot was to follow the example of Sulla and have all his future acts ratified in advance by the Senate, which might have saved him a lot of

time and trouble when he returned to Rome.

Pompey commanded a large army consisting of Lucullus's troops, his own soldiers that he had raised for the pirate campaign and allies from local communities all round the Mediterranean. In addition he summoned allied kings to meet him and provide troops. He set up headquarters in Cilicia and made diplomatic arrangements with the surrounding states to ensure the safety of his flanks and rear while he marched against Mithradates. There was a constant rivalry between some of the eastern states that prevented them from uniting, which was advantageous to Rome, but Pompey did not wish to be distracted from his main purpose by being drawn into minor wars between them. Since he would be involved in war not only with Mithradates but also with Tigranes of Armenia, he made efforts to neutralize the Armenians by making overtures to Phraates, the King of Parthia, whose territory bordered on Armenia. If the Parthians could be persuaded to tie down Tigranes while Pompey concentrated on Mithradates, all well and good.

Mithradates was a wily adversary and a born survivor. He avoided pitched battles, hoping to draw Pompey onwards into the mountains where he would not be able to supply his army so easily, then it might be possible to cut his supply lines, bottle him up and starve him into surrender or death. Pompey stopped chasing him and turned off into Lesser Armenia to forage, hoping to lure Mithradates into attacking him, but the plan did not work properly. Later he caught up with Mithradates's army, annihilating about a third of it, but still Mithradates escaped. The old king tried to find refuge with Tigranes again but was forcibly expelled and continued to flee to the north. Pompey turned to Armenia, where he put an end to the revolt of Tigranes junior and reinstated the elder Tigranes on the throne.

It was important to detach as many of Mithradates's allies as possible. In 65 Pompey turned against the Albanians and Iberians who had fought for the King. Pompey eventually came to terms with Osroes, King of the Albanians and Artoces, King of the Iberians. Meanwhile Pompey's legates had been given several tasks, Lucius Afranius was stationed in Armenia and Aulus Gabinius was in Mesopotamia, while others patrolled the coasts and guarded routes. With some of his army Pompey made an excursion towards the Caspian Sea, but turned back before reaching it. Leaving Mithradates to his fate in the north for the time being, Pompey then turned his attention to Syria, Judaea and Nabataea, three kingdoms which were always antagonistic to each other, and where palace revolutions often occurred, substituting one ruler for another, often with the assistance of the other states. A struggle for the throne of Judaea involved

Pompey in a minor war in which he captured Jerusalem, and entered the inner sanctuary of the temple, not expecting to find it empty, and perhaps not even fully aware of the enormity of the sacrilege. He set up one of the rival candidates for the throne, but as high priest, not king, so that Judaea remained relatively weak against its neighbours.

At the siege of Jerusalem or perhaps a little earlier, news arrived that Mithradates was dead. His son Pharnaces succeeded him, but had no ambition to continue the war, which could now be finally concluded, and settlement of the whole of the east could begin, with due attention to the delicate balance of power that must be maintained. Pompey spent the winter of 63 to 62 in putting his administrative arrangements in place, generally admitted by modern scholars to be sensible and sound. In the cities with a long history of Greek settlement, it was easy to install the Roman provincial administrative machinery, but in areas such as Pontus there was no infrastructure upon which to build, so Pompey divided the province into eleven districts, each with an administrative centre.

In 62 Pompey returned to Rome. He surprised everyone by disbanding his army, revealing that he had no intention of seizing power in Rome. He had won the war, enriched the treasury by unimaginable amounts, annexed provinces, settled the east and now all he asked was that his arrangements should be ratified by the Senate, and his veterans should be settled on the land. These were perfectly reasonable requests, but his enemies in the Senate were determined not to co-operate. They went through all the details in endless debates, led by Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Quintus Lutatius Catulus and Quintus Metellus. The first two were sworn enemies of Pompey, and he had clashed with Metellus over the control of Crete during the pirate campaign. Another rising politician, Marcus Porcius Cato, lent his considerable talents in oratory to the anti-Pompeian campaign. For some considerable time, Pompey was thwarted at every turn. Rome had changed since he had been away.

Rome During Pompey's Absence

While Pompey was still in the east, there had been disturbances in Rome, centred on Lucius Sergius Catilina, or Catiline, who was accused of conspiring to overthrow the state. The charge against him was nebulous, and so confused even at the time that it is well nigh impossible to ascertain the truth at a distance of two thousand years. Modern scholars have dismissed most of the stories about Catiline as fabrications. The one man who did firmly believe that Catiline posed a threat was Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of the consuls for 63. Catiline had been a candidate for the consulship for 66 but was not elected,

and he was prevented from even standing for election for 65 and 64. In 63 Cicero and Antonius Hybrida were elected and Catiline lost his chance once again. It was said that in desperation he had started to raise troops, and stirred up the people to his side by promising to cancel all debts, which was a common rallying cry in Rome. Towards the end of 63, Catiline went to Etruria, where discontented people of all ranks gathered around him, including veteran soldiers. In Rome, the ringleader was said to be Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, stepfather of Mark Antony, who was a teenager in 63. Lentulus was said to have tried to recruit some Gallic tribesmen who were visiting Rome to convert them to the cause, whatever it was, and perhaps provide some cavalry to add to Catiline's army. The Gauls considered the matter, but decided not to get involved, and told their patron in the city what had happened. Cicero was informed and started to gather evidence. Then he pounced, arresting as many suspects as he could, including Lentulus Sura.

This was Cicero's political triumph, saving the state from the conspiracy. The suspects were brought before the Senate, where Cicero demanded the death penalty. He did not suggest a proper trial, possibly because as an experienced lawyer he knew that the men might be acquitted. Julius Caesar, who was now Pontifex Maximus, tried to suggest the milder punishment of closely guarded house arrest in some of the towns of Italy. No one listened to him. Cicero won the day and had all his suspects executed. It was to rebound on him later. And since one of the victims was Mark Antony's stepfather, he had made a mortal enemy.

Pompey was at a disadvantage because he had not been able to exercise a significant influence on Roman politics while he was fighting the war against Mithradates and then attending to the annexation and administration of the eastern provinces, and the alliances with other states. He did manage to secure some of the magistracies for his friends in the year prior to his return to Italy. Metellus Celer and Valerius Flaccus travelled back to Rome for the elections and were both elected praetors for 63, and Titus Ampius Balbus and Titus Labienus were tribunes for the same year. If these men had been sent to prepare the way for Pompey's return, when he would need senatorial co-operation, they achieved little that was noteworthy, except that Labienus and Ampius Balbus proposed that Pompey should be allowed to wear a gold crown at the theatre, and triumphal dress at the games. This was not just an empty gesture. The Romans attached great importance to outward display and marks of merit.

It is just possible that Publius Servilius Rullus, another of the

tribunes for 63, was one of Pompey's men. One of the most pressing concerns when the army came home was to find land for the settlement of the retired soldiers, since they did not get pensions, and there was also a backlog of veterans from the war against Sertorius, since the programme designed to deal with them had never been completed. It was always a difficult matter to find land for the soldiers without ejecting people already settled on it, and in 63 Rullus presented a land bill that would have solved several problems at once if it had ever been put into effect. The clauses of the bill had been well thought out, taking into account the high level of debt and unemployment in Rome, and the distress caused by the confiscation of public land whenever redistribution had taken place. Rullus proposed to set up a commission of ten men to deal with all the public land throughout Italy. They were to have praetorian powers for five years, which meant that they would hold *imperium* and would be legally able to command troops. They were not to be responsible to anyone, so they could make decisions without going through the Senate. All this made the senators nervous. The commissioners were to have access to funds to enable them to purchase land, including plots in the provinces. The veterans of Sulla's army were to be allowed to keep their plots, unless they expressed a wish to sell.

There is no firm proof of any relationship between Rullus and Pompey, and some scholars have suggested the complete opposite, that Rullus was in fact an enemy of Pompey, perhaps a front man for Crassus and possibly Julius Caesar, and the bill was designed to embarrass Pompey when he came home because he would have to ask nicely, cap in hand, if the commissioners would help him to settle his veterans. This is the line that Cicero took, and he talked the bill to death, ostensibly on Pompey's behalf. On the other hand, it is possible to interpret Rullus's land bill as solid preparation for the return of Pompey's army from the east, by establishing a well-regulated system of land distribution that would upset as few people as possible and still achieve its aims, while at the same time relieving the urban poor and solving the problem of debts. The bill was not passed, but Caesar would revive parts of it a few years later.

The Rise of Caesar

When Pompey returned to Rome, Gaius Julius Caesar was praetor and soon left the city to govern the province of Further Spain, where he had been quaestor in 69. After conducting a successful campaign against the Lusitanian tribesmen, Caesar had been voted a triumph to celebrate his victory when he returned to Rome in 60. He would have to remain outside Rome until the triumph was held and the troops

disbanded, because the law forbade a general to enter the city while in command of an army. This conflicted with Caesar's ambition to stand for the consular elections for the following year. The Senate refused permission for him to stand *in absentia*. Without hesitation, he cancelled the triumph, entered Rome, and was duly elected consul for 59.

Caesar's career up to this point had not been remarkable. As the nephew of Gaius Marius, he was decidedly not a sympathiser of Sulla and his party, but on the other hand he remained aloof from Carbo, so he was not directly involved in the civil war between the two factions. He was only nineteen years old when Sulla came to power, but his lack of years and experience did not make him compliant to Sulla's demand that he should divorce his young wife to sever all connection with the previous regime. Caesar refused to put his wife aside and went into hiding. Unwisely he lingered too long in a marsh where he caught malaria, and was captured, but fortunately he was related through his mother Aurelia to the three Aurelius Cotta brothers, Gaius, Lucius and Marcus, who were followers of Sulla. They spoke up for him, and Sulla relented, allegedly remarking that Caesar should be watched, because he had many Mariuses in him.

Removing himself from Rome, Caesar obtained a post on the staff of the governor of Asia, where he was despatched on a diplomatic mission to King Nicomedes of Bithynia, to collect some ships that had been promised for the Roman fleet. For the rest of his life, Caesar was the butt of scurrilous jokes about Nicomedes, with whom he was widely supposed to have had a homosexual relationship. He went on to serve in a military post in Cilicia, but when he learned of the death of Sulla he returned to Rome. In 73 he was made a priest, *pontifex*, in place of Gaius Aurelius Cotta, who had died. These appointments to the college of fifteen *pontifices* were not elective, but usually passed to a relative of the previous priest. The bestowal of a priesthood was a great honour and usually signified that the chosen man was destined for an important political career. The duties were not onerous and could be combined with other political activities.

Caesar's first meaningful post was obtained in 69 when he served as quaestor in Further Spain, dealing with judgements in the provincial courts and administrative matters. This junior post gave entry to the Senate, thanks to Sulla's legislation, which was not revoked, so after his return to Rome in 68, Caesar could embark on his rise to political fame. It was a slow process. His wife, whom he had refused to divorce, had died just before he left for Spain, leaving him with his daughter and only legitimate child, Julia. In 67 he married Pompeia, no relation to Pompey the Great, but a granddaughter of

Sulla. Caesar was not yet a force to be reckoned with in Roman politics, but he appears in the sources from time to time, speaking in favour of the bills to bestow special commands on Pompey, and in 63 he was made high priest.

Unlike Pompey, Caesar's rise to power was not meteoric and did not involve spectacular military commands. He plodded through the relevant magistracies in the proper order, becoming praetor in 62, and governor of Further Spain in 61. When he set out for home in the following year, announcing that he would stand for the consulship for 59, he had made enough of an impression on his rivals for them to realize that he was clever and dangerous and they did not want him in office as consul. They made strenuous efforts to block him, and then when they saw that the Roman people were favourable to him and he would certainly be elected, they resorted to rampant bribery to ensure that a candidate of their own was also elected. Marcus Porcius Cato, normally a strict upholder of the law, condoned the bribery to support his son-in-law Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, who was voted in as Caesar's consular colleague.

There were now three men who covertly controlled the political scene: Caesar himself as consul, the fabulously wealthy Marcus Licinius Crassus, who supported Caesar largely via ready cash, and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, whose long drawn out attempts to have his eastern administration ratified by the Senate, and his veterans settled on the land, drove him into the arms of the other two. This unofficial, non-permanent partnership is labelled by modern historians as the First Triumvirate, but this gives the impression that there was some sort of agreement, an agenda and a set of rules for the three men to work to, which was not the case. Pompey, Caesar and Crassus worked together for their own ends. Pompey required resolution to his political problems, Crassus wanted political esteem and Caesar had the power, for one year, to bring about the necessary legislation. His agenda covered several current problems. The most important was a land bill that would enable Pompey to settle his veteran soldiers, and also alleviate population pressure in Rome without displacing people already settled on the land. All the sticking points of previous bills were to be circumvented, and the expenses that would be incurred in putting the proposals into effect were already covered, since Pompey had filled the treasury with vast wealth from his eastern conquests, some of which could surely be used to settle the soldiers who had enabled him to do so.

There was little in Caesar's bill that was inflammatory, but in the Senate the opponents of Caesar and his proposals, led by Cato, tried to talk the bill to death as they had done with every last detail of

Pompey's administrative arrangements for the east. Impatient for quick results, Caesar removed Cato from the Senate and put him in prison. It was perhaps understandable, since Caesar was in a hurry and the bill would ameliorate several problems at once, but to act in such a high-handed manner only proved to his enemies that they had been right to distrust him and his methods, for the opposition was not so much against the land bill, as against Caesar. It was not very long since Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus had tried to instigate reforms involving redistribution of land, and the collective senatorial memory of the threat to their dominance still rankled.

Caesar made one final attempt to have the bill passed by the Senate, in the proper legal manner. He asked the other consul Bibulus what were the main objections to the bill, so that each one could be ironed out in debate, but Bibulus would not co-operate. Then, like the tribunes Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Caesar went direct to the people's assembly, with Crassus putting in an appearance alongside him. Pompey made a speech outlining the benefits of the land bill, and hinted that his soldiers would deal with any opponents who tried to sabotage it. There was some rioting in which Bibulus was attacked. He survived, although he was covered in manure for his pains. The bill was passed, despite the intransigence of the Senate. Pompey and Crassus were appointed to the commission of twenty men to carry out the land settlements, and Caesar took the precaution of having all senators swear an oath to support the new law. Cato and his friends refused, but the voice of reason came from Cicero, who could see that there was nothing meaningful to be gained by refusing to uphold it, except to frustrate Caesar.

Disregarding his colleague Bibulus, who had declared that he was watching the skies for omens, which would normally have put an end to all public business, Caesar continued to push through further legislation. All Pompey's arrangements for the eastern provinces and allies were ratified, despite a show of opposition from Lucullus. Yet another law concerning extortion of provincials was passed, the *lex Julia de repetundis*, which remained in force through the Empire. The tax gatherers for the province of Asia were bailed out, having put in a bid for the taxes from which they hoped to make a profit, and then panicking when they found that they had miscalculated and their bid was too high. The King of Egypt, Ptolemy Auletes (literally meaning the flute player), was officially recognized by Rome and his tottering rule was shored up, though he had to pay for the service, and both Caesar and Pompey made a fortune. The Egyptian connection was to play a role later, when Pompey arrived there after his defeat in the civil war, looking for men, money and ships.

The relationship between Pompey and Caesar was cemented by a marriage alliance. When Pompey had returned from the east he had divorced his wife Mucia, the mother of his two sons and his daughter. Since he had not yet remarried, he was the most eligible bachelor in Rome. He married Caesar's only daughter Julia, and the union was generally agreed to be a successful and loving relationship. In the same year, Caesar married Calpurnia, the daughter of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, who was elected consul for 58.

The next item on Caesar's agenda was to obtain a province that would bring him fame, fortune and glory. In an attempt to forestall him before the consular elections in 60, the Senate had fallen back on a law passed by Gaius Gracchus that stipulated that provinces had to be assigned to outgoing magistrates before the elections took place. The Senate allocated the provinces for the outgoing consuls of 59 to make certain that there would be no question of a territorial province for Caesar. He was destined for the mundane task of caretaking woodlands, which would not have satisfied him at all. He overturned this plan and obtained the proconsulship of Gaul, most of which was not yet a Roman province. There were signs of trouble brewing in Gaul because the Aedui, a tribe that was friendly towards Rome, were threatened by another tribe called the Sequani. There was a danger of escalating violence, because other Gallic tribes were being displaced as the Aedui fought their enemies, and the Sequani had allied with the German tribe of the Suebi, enthusiastically led by their chief Ariovistus. There was no immediate threat to Rome, but the memory was still very vivid of the Gallic invasions when the city had been abandoned for some time, and the later migrations of the Cimbri and Teutones, who were finally repulsed by Caesar's uncle Marius.

Caesar obtained his province in stages. The tribune Vatinius passed a law granting Caesar the province of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with command of three legions. This post was to last for five years, terminating on 1 March 54. The need for continuity and longer than usual commands had been established when Pompey was given three years to eradicate the pirates. The fact that he had achieved his aims in three months instead of three years did not detract from the principle that some problems required more than one proconsular year. Then Caesar also obtained Transalpine Gaul, where Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer was to have been governor, but he died before taking up his post, so it was awarded to Caesar. Strictly, the territorial extent of Transalpine Gaul was limited to the province formed in 121 to protect the land route from Italy to Spain and the lands belonging to Massilia. The capital was at Narbo (modern Narbonne), reflected in the later name for the province, Gallia

Narbonensis. If the meaning of the words Transalpine Gaul was stretched a little, it implied the whole of the country up to the coasts of the Atlantic and what is now the English Channel, giving Caesar free rein to embark on his ten year conquest of Gaul and its conversion into Roman provinces.

Before Caesar left for his new province, he took some pains to protect his legislation from attacks by other politicians, just as Sulla had attempted but failed to do before he left for the east. Part of Caesar's plan included the election of Publius Clodius Pulcher as tribune for 58, despite the fact that he was not of plebeian origin. Caesar and Pompey presided over an adoption ceremony, where an obliging plebeian called Publius Fonteius formally adopted Clodius so that he could legitimately stand for election as tribune.

One of Clodius's first enactments was to outlaw anyone who had executed Roman citizens without trial. This law was aimed at Cicero, who was forced into voluntary exile for a while. Cato was removed for a short time as well. Clodius was responsible for the annexation of Cyprus, which strictly belonged to Egypt, but Ptolemy Auletes was in no position to argue. The new province required a governor and Cato was prevailed upon to take up the appointment. For the benefit of the people Clodius amended Gaius Gracchus's legislation for the distribution of cheap grain, making it entirely free at state expense. He also made it more difficult for anyone to disrupt political proceedings by retiring to observe the skies, as Bibulus had done. He arranged for the two consuls for 58, Caesar's father-in-law Lucius Calpurnius Piso and Pompey's adherent Aulus Gabinius, to govern respectively Macedonia and Syria, each with a five year command. Sulla had tried to limit the duration of provincial government to one year, but it was becoming more common to bestow longer commands on governors of some of the larger or more troublesome provinces, or on commanders who took on special tasks. So far, Clodius's legislation had favoured Caesar, but if he had been primed by Caesar, or had been enacting laws that he thought might please him, he soon veered from this path. He harrassed Pompey, nibbling away at some of his eastern arrangements and interfering with the allied states. He even started to agitate against some of Caesar's acts as consul. Clodius's gangs terrorized the streets and Rome was in danger of descending into mob rule.

Pompey retaliated by recruiting two of the tribunes for 57, Titus Annius Milo and Publius Sestius, allowing them to build up rival gangs with which to counter Clodius's men. He began proceedings for the recall of Cicero, who came home in autumn 57. When food shortages became endemic, Pompey was placed in charge of the grain

supply for five years, with proconsular powers and permission to appoint fifteen legates. He took his duties very seriously, travelling widely to negotiate with farmers and landowners, merchants and shippers in Italy and the provinces. One of his journeys was the occasion for his most famous pronouncements. When he wanted to set sail even though the captain of his ship warned that the weather was worsening, he said: 'We have to sail. We do not have to live.'

For the last two years, although he was engaged in the conquest of Gaul, Caesar kept a close watch on what was happening in Rome. He had agents there who informed him of what was going on, and who could ensure that some of his own followers obtained magistracies so that at best some of his wishes could be put into effect, or at worst some of his enemies might be prevented from doing him any harm. He did not neglect the military side of his proconsulship. By 56 he had repulsed the Helvetii who had tried to migrate from the Alpine region into Gaul, and had defeated Ariovistus, dispersing the tribesmen of the Suebi, and discouraging the rest of them from crossing the Rhine from Germany. His second campaign was aimed at the Belgae of north-western Gaul, and the tribes which had joined them. This involved almost annihilating the Nervii, a procedure that is justly regarded with distaste by modern historians. For these wide-ranging campaigns he relied on his subordinates who were capable of operating independently as his legates, such as Titus Labienus and Publius Licinius Crassus, the son of Marcus Crassus.

In the spring of 56, Caesar went on a tour of inspection of the provinces under his command, and met Marcus Crassus at Ravenna. In April, he came to Luca (modern Lucca) where he met Pompey and a large congregation of senators. Crassus may have been present as well, but this is not certain. The most important point is that the three men, Caesar, Crassus and Pompey, now dominated Roman politics to the extent that they could decide in advance what was to happen in the political arena for the next few years. They agreed that in order to block the consular candidate Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had announced that he would undo Caesar's legislation, Pompey and Crassus were to be the consuls for 55, which would no doubt be put into effect by the expenditure of large quantities of cash distributed in bribes to the electorate. They could easily afford this sort of massive outlay. Crassus's wealth was legendary. He said that no one could account himself rich unless he could afford to raise, equip and pay an army. Pompey was perhaps even more wealthy, since he had large estates in Picenum, and many contacts and clients in Spain and in the east, where he had lent money and secured profits for himself for the future. For the year following their consulships, Pompey and Crassus

would both obtain prestigious commands, and they would see to it that Caesar's Gallic command was prolonged to give him enough time to complete his conquest.

The Republic was not dead, but it was already moribund because, from now onwards, rich men with influence, and more important control of loyal armies, could dominate the political scene and mould it to their own advantage, and sometimes to the advantage of the state. There was much that needed reform, but the intransigence of the Senate and the annual turnover of magistrates meant that any reforms that were agreed upon during a term of office could be annihilated in the following year. In such a political system it was not possible to develop sustainable policies or to implement long-term forward planning. Some of the magistrates who were frustrated simply found ways of beating the system to force through legislation and maintain it afterwards. Sulla had shown the way; Caesar developed it into an art.

As consuls Crassus and Pompey did not engage in far reaching reforms, except to pass laws designed to tidy up electoral procedure, to reduce the disorder that was becoming increasingly common, and to prevent the rampant bribery that attended canvassing for votes. This was somewhat two-faced, since not a little bribery had gone into ensuring their own election.

One success for Pompey concerned the dedication of his stone theatre and temple complex in Rome. He had seen Greek theatres while he was in the east, and determined that Rome should also have a similar cultural centre. It was the first permanent theatre in Rome, in place of the temporary timber structures where performances had been put on in the past, and it had a temple, a meeting house and colonnaded walks complete with sculptures and works of art displayed all around, arranged by Cicero's friend Atticus. It was a Roman version of the modern leisure centre.

The consuls for 54 were Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher. At some point Pompey's son married Appius's daughter, but there was no solid political alliance, with Appius slavishly following Pompey's agenda. For their proconsulships Pompey was to be governor of both the Spanish provinces for five years, and Crassus was awarded the province of Syria for the same length of time, with an unpublicised but nonetheless well known plan to launch a campaign against Parthia. Crassus raised an army and left Rome, but Pompey remained behind. He was still in charge of the food supply, to which he devoted most of his attention, so he sent two legates, Marcus Petreius and Lucius Afranius to govern Spain on his behalf. This was an important innovation in provincial government, one that Augustus

adopted and developed at the beginning of the Empire.

The consul Domitius Ahenobarbus set about bringing down several of Pompey's adherents, who were attacked in the courts. One was Aulus Gabinius, who was the governor of Syria until Crassus took over. He survived the first attacks but was prosecuted when he arrived home in the autumn of 54, for having left his province without permission from the Senate, in order to mount a military expedition to replace Ptolemy Auletes on his throne. Gabinius had succeeded in his mission, with the help of a young cavalry officer, Mark Antony. When Gabinius set off for Rome, Antony travelled to Gaul to join Caesar.

Since Gabinius was Pompey's man, and Pompey had already assisted Ptolemy Auletes, it was assumed that Pompey had ordered the expedition into Egypt. The prosecution of Gabinius was therefore intended to embarrass Pompey. The first charge was for *maiestas*, treason against the Roman people. Gabinius was acquitted, but was then condemned on a different charge, this time for extortion. Cicero failed in his defence of Gabinius and Pompey would not use force to save him. Nor would he resort to armed intervention when the elections were delayed in 54. A personal tragedy laid him low for a while, when his wife Julia died in childbirth. The child died too. Some historians have alleged that this was the start of the rift between Pompey and Caesar, but this is now discounted, since there was no detectable change in their political or personal attitudes towards each other for some years thereafter. Even when the news reached Rome in 53 that Crassus and most of his army had been wiped out by the Parthians, there was no deterioration in the relationship between Caesar and Pompey. Crassus had been a partner but not a binding force.

Violence in Rome had escalated to such a degree that the elections in 54 were abandoned and it was not until the middle of 53 that consuls for that year were elected. Pompey presided over the proceedings in the midst of rumours that he was to be made Dictator, but he did nothing to stop two men who were inimical towards him, Domitius Calvinus and Marcus Messalla, from becoming consuls for the rest of the year. In 52 the disruption was even worse. The elections that should have been held in 53 for the following years' magistrates had been continually postponed, then in 52 the rival gangs of Clodius, who intended to stand for the praetorship, and Milo who was a consular candidate, clashed at a tavern outside Rome. Clodius was killed. The people of Rome had benefited from Clodius's measures as tribune, and gave him a splendid funeral in the city, which involved turning the Senate House into his pyre.

Having declined to suggest that Pompey should be made Dictator,

the Senate now passed the last decree, empowering him to raise troops, in addition to those he already commanded as controller of the food supply. As an acceptable compromise, Bibulus suggested that Pompey should be made sole consul, yet another anomalous appointment in his career. The proposal was accepted and Pompey started energetically tidying up, at first alone, and towards the end of his term with a colleague, his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, whose daughter Cornelia was now Pompey's wife. Milo was brought to trial, and defended unsuccessfully by a nervous Cicero, who was intimidated by Pompey's troops standing all around as he spoke. Pompey had determined to abandon Milo, even though he had once been one of his own men when he needed to use him to check Clodius.

With his usual speed and efficiency Pompey passed laws to curb the violence, prevent bribery at elections, and streamline the proceedings in the jury courts, which were to be limited to three days for the examination of witnesses, and one more day for the final speeches. There were to be 360 jurors, of whom a random eighty-one men would be selected for the final hearing making it impossible for anyone to bribe them all.

Two of Pompey's laws seemed to be directed against Caesar. While he was in Gaul, Caesar as proconsul was immune to any prosecution, but once he gave up his command he would be a private citizen and vulnerable to attack. He had upset enough people to make this a likely occurrence. He may have easily escaped condemnation, but anyone who was undergoing a trial was banned from standing for election. Since he wished to take up a second term as consul as soon as his proconsulship ended, Caesar had asked for permission to stand for election *in absentia* so that he could step directly from one office to another without an interruption, and still be protected from prosecution. This privilege had been refused when he returned from Spain some years before, but this time a law had been passed, known as the law of ten tribunes, allowing him to stand as consular candidate without putting in a personal appearance in Rome. Pompey supported this law and worked hard to push it through, but then he seemed to contradict himself by passing the *lex de iure magistratuum*, stipulating that candidates for any of the magistracies must come to Rome. He added a codicil exempting Caesar from this law, since his case had already been dealt with in a separate law, but in future no one else was to be allowed to emulate him. Interpretations of Pompey's action range from forgetfulness to deceit, but if he had wanted to circumvent the law of ten tribunes he could have simply repealed it. There is no need to interpret this as a breach between Caesar and Pompey in 52.

The next law was designed to impose a gap of five years between a magistracy in Rome and a promagistracy in a province or on a specific task. Both Caesar and Pompey would have to find some way of avoiding prosecution for a period of five years without an appointment, but Pompey had already surmounted this problem by extending his Spanish command for another five years. The law had an unwelcome effect on several men who had never entertained a wish to govern provinces, because there was now a shortage of ex-magistrates who had not held a post for five years. Marcus Tullius Cicero had to leave his beloved Rome to govern Cilicia from the middle of 51 until the summer of 50.

By the time he returned to Rome, there had been a change of attitude towards Caesar. Marcus Marcellus and Servius Sulpicius Rufus were elected consuls for 51, and Marcellus had started to agitate for the recall of Caesar from Gaul. Modern historians are hampered because there is no reliable evidence about the date when Caesar's command was due to end. Crassus and Pompey had been awarded five years in Syria and Spain, with a probable terminal date of 1 March 50, but it is not known if this was also the date when Caesar should lay down his command. Pompey was safe for another five years, and was authorized to remain in Rome while legates governed his provinces. It was beginning to look as though Caesar would not be able to rely on similar privileges. In September 51 Metellus Scipio proposed that any discussion about Caesar's command should be postponed until 1 March 50, which gave Caesar some leeway, but not enough to cover the period of the elections.

The consuls for 50 were no friends of Caesar, and it seemed that the tribune Scribonius Curio would prove to be an even worse enemy, but in the spring he went over to Caesar. The consul Gaius Marcellus opened the debate on Caesar's command by proposing that successors should now be appointed. Curio suggested that the same should apply to Pompey's command in Spain. Pompey proposed an extension of Caesar's command until 13 November 50, but Curio blocked him. It became clear to Pompey that Curio and others were determined to split him from Caesar. In the summer he fell dangerously ill, and was gratified to find that there was widespread rejoicing when he recovered.

In December 50 Gaius Marcellus made two separate proposals: that Caesar should lay down his command and give up his army, and Pompey's command should be terminated. The first was passed and the second was defeated, highlighting the favourable attitude of the Senate to Pompey and their hostility to Caesar. The tribune Curio, whose office was due to end when the incoming tribunes took up

office on 10 December, reiterated his consistent proposals that both Caesar and Pompey should lay down their commands at the same time. The vote was overwhelmingly favourable, but Marcellus did not act upon it and dismissed the Senate.

One of the new tribunes for 49 was Mark Antony, who waited only a few days after taking up office on 10 December to make a speech against Pompey in the Senate. Pompey did not retaliate. Cicero thought that Pompey had come to the conclusion that Caesar would obtain what he wanted by force if necessary, but he may have been transposing his own opinions onto Pompey. At the beginning of 49 Caesar sent a letter for the tribunes Antony and Quintus Cassius to relay to the Senate, suggesting that he and Pompey should lay down their commands at the same time, but he included the threat that he would not do so if Pompey retained command of his troops in Spain. Some last minute compromises were proposed. Antony and Cassius vetoed the suggestion that Caesar should give up his command by a certain date. Then it was proposed that Caesar should retain command of Cisalpine Gaul or Illyricum with one legion, but that failed too, despite the fact that the many senators and Pompey himself were in favour of the idea. Soon afterwards the Senate passed the last decree authorizing the magistrates to ensure the safety of the state. Antony and Cassius were prevented from exercising their veto by the threat of violence. Some sources suggest they were physically ejected from the Senate. They left Rome in a hurry with Scribonius Curio to join Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, where he was poised with his army on the border between his province and Italy, marked by a small river called the Rubicon. It was so geographically insignificant that after two thousand years no one can say exactly where it was, but its political significance was enormous. To cross it at the head of troops was an act of rebellion. By the time Antony and Cassius joined up with Caesar he had crossed it on the night of 10/11 January.

Civil War

The eventual outbreak of war took everyone by surprise. Neither the Senate nor Pompey was prepared for it, despite the fact that no-one had been able to find any solution to the problem. It was clear that Caesar would never back down unless he could achieve what he wanted, and Pompey was not willing to retire into private life, standing aside while Caesar fulfilled his ambitions. The *optimates* did not want Caesar as consul for a second term, and saw no reason why he should obtain the office by being allowed to break all the rules about standing for office in person and not using wholesale bribery, privileges that were denied to everyone else via Pompey's legislation

as sole consul. The *optimates* did not want Pompey in supreme command either, but they thought that they could make use of him. After all, he was the best general they had. They knew that Caesar was determined and ruthless, but they made no preparations to avert disaster when he did the very thing that they feared and invaded Italy.

Pompey already had command of troops, but most of them were in Spain. Some time before the war began he had obtained two legions from Caesar's army on the pretext of beginning a campaign. One of these legions had been originally his own, but Caesar inspired tremendous loyalty in his troops, so after their service in Caesar's army, Pompey's soldiers were no longer trustworthy. Unfortunately, Pompey had overestimated his abilities to raise another army. He had boasted that he only needed to stamp his foot in Italy and troops would spring up, but stamp as he might the men were not forthcoming. To the horror of the senators, he decided to evacuate Rome and establish a base in Greece, where he could train the troops that he did have, and recruit more. It was a strategically correct decision, and Pompey carried out the evacuation of the port of Brundisium with characteristic military aplomb, just as Caesar caught up with him in a rapid march from Rome.

Caesar did not chase after Pompey but returned to the city, observing all the politically correct forms by not crossing the city boundary while still in command of troops, which was a little odd considering that he had just marched into Italy at the head of an army. But it was important to show that he intended no harm and that there were to be no proscriptions such as Sulla and his own uncle Gaius Marius had set in motion. He adopted a studied policy of mildness, his famous *clementia*, which he had demonstrated when he had surrounded the troops led by his avowed enemy Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium. He let Domitius and his officers go free, to join Pompey if they wished.

In Italy Caesar had the support of many cities and communities, and he worked on the rest, spreading the word that he had no desire to murder people or confiscate property. He was concerned to leave a pacified country behind him when he set off to deal with the Pompeians. He installed his adherents in significant posts: Mark Antony was in charge of Italy, his brother Gaius Antonius was sent to Illyricum and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was made prefect of the city of Rome. Caesar entrusted the command of Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Licinius Crassus, the son of the consul who had met his end in Parthia. Scribonius Curio was to command Sardinia, Sicily and Africa, where he could secure the grain supply for Rome. Caesar decided to carry the war to Spain in order to eliminate Pompey's legates and troops there,

before facing Pompey himself in Greece. He summed up the situation with the neat phrase that he would deal first with the army with no leader and then the leader with no army.

Caesar made short work of Lucius Afranius and Marcus Petreius, Pompey's legates in Spain. Caesar's troops were experienced and battle hardened, and intensely loyal, and the two Pompeian commanders were no match for him. By August he had accepted their surrender at Ilerda. In Further Spain Marcus Terentius Varro, loyal to Pompey but also a realist, surrendered rather than have his soldiers massacred in an unequal fight.

In Rome, Lepidus had brought about Caesar's appointment as Dictator, which gave him the necessary powers to pass legislation to relieve the chronic debts that always plagued the poorer citizens, and to ensure that food was distributed to them. He held the elections, and was elected consul for 48 with Publius Servilius Isauricus as colleague. Then he laid down his dictatorial powers and embarked for Greece.

Pompey had been granted time to train his army while Caesar was in Spain, but he could not control the senators who were with him, continually exhorting him to this and that activity. When Caesar arrived in Greece he had only half his army, and Mark Antony in charge of the other half still in Italy could not cross to Greece because Marcus Bibulus, the commander of the Pompeian fleet, assiduously patrolled the sea lanes. Pompey had made his base at Dyrrachium where he could be supplied by sea, but if Caesar wished to remain there watching Pompey, he would be forced to forage over a wider and wider area for food and fodder. When Antony managed to evade the Pompeian fleet and landed north of Dyrrachium, Caesar marched to meet him, and Pompey followed but withdrew when he found himself between the two sections of Caesar's army. The opposing forces returned to Dyrrachium, and dug in. Pompey erected a defensive line all round three sides of his camp, with the fourth side open to the sea, and Caesar erected siege works extending round Pompey's lines. At one point Pompey very nearly broke through the siege works, but the attempt failed. So did Caesar's offer of negotiation. The stalemate was ended when Caesar, short of food, moved off towards Thessaly. Pompey broke camp and followed him to a place called Pharsalus. The battle that they fought there was to dictate the future course of Roman history.

Civil Wars: The Rise of Octavian 48–30 BC

Facing Caesar's army at Pharsalus in the summer of 48, Pompey steadfastly refused to engage in a pitched battle, though Caesar tried every day to entice him by drawing up his troops near to Pompey's camp. According to Caesar's account of the civil war, Pompey's resolute refusal of battle nearly succeeded in driving him away in search of food, but on the very day that Caesar had given the order to break camp, Pompey offered battle. The senators who had been eager to risk a battle had probably won the day by persuading Pompey to seek an end to the contest. As soon as he realized that Pompey meant to fight, Caesar halted the withdrawal and ordered his army to form up in the usual three lines, but took the precaution of adding an extra fourth line, which he stationed out of sight. He placed himself and Publius Sulla in command of the cavalry on the right wing because he had observed a build up of strength on the Pompeian left. Mark Antony commanded the Caesarian left wing and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus the centre.

When the Pompeian cavalry attacked Caesar's right wing, the extra fourth line of Caesarian soldiers, who had been waiting for just such a moment, suddenly appeared and tipped the balance by charging into the cavalry and dispersing them, and then turning on the unprotected Pompeian left flank. Caesar had ordered his men to aim their weapons at the faces of the Pompeian soldiers, which thoroughly demoralized them. They fled for the camp. Some survivors took up a position on high ground where they stayed all night, but surrendered in the morning. Pompey had ridden off the field and escaped. Caesar eventually heard that he was aiming for Cyprus, and guessed that his ultimate destination would be Egypt, where he would try to profit from his connection with Ptolemy Auletes and his heirs, and collect men, money and ships to continue the war.

Caesar sent Mark Antony back to Rome to keep order there, and placed Domitius Calvinus in command of the province of Asia with three legions, made up from the surrendered Pompeian troops. Caesar had won a major battle, but the war was by no means over. Pompey was still free and active, and there were pockets of Pompeian sympathisers distributed in parts of the Roman world, and the Pompeian fleet was still a force to be reckoned with in the

Mediterranean. Although Caesar had taken steps to secure Spain after the defeat of the Pompeian generals, his grasp was not as firm as he would have liked. Scribonius Curio had successfully taken over Sardinia and Sicily, but he had been killed when he tried to gain control of the province of Africa. In these two areas, Africa and Spain, the surviving Pompeians would eventually gather.

Instead of pursuing the scattered Pompeian officers and their men, Caesar decided to follow Pompey. If he could capture him it might be possible to bring about a negotiated peace. Caesar had tried to negotiate several times before and during the war and, though it was more than likely that he had done so as a demonstration of his own good faith in contrast to the intransigence of the senators and Pompey himself, there may have been some element of sincerity in his attempts. When he reached Alexandria, however, Pompey was already dead. There was a civil war going on in Egypt between the heirs of Ptolemy Auletes who had recently died. The army of the young Ptolemy XIII was currently in control of Alexandria, and the forces of Cleopatra VII were camped close by, with their sister Arsinoe as an interested onlooker. Their younger brother, who would become Ptolemy XIV, was still a child, and took no part in the war. The advisers of Ptolemy XIII assumed that following closely behind Pompey there would be either Caesar himself or his officers, and they had no wish to become involved in the Roman civil war. The general Achillas allegedly pronounced that 'Dead men don't bite' and so Pompey was killed and beheaded as soon as he landed.

When Caesar arrived in Alexandria he was immediately caught up in the Egyptian civil war. In his account of the civil war Caesar says that he could not leave immediately because of adverse winds which kept his ships in harbour, so he remained in Egypt because he considered that the war between Ptolemy's heirs would affect the Roman people and himself as consul. This altruistic phrase carefully avoids the fact that the Romans were increasingly interested in Egypt, largely because of its wealth, and if Caesar could bring about a peaceful conclusion to the current war and establish one or possibly more of the Ptolemaic heirs on the throne, they would be grateful to him. Another consideration was the fate of the loans he had made to Ptolemy Auletes and the potential loss of his returns on them if anarchy descended on the country.

There was some risk in attempting to end the Egyptian war. Caesar had very few troops, and although he had asked his ally Mithradates King of Pergamum to recruit more soldiers for him in Syria and Cilicia, there would be a delay before they arrived. Consequently Caesar was besieged for a short time in Alexandria by

the army of Ptolemy XIII under Achillas. Cleopatra VII was with him in the Royal palace, having arrived there, as the legend says, rolled up in a carpet delivered to Caesar by one of her servants. She is only briefly noted in Caesar's memoir of the events, but it was Cleopatra whom he chose to elevate to the throne of Egypt, and it was Cleopatra who bore him his only acknowledged son, called Ptolemy Caesar and nicknamed Caesarion, or little Caesar.

At some unknown date in the middle of 47, Caesar left Egypt, pausing on the way back to Rome to make war on King Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates VI. Pompey had confirmed him as ruler of the Crimea but he had taken advantage of the preoccupation of the Romans to try to regain the kingdom of Pontus, defeating Caesar's general Domitius Calvinus. Caesar rapidly restored order and left two legions in Pontus, issuing his famous arrogant but amusing statement *veni, vidi, vici* (I came, I saw, I conquered).

He arrived in Rome in midsummer, though it was September by the calendar, which was out of synchronization with the seasons. He was Dictator for the second time, held the elections in which his own men Publius Vatinius and Fufius Calenus were elected consuls, and he promoted several of his adherents to reward them. Among them was his sixteen year old great-nephew Gaius Octavius, who was given the honorary position of *praefectus urbi* during the festival of the *Feriae Latinae*, a very old celebration in memory of the Roman conquest of Alba Longa. All the magistrates left the city to travel to the Alban Mount, leaving the city in the hands of one of the younger members of the upper class families. It was a mark of distinction for the young Octavius, but since he was always ill with some complaint or other, probably no one took much notice of him.

The Wars in Africa & Spain

It was now time to settle the problem of the Pompeians in Africa and Spain. Caesar decided to go to Africa first and started to make preparations for another war. His soldiers chose this moment to dig their heels in. They had been fighting for him for a long time and they were tired, they said, and wanted to be discharged. It was thinly disguised blackmail in the hope of receiving more pay and rewards, but Caesar turned the tables on the men, addressing them as 'Citizens' as though he had already dismissed them, and promising to give them all that they asked for as soon as he had returned from the war in Africa, for which he would employ other troops. The soldiers begged to be allowed to go with him.

The African campaign lasted for a few months and was over by

the middle of 46, but it was not a foregone conclusion that Caesar would be victorious. At one point a Caesarian foraging party was attacked by the Pompeian cavalry, and in making for the camp they were attacked again by Marcus Petreius, one of Pompey's generals who had faced Caesar in Spain. Caesar himself had to rally the men in this skirmish, physically manhandling one of the soldiers to explain that the enemy was in the opposite direction to the one in which the men were running.

The Pompeians had taken over the city of Utica, the capital of the province of Africa after Carthage had been destroyed. Cato had taken over from the governor Atius Varus, but he was not chosen as commander of the Pompeian army. Metellus Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, was appointed instead and Cato acquiesced. Like Pompey himself Scipio refused to engage Caesar in battle, but at Thapsus Caesar managed to lure him into attacking, making it appear that he was in a disadvantageous position, trapped between two Pompeian armies. In the final battle Scipio was defeated, and the Pompeian survivors fled to Utica, where they fought their way into the city by killing many of the inhabitants. Cato stopped the massacre. Many of the Pompeians were eventually hunted down and captured by Caesar's troops, and the rest moved out of Africa to congregate in Spain, supported by the fleet. Cato did not leave Utica, preferring suicide to Caesar's clemency.

Some of Caesar's veteran soldiers were settled in colonies on the African coast, where they served to guard the area against the Pompeian fleet. Their settlement in Africa also absolved Caesar from the obligation of finding lands for all of them in Italy, though there were still many men to settle when he arrived in Rome. He appointed legates to seek out available land that could be purchased and it was paid for from the vast booty from the wars, so no one was evicted and no funds were taken from the state treasury.

Caesar arrived in Rome in July 46. In September he held four separate triumphs, parading through the streets with his captives and the spoils of war, which were traditionally dedicated to Jupiter in the temple on the Capitol Hill. The triumphs were all celebrated over foreign enemies, the Gauls, the Egyptians, Pharnaces and Juba of Numidia, though this last was really over the Pompeians in Africa, who had been assisted by Juba. The leader of the Gauls, Vercingetorix, had been in prison for six years awaiting this event and was killed as soon as the triumph was ended. Cleopatra's sister Arsinoe was marched through the streets, representing the Alexandrian war, but she was spared and sent to Ephesus. The infant son of Juba also featured in the triumph, and was brought up in Rome. He was

eventually given Roman citizenship and installed as King of Mauretania. There was no mention of a triumph over Pompey the Great.

There was still a war to be fought against the Pompeians in Spain. Pompey's sons Gnaeus and Sextus had assembled a large army, recruiting soldiers from native Spanish tribes. The memory and reputation of Pompey the Great was still alive in Spain, and he had cultivated many clients in the province. Caesar left Rome towards the end of 46. This final campaign in the prolonged civil war was the most desperate and the most brutal. Caesar besieged Corduba where Sextus Pompey held the town with two legions, but drew off when he saw that he could not take it quickly. He was short of supplies. He transferred the siege to Ategua, full of stores of food and held by the Pompeian Munatius Plancus, whose response to the siege was to murder all the citizens who were sympathetic to Caesar and then throw the bodies over the walls. Caesar hoped to be able to induce Gnaeus Pompey to commit his troops to a battle to relieve the city, but when Gnaeus found he could do nothing to break the deadlock, he marched away. Caesar took Ategua and then chased after Gnaeus and the Pompeians. He caught up with them at a place called Munda, which has not been securely identified, but was probably in the vicinity of Urso, where Caesar later founded a colony. Gnaeus chose his ground well and offered battle, on the day that Caesar had decided to move away, as at Pharsalus. The battle was extremely hard fought on both sides, and Caesar admitted after his victory that he had often struggled to win, but this was the first time he had been forced to fight for his life.

Gnaeus Pompey escaped but was soon captured and, like his father, he was beheaded. His younger brother Sextus left his legions at Corduba and escaped to the coast to join his fleet. Ironically, the son of the man who had suppressed piracy in the Mediterranean became one of the most successful pirates of all time, surviving at sea for the next decade, and a constant irritation to Caesar's successors.

The resistance in Spain did not end after the battle of Munda. Caesar spent several months in pacifying the country, settling veterans, founding colonies, administering justice, adjusting administrative procedures and redefining territorial boundaries. He was joined by his great-nephew Gaius Octavius, who had been invited to accompany Caesar at the beginning of the campaign, but fell ill and could not leave Rome. When he recovered, Octavius made the journey with a few friends and attendants. This was not as simple a task as it may sound and required courage and determination. Caesar was impressed with the boy, with his intelligence, his reserve, and the

tactful way he handled deputations from the Spanish communities. Caesar returned to Rome in summer 45, with Octavius travelling in his carriage, until Mark Antony came to meet them, and took Octavius's place. Antony had recently been out of favour with Caesar. After the battle of Pharsalus, when Antony was acting as Caesar's deputy in Rome, he had been somewhat heavy handed in putting down a riot when the populace had been stirred up about the problems of debt. Caesar could not condone his actions, which reflected badly on him as Dictator, so Antony was quietly dropped and he was not asked to take part in the African war, nor did he receive any appointments for 46, in fact he had been overlooked in favour of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was made Caesar's deputy. It was clear on the journey back to Rome that Antony had been forgiven. He was promised the consulship with Caesar as colleague for 44.

Caesar's Reforms

The Republican system demanded considerable repair. From the time of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus the checks and balances that were originally built into the unwritten constitution had begun to fail, finally descending into chaotic violence. Sulla had shown that the real power lay with the man who could command the personal loyalty of the troops. Soldiers traditionally swore an oath of loyalty to their commanding officers, nearly always the consuls, and through them they owed loyalty to Rome, but personal military power had grown as campaigns lengthened, especially when the wars were fought abroad. Then the troops were not defending the homeland any longer, but fighting on behalf of a commander, who in turn was fighting to support the ideology of Rome, and more than likely to promote himself. As Rome expanded and wars were fought more or less continuously in one part of the world or another, there was a need for more and more troops. The indifference of the Senate to the ultimate fate of their increasingly large number of soldiers threw the two elements together; the commander needed the soldiers to succeed in his tasks and the soldiers needed the commander because he was the one man on whom the veterans placed their hopes for settlement on the land when they were discharged.

On the political scene, internecine strife resulted from the factions that had formed around leading figures, and from the shifting struggles between the *optimates* and the *populares*. Tribunes and other magistrates could be purchased to present the ideas of either of these groups, laws could be passed by the people's assemblies, circumventing the Senate, but then any legislation could be immediately overturned by a new set of magistrates. In this

environment, it was impossible to sustain long-term planning or consistent policies. Many Roman politicians were more concerned with their own careers than they were with the government of the city and the provinces, and some of them regarded Rome as the centre of the universe with the provinces as exploitable satellites, places where they would be able to accrue personal wealth, without reference to the fact that they were functioning parts of a homogeneous empire.

By contrast Caesar thought in terms of the whole state embracing Rome itself and the provinces. This is controversial, like almost everything else about Caesar. From his own time to the present day his motives have been questioned. Was his frenetic legislative activity part of a logical long-term plan designed to reshape the government of a single city state into a fully fledged Imperial administration? Or was it piecemeal and haphazard and mostly designed to elevate himself into the sole ruler of Rome and the provinces? In the opinion of the author of this book, Caesar could see clearly what was necessary to improve the government even if he could never make it work perfectly, but he was no longer young and he was in a hurry to force through all the legislation that he envisaged. The laws that he passed were full of common sense measures and not too inflammatory, but his methods were questionable and arrogant. He tried to do too much too soon, and in the end it was not what he did so much as how he did it that turned men against him.

In order to put all his ideas into effect, Caesar required continuous long term power, and he received it legitimately in the form of a Dictatorship for ten years in 46. He was also consul for the third time that year, and again for the fourth time, but without a colleague, for most of 45. He resigned the office before the end of 45, but since he was Dictator this did not represent any loss of power. Besides, some of his associates were made suffect consuls in 45. The *consules suffecti* were additional consuls who took up their office after the elected ones (*consules ordinarii*) resigned their consulships. During the Empire it became more common for the ordinary consuls to resign so that suffect consuls could take their place. The scheme provided the necessary experience and rank for such men to proceed to further appointments. Caesar had also been granted the right to nominate candidates for some magistracies, and he installed some of his friends as provincial governors, but this does not mean that he used them as his deputies, directing their every move. Not all of them turned out to be exemplary role models.

Caesar very rapidly enacted several laws in the intervals between the civil wars. Between 46 and 44 he produced a staggering amount of legislation. He passed laws to alleviate the ever-present problem of

debt. He revised the list of people who were eligible for the free corn dole that Clodius had instituted, reducing the number of recipients to 150,000. He reformed the jury courts, which were henceforth to be made up of equal numbers of equestrians and senators. In order to regulate provincial government, he decreed that praetors were to govern for one year and consuls for two, thus preventing anyone from emulating his ten year term as proconsul of Gaul. He abolished the old lunar calendar that required constant adjustments, which had been neglected for the past few years, so that the months no longer matched the seasons. Caesar inserted an extra two months into the year to bring the months into line with the seasons, and then established a new way of reckoning time, based on the Egyptian solar calendar of 365 and one quarter days, rectified by inserting one day every four years. It was not adjusted again until the eighteenth century.

At first there was little active opposition, since many of his adversaries had been removed in the wars, and many people were too weary of the upheavals of the past years to argue. He tried to foster good relations with the Pompeians who had surrendered to him, to win them over without bloodshed, and he extended his good will to the Italians and the provincials. For some time he had promised Roman citizenship to the Transpadane Gauls, and fulfilled this promise as soon as he could. Whether or not it was his main purpose to cultivate the loyalty of people such as these, he was able to extend his client base all over the Empire, just as Pompey had done via his wide-ranging campaigns.

In Rome, Caesar lost some of his popularity by inviting Cleopatra to stay in the capital. She may have arrived in time for his four triumphs in September 46, bringing their son Caesarion with her and her young brother, Ptolemy XIV. She set up her household in Caesar's villa across the Tiber, where Caesar visited her, giving rise to the rumours that he intended to marry her and make her Queen, and himself King of Rome. Many honours had already been voted to him, which he accepted graciously, such as the right to wear triumphal clothing and a laurel wreath on public occasions, very important distinctions in Rome. Up to now he had not shown any definite signs of wanting to become king, but one day a diadem denoting kingship appeared on the head of one of his statues. Two tribunes who may or may not have been guilty of placing the diadem were punished, and the situation was defused, temporarily.

For some years Caesar had been planning new buildings for Rome, financing them with the funds he had gathered while conquering Gaul. As Dictator he embarked on a programme of public

works, which beautified the city of Rome and provided employment. The Forum Julii was one of these projects, dedicated in 46. Inside the new Forum there was the temple to Venus that he had vowed to the goddess at the battle of Pharsalus, and opposite the statue of the goddess he placed a gold statue of Cleopatra, which did little to assuage the suspicions that he intended to marry her and make her Queen.

Another project was to rebuild the Senate House that had been burned down in 52. He enlarged the Senate to 900 members, promoting some of the equites to senatorial rank, and admitting men from the Italian towns. These men who were promoted would owe him a debt of gratitude and would support him in the Senate, but then, ironically, there was little very senatorial debate about his measures. Caesar simply informed the senators of his decisions and then passed the laws. As Dictator he was entitled to direct the policies of the state, but it was all very irregular and Cicero complained that government was being carried out from Caesar's house. It was true, because Caesar had a lot to do and had neither time nor patience for strict Republican formalities. Some senators who had not been present at the meetings where the laws were presented found that their signatures had been added to them, as if they had given their consent. It was all too high-handed for strict Republicans, who had hoped for a return to the old way of doing things when the civil wars ended. It is unlikely that Caesar's opponents had ever been prepared to wait for the phase of Caesarian domination to end, hoping that, like Sulla, Caesar would content himself with passing his laws and then resign, but if they had ever thought along such lines they were to be completely disillusioned in February 44. The Senate made Caesar *Dictator perpetuus*, or Dictator for life.

The Ides of March 44 BC

Caesar accepted the lifelong Dictatorship on 14 February. He had announced some time ago his intention of mounting a campaign against the Dacians and then the Parthians. Since 53 when Crassus was defeated and killed in Parthia there had been no time for retribution, but now it was possible to think of at least making a show of strength to redress the balance. Some of his contemporaries, followed by some modern historians, have accused Caesar of failing dismally to find a solution to the political disaster into which Rome had sunk, and running away to fight battles that would restore his reputation and glory. Whatever his reasons, Caesar had already prepared for the campaigns, and had sent the young Gaius Octavius to Macedonia to serve with the legions poised to march to the Danube

and then to Parthia. He intended to leave quite soon, probably in March. If he went on campaign, and particularly if he was successful, he would return to Rome all powerful, and since he had secured many of the magistracies and a large number of senators, it might not be possible to annul all his legislation while he was away. There were some men who had already begun to think of ridding themselves of Caesar long before the situation reached this critical point. They would have to act soon.

On 15 February 44 the Romans celebrated the festival of the Lupercalia. It was an extremely old fertility rite, in which young men, wearing only a loincloth, ran around the streets of Rome, striking women with goatskin thongs, which was supposed to help them to conceive children, most especially sons who would fight for Rome. This year the consul Mark Antony took part, stripping off and running with the other young men, but carrying a diadem with him. When he reached Caesar's chair, Antony offered him the diadem, the symbol of kingship. Caesar refused it. The crowd roared its approval that he had rejected it. Antony repeated the offer, with the same result. No one can say with certainty how this scenario came about, whether Antony thought it up himself, or whether Caesar was behind it as a means of testing the reaction of the people, or to try to allay suspicion that he wanted to be king. All that it achieved was to deepen the distrust.

It was announced that Caesar was to leave Rome on 18 March. A meeting of the Senate had been called for 15 March, in Pompey's theatre. On that morning Caesar felt ill, and his wife Calpurnia had a premonition of some disaster, so he very nearly decided not to attend, but his supposed friend Decimus Brutus came to his house and persuaded him to change his mind. The conspirators, comprising seemingly loyal Caesarians as well as pardoned ex-Pompeians, had chosen that date for their liberation of the state, so it would have been somewhat awkward if their victim did not turn up. They called themselves Liberators, and they had high standards. They decided not to kill Antony. Gaius Trebonius distracted him in conversation as he was about to enter the meeting room with Caesar. Inside, twenty-three conspirators met Caesar and all of them struck a blow with their daggers. Caesar fell dead at the base of the statue of Pompey. Senators who had no idea that there had been a plot fled to their homes, as did Mark Antony, where he barricaded himself in and probably waited for an attack. None came.

The incredible truth was that the Liberators had not made any plans except to assassinate Caesar. Once that was achieved they seemed to think that the Republic would bounce back into place, as if nothing had changed. They had not arranged for any of their number

to take over and direct operations until everything had calmed down, for that would be to act as tyrannically as Caesar. They had considered the political problem solely from their own point of view as *optimates* and had not thought of what the reaction might be from the people. When they tried to make a speech explaining why they had killed Caesar, the people drove them off and they took refuge on the Capitol Hill. Consequently it was left to Antony to restore order, and it is to his credit that he did so without resorting to bloodshed, or allowing a witch hunt to develop to mow down the Liberators.

Mark Antony & Octavian

Antony and Aemilius Lepidus co-operated to blockade the Capitol and to bring soldiers to the Campus Martius. Antony called a meeting of the Senate for 17 March in the Temple of Tellus, which was conveniently close to his own house. In the meantime he rallied as many of Caesar's supporters as he could, including Caesar's secretary Oppius and his adherent and financier Cornelius Balbus. He also approached Caesar's widow Calpurnia, who gave him all her husband's papers. Faberius, Caesar's private secretary and full of useful information, readily worked with Antony.

The first concern at the meeting of the Senate was to put into effect a general amnesty. Cicero proposed it amid universal acceptance. Then the question of how to deal with the conspirators was considered. A murder had been committed and the perpetrators should be punished, but on the other hand if Caesar really was a tyrant, then the conspirators had performed a singular service to the state and should be rewarded. The problem was that even if Caesar was pronounced a tyrant it was not possible to annul all his acts. Most of the men in office had been placed there by Caesar, future appointments had been arranged in advance, and the provincial governors for the most part owed their position to Caesar. To cancel all this would mean setting up an entirely new government from scratch. His arrangements had to be left as they were. As Cicero wrote despairingly to his friend Atticus, the tyrant was dead, but the tyranny still lived.

On the day following the meeting of the Senate, Caesar's will was read. He had left money to every Roman citizen, and larger sums to some of the men who had killed him. One quarter of his fortune was to be divided equally between his nephews Pinarius and Pedius, but the vast bulk of it went to the youth Gaius Octavius, his great-nephew who was currently in Macedonia. That was not all. There was a codicil to the will, in which Caesar adopted Gaius Octavius as his son. The legality of this has been the cause of much speculation, both ancient

and modern. Gaius Octavius was determined to take up his inheritance in full, and eventually he ratified his adoption, so that speculation about whether or not it was legal was squashed.

He arrived in Rome, probably in May 44, already calling himself Gaius Julius Caesar. Strictly he ought to have added Octavianus to the name to signify that he had been adopted from the Octavian family into the Julian clan. Octavian is the name by which historians know him, but he never used it himself. By the time of his arrival, Antony had abolished the Dictatorship, and he had arranged for the chief conspirators Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus to leave Rome, even though they were still in office and ought to have remained in the city. They were given legitimate tasks so that it would not seem like banishment, but Cicero found it very demeaning that his heroes were sent to look after the corn supply in Asia and Sicily. Decimus Brutus was to be governor of Cisalpine Gaul and left to take up his appointment, so three of the conspirators were absent from Rome.

Antony's first meeting with Octavian, as reported by the historian Appian, was not a success, but the speeches invented for them serve to outline their personalities and the political situation. Antony was suspected of mixing up state finances with his own, because he had suddenly been able to pay off his not inconsiderable debts, and perhaps worse, he kept on producing schemes and proposals that he said he had found among Caesar's papers, which gave them slightly more authority than if he had presented them as his own ideas as consul.

The government of the provinces required attention, and the Senate confirmed in office most of the governors appointed by Caesar. Antony had been assigned to Macedonia, as part of Caesar's plan to invade Parthia, but this scheme was now redundant, and Antony preferred to remain within reach of Rome. He decided that as governor of Cisalpine Gaul he would be able to monitor events in the city, so he angled for that province, instead of Macedonia. The problem was that Cisalpine Gaul had been awarded to Decimus Brutus, one of the assassins of Caesar, and he had already taken up his post. For the time being Antony left him in control, but he was just as determined to gain the province eventually for himself. He placed his brother Gaius Antonius in command in Macedonia, with one legion, transferring the other four legions to his own command, ready for action in Cisalpine Gaul. He may have forgotten that Octavian had been with these legions for some time while waiting for Caesar to start his Parthian campaign, which made it easy for the young man to subvert them later on.

Octavian assisted Antony in exchanging his provinces, but in other respects he made life awkward for him. Antony had been careful to emphasize the value of Caesar the politician but had tried to suppress the memory of Caesar the Dictator. Octavian did not subscribe to this subtle distinction, and seized any advantage to proclaim himself as Caesar's heir. When he organized a series of games in honour of Caesar, a comet appeared, which was taken as proof that Caesar had become a god. From then onwards Octavian called himself *divi filius*, the son of a god. It is sometimes hard to remember that Octavian was only eighteen years old when Caesar was assassinated.

Gradually, Antony was portrayed as a potential tyrant. Octavian started to arm himself, gathering Caesar's veterans to protect himself against Antony. Then, listening to Cicero's virulent speeches denouncing Antony, the senators too were convinced of the need to raise troops to guard against his possible take-over of the state. Octavian already commanded troops, and only needed the authorization to use them. Cicero wanted to rid the world of Antony at all costs. He and Octavian made an alliance, and Antony, instead of marching on Rome as Cicero said he would, prudently went to his province of Cisalpine Gaul. He would have to fight Decimus Brutus to gain control of it, and there was no time to lose. He had only one month before his consulship ended, and then the Senate would empower the new consuls to take up arms against him, so he would be fighting on two fronts. He blockaded Decimus Brutus in Mutina (modern Modena).

In the spring of 43, the consul Aulus Hirtius marched northwards, reinforced by Octavian and his troops. Cicero had persuaded the Senate to confer a command on the young man. The other consul Vibius Pansa was on the way from Rome to join them. Antony decided to attack Pansa before the armies could unite. He routed the troops, and Pansa was wounded and died later, but Hirtius arrived before complete victory could be assured, and Antony withdrew. After a second battle at Mutina, Antony had to acknowledge defeat, and set off with his soldiers for Gaul. The governors of Transalpine Gaul and Spain were Caesarians, and might be persuaded to help him.

At Rome, it was considered that Antony was finished, and official thanksgiving was decreed. He was declared *hostis*, an enemy of the state, and Decimus Brutus was ordered to pursue him. Octavian was ordered to help Decimus, but seemed strangely reluctant to march or to relinquish command of any of his troops. Cicero thought that he would be able to use and control Octavian to eliminate Antony, and he made a clever pun about how the young man ought to be praised,

honoured and immortalized, in Latin *laudandum adulescentem, ornandum, tollendum*. The word *tollere* can mean to raise up, and also to remove by death. Cicero was clever, but not clever enough to realize that, far from being able to use and then discard Octavian, the supposedly innocent youth had simply been posing as his friend in order to use his political prestige to gain a command. No one seems to have realized that Octavian would never, ever, assist one of the men who had assassinated Caesar, so it was a considerable surprise to Cicero and the Senate when Octavian arrived at Rome with eight legions to ask politely for the consulship.

The Senate was in no position to argue, and so Octavian became consul, with Caesar's nephew, Quintus Pedius, as colleague. One of Octavian's first acts was to have his adoption by Caesar ratified by law. Confirmed now as Caesar's legitimate heir, Octavian made no secret of the fact that one of his main aims was to condemn all Caesar's assassins. They were all properly tried by court proceedings, even though they were absent. They were all condemned. This meant that they were outside the law, as Antony was. While Octavian marched north to pursue Decimus Brutus, Pedius revoked the law declaring Antony an enemy of the state.

After fleeing from northern Italy, Antony had made spectacular progress. He arrived in Gaul with his army in May 43, and had soon joined with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. Between them, they commanded ten legions, but potentially they could find themselves fighting against the three legions of Munatius Plancus in Transalpine Gaul, and the two legions of Asinius Pollio in Further Spain. By the end of the summer both these governors had gone over to Antony, leaving Decimus Brutus defenceless against their overwhelming force. When Octavian arrived in northern Italy, he met Antony and Lepidus at Bononia (modern Bologna) and the three of them decided the future of Rome. They were careful to have their association ratified by law. On 27 November 43, the tribune Publius Titius passed the legislation to recognize them as 'three men appointed to reconstitute the Republic' (*tresviri rei publicae constituendae*). This is usually termed by modern historians as the second triumvirate, but officially there had never been a first triumvirate, merely an informal agreement between Pompey, Caesar and Crassus. Antony, Lepidus and Octavian were formally appointed with equal powers to the consuls for five years. They were empowered to make laws, and to nominate magistrates and the governors of provinces. Antony was to govern Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, Lepidus was to take control of Gallia Narbonensis and all Spain, Octavian was to control Sardinia, Sicily and Africa. Since they intended to declare war on the Liberators, they would

govern their provinces via legates. The eastern provinces were not within their reach, since Brutus and Cassius had seized them and started to raise armies. The war would have to be carried across to the Mediterranean, just as Caesar had made war on Pompey the Great.

Before they could embark on a major war, the three men required the removal of the associates of the self-styled Liberators, and vast quantities of money. They proscribed seventeen men and posted up the lists, but many more names were quickly added and the result was organized mayhem. One of the motives may have been to seize property and therefore wealth, but the prime motive was the eradication of anyone who sympathized with the Liberators. Cicero was one of the first victims. If he had resolutely left Rome to join Brutus and Cassius, he might have survived, but he vacillated and was cut down near one of his villas. In a barbaric act of revenge, Antony had his head and hands nailed to the Rostra in the Forum, where senators stood to make their speeches.

The financial situation was in crisis, since Brutus and Cassius controlled the eastern provinces, so none of the revenues reached Rome. Compared to the east, the western provinces were not so wealthy, and so the heaviest financial burden fell on Italy. As for ready cash, the Triumvirs seized all the personal savings entrusted to the Vestal Virgins, and they revived old taxes and invented new ones, including a tax on wealthy women. This tax met with determined opposition from a deputation led by Hortensia, the daughter of the lawyer Hortensius, accompanied by Octavian's sister and Antony's mother. They protested that women had no voice in politics and therefore they should not be expected to pay for wars unless Rome itself was threatened. The tax was ratified but at a much reduced rate.

Time was of the essence, as the Liberators grew stronger in the east. Brutus captured and eventually killed Antony's brother Gaius, and Cassius reached the province of Syria before the Caesarian governor Dolabella could establish himself there. Cleopatra sent four legions to help Dolabella, but Cassius seized these too. The whole of the east would have to be won back by the Triumvirs. They also had to reckon with the pirate fleet of Sextus Pompey, whose presence in the Mediterranean endangered the corn supply, and hindered the transport of the Triumviral army from Italy to the eastern provinces. Fortunately for the Triumvirs, Sextus Pompey did not unite with the Liberators, but he had gained control of Sicily and early attempts by the Triumvirs to oust him failed dismally.

When the civil war began, Lepidus was left in Rome with some troops in order to keep control and ensure that no one tried to overturn the Triumvirs' legislation. Like Caesar before the campaign

against Pompey, Antony did not have enough ships to take his whole army across the sea. Cleopatra sent a fleet from Egypt to aid the Triumvirs, but it was wrecked in a storm. However, the Liberators reacted to the news that she had despatched ships for Antony by sending their own fleet to search for them, which gave the Triumvirs the time they needed to send eight legions under Decidius Saxa and Norbanus Flaccus across the Adriatic to Macedonia. Antony's generals set off eastwards towards Thessalonika, and Brutus and Cassius moved into Thrace and then along the Via Egnatia to meet them. Antony and Octavian took advantage of a brief moment when the enemy fleet drew off and landed at Dyrrachium with the rest of their army. Norbanus and Saxa had established a base at Amphipolis, and Brutus and Cassius had camped to the west of Philippi. Antony marched to Amphipolis, left a garrison there, and took the army to reconnoitre the situation at Philippi. Octavian had to be left behind at Dyrrachium, because he was too ill to travel.

Antony did not attempt to mount a full frontal attack on the camps of Brutus and Cassius, but decided to cut the supply lines by building a causeway across the marsh to the south and come up behind the Liberators. While the work was proceeding, hidden from the Liberators, Octavian arrived, carried in a litter, too ill to ride but determined to be there. The battle of Philippi in late autumn 42 was a prolonged affair. It began with a skirmish when Cassius attacked Antony's troops and then Brutus joined in. The result was a stalemate, when Antony captured Cassius's camp and Brutus captured Octavian's, but did not capture Octavian himself, since he was hiding in the marsh. The stalemate may have persisted for some time but for the fact that Cassius believed that Brutus had been killed, and in despair he committed suicide. Nothing happened for about two weeks, then Brutus offered battle and Antony defeated him. When the body of Brutus was brought to him, he arranged an honourable funeral for him.

Octavian's part in the two battles had not been impressive, and the victory was truly Antony's, but Octavian was far from negligible in the political sphere. They were the two most powerful men of the Triumvirate, Lepidus being gradually eclipsed, but neither Antony nor Octavian could afford to make a separate bid for supremacy. They agreed that Antony would govern the provinces of Gaul via his legates, and also the whole of the east. Octavian would govern Spain, Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily, and Lepidus would control Africa. Octavian would have to fight for Sicily since Sextus Pompey still controlled the island, and there had been rumours that Lepidus was seeking an alliance with him, so Octavian would have to tread

carefully in Rome. His first major task would be to find lands for his discharged veterans, in fulfilment of the promise made to the troops when the Triumvirs had held their meeting at Bononia.

Antony remained in the east, repairing the damage that the Liberators had caused by extracting supplies and money. Some cities had been impoverished, others had tried to resist, but in the end they had all suffered. It was not only the cities of the Roman provinces that had been affected. The fragile relationships with rulers whose kingdoms bordered on the provinces also required attention. Unfortunately the sources do not elucidate Antony's arrangements in the east, as if all his activity had been expunged from the record. Greater emphasis is laid on the fact that he went to Athens for the winter of 42–41. In the spring of 41 he travelled to Ephesus, where he was hailed as the new Dionysus, the god of wine and beneficence, highly appropriate for Antony, who could drink anybody under the table and was ridiculously generous to his friends and acquaintances. The Romans did not approve of treating living persons as if they were divine, but in the east it was quite normal and Pompey had been treated in the same way when he campaigned against Mithradates. Antony's new found divinity would counterbalance Octavian's claims to be the son of the god Caesar.

At Pergamum, Antony met with delegates from the eastern states, and demanded ten years' taxes from communities which had already paid vast sums to the Liberators to support their armies. In response, he was asked if he could arrange a second summer and a second harvest, and in the end he settled for nine years' tax payable over two years. He needed to pay his troops and to supply them, no light task given the number of legions he had at his disposal. The ultimate aim was to mount the campaign against the Parthians that Caesar had planned, but for the time being he concentrated on making friendly overtures to the states which bordered the Parthian Empire.

One state in particular, which could scarcely be said to border on Parthia, was vital to his plans. Egypt was wealthy, possessing all the resources to supply food for the soldiers and to build a fleet of ships. Queen Cleopatra would be at least sympathetic to his needs. She had been placed securely on her throne by Caesar and she had tried to help the Triumvirs by sending soldiers and ships to fight against the Liberators. The question was how to approach her. Antony did not want to go to Egypt because it would place him in a subordinate position, so he sent an envoy to ask Cleopatra to come to meet him at Tarsus, in Cilicia (modern Turkey). She agreed, sailing in her famous Royal barge described by Plutarch at length and in superlative terms. Antony wanted financial assistance for his Parthian campaign.

Cleopatra wanted recognition for herself and her son Caesarion as independent rulers of Egypt, and Antony was the man of the moment with all the power of the Roman world at his disposal. The two of them could do good business together, but not on Cilician soil. Cleopatra insisted that while she remained on her barge on the River Cydnus, she was still in Egypt, and Antony must come to her.

This famous meeting started out as a political expedient for both Antony and Cleopatra, but developed into an immortal legend. The historian Appian says that Antony was bowled over and fell in love instantly. This may contain an element of truth, but it was not their first meeting. Antony may have seen the teenage Cleopatra when he was a young cavalry officer in the army that Aulus Gabinius took from Syria to Egypt to stabilize the throne for Ptolemy Auletes. They may not have been formally introduced but Antony would certainly have known of her. When Cleopatra came to Rome as the guest of Caesar, Antony would almost certainly have been properly introduced to her, but she was firmly in Caesar's domain, and therefore out of bounds. Besides, Antony had just married Fulvia, the widow of his friend Curio who had been killed in Africa, and apparently he was in love with his wife. However long it took for Antony to realize Cleopatra's finer points as a woman as well as a political and financial ally, an association developed from the moment when they met at Tarsus. Their relationship transcended any formal alliance. But it played into Octavian's hands, when the time came to use it against Antony.

After their meeting, Antony attended to problems in Syria, and left Decidius Saxa in command when everything was settled. The sources are hostile to Antony and do not allow him any success, even accusing him of creating more problems than he solved, but it is significant that all was calm for some time thereafter. Sailing from Tarsus, Cleopatra returned to Egypt, where Antony joined her for the winter of 41–40. Their relationship as lovers was confirmed when Antony acknowledged as his own the twins that she had borne him, Alexander Helios (named for the sun) and Cleopatra Selene (named for the moon).

In Italy, Octavian was having more trouble than he had anticipated in finding lands for the veteran soldiers. He had begun well, trying to pour oil on troubled waters when the redistribution of land entailed evictions, but he met with active opposition from Lucius Antonius, Antony's brother, and Fulvia, Antony's wife. They said that Antony's veterans were being treated unfairly, but Octavian defused the situation by allowing Antony's men to supervise the proceedings. Lucius then took up the cause of the displaced farmers instead. The end result was a war, in which Lucius was blockaded in Perusia

(modern Perugia). In February 40, the town was burned – no one seems to know who was responsible – and Lucius was captured. He was sent to govern Spain, but was accompanied by several of Octavian's supporters to make sure that he acted in accordance with their wishes. Meanwhile, Antony did nothing at all, so that nobody could decide whether he had instigated the whole event, or whether Lucius and Fulvia had acted with misguided zeal on his behalf, but without his knowledge. Seeds of distrust were being sown. Octavian was accumulating ever more power in the west. After the fall of Perugia and the capture of Lucius, many of the Antonians fled, including Antony's wife Fulvia, and his mother, Julia. Fulvia, accompanied by Munatius Plancus, arrived in Greece to meet Antony in Athens, with the news that Plancus's legions had gone over to Octavian. Another blow to Antony was the unexpected death of Fufius Calenus, the governor of Gaul as Antony's legate. Octavian quietly assumed command of Calenus's legions and sent his own man, Salvidienus Rufus, to replace him in Gaul.

Antony did not react immediately. He really needed to go to Italy to meet Octavian, but for the moment he had more pressing local problems to think about, because the Parthians invaded Syria, early in 40, killing the governor Decidius Saxa. Antony delegated his general Ventidius Bassus to restore order in Syria, and then in the autumn of 40 he sailed to Italy. In the meantime, Sextus Pompey had given refuge to Antony's mother as she fled from Octavian, and now Sextus proposed an alliance with Antony, who guardedly said he would agree to it if he could not make peace with Octavian, but if peace was arranged then he would try to reconcile the Senate and people of Rome with Sextus and his men.

Octavian and Antony finally met at Brundisium and settled their differences. War had been narrowly avoided. Antony left his wife Fulvia in Greece, where she died without ever seeing him again. He was accompanied by Domitius Ahenobarbus, originally the commander of the fleet raised by Brutus and Cassius, but now an ally. They found the gates of Brundisium closed against them, and assumed that this was on Octavian's orders. There was some skirmishing as Antony started to besiege the town, but the soldiers on each opposing side were not willing to fight each other. As far as they were concerned the two antagonists were both connected with Caesar and although their own loyalties were divided, the soldiers saw no reason for war. A treaty was made, redefining the division of the Roman world between Antony, who would from now onwards hold the east, relinquishing his command in Gaul, and Octavian, who would control the west. The two men then returned to Rome, where they were met

by a relieved population. In order to cement their new alliance, Antony married Octavia, the sister of Octavian, who had been recently widowed. She would become the mother of his two daughters, both called Antonia, the younger of whom would in turn become the mother of three children, the celebrated general Germanicus, the future Emperor Claudius, and Livilla.

The Triumvirs were now in effect whittled down to two, even though Lepidus had not yet been entirely obliterated. One of their major tasks concerned the menace of Sextus Pompey, who had as yet received nothing from the arrangements made at Brundisium, and had reapplied his stranglehold on Rome's corn supply. There were riots in the city. The people implored both Antony and Octavian to put an end to the food shortages. At one point the mob threw stones at Octavian when he tried to speak to the people, and Antony had to rescue him. Neither Octavian nor Antony had enough ships to combat Sextus Pompey, whose crews were by this time far more experienced than any that the Triumvirs could assemble. Negotiation rather than war was the only alternative, so after a false start, the three men met at Misenum on the coast of Italy and another treaty was made in 39. The future now seemed more secure than it had done for some long years, but for a brief moment Antony and Octavian came very close to having their individual futures wiped out at one stroke, when they dined with Pompey on board his ship to celebrate making peace. When the banquet had begun, Pompey's admiral Menas suggested that they should cut the cables and sail away, dumping the two guests overboard when they were far enough out to sea. Fortunately for the Triumvirs, Pompey refused to stoop to such an action.

The terms of the treaty were that Sextus Pompey was to control Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily, which merely ratified the status quo because neither of the Triumvirs could claim complete control of these islands, despite Octavian's attempts to fight for them. In return for the territorial concessions, Sextus Pompey was to guarantee the corn supply for Rome. For the future, he was promised the consulship and control of the Peloponnese. Neither promise was fulfilled.

The Triumvirs had already filled all the main magistracies for 39 through to 36, and now they designated the men who were to hold magistracies for 35 to 31. They declared an amnesty for the men who had taken refuge with Pompey, and some of the magistracies went to them, in multiples in some cases, to reward them and give them administrative experience as well as rank. According to the historian Dio, in 39 there were more than two consuls, and in 38 there were sixty-seven praetors, presumably holding office for a short time and then relinquishing it. As a precaution against opposition, the

Triumvirs had all their acts ratified by the Senate, by a law that was retrospective, stretching back to the beginning of the Triumvirate. It was a sort of insurance policy in case anyone took issue with their proceedings from their first meeting onwards. Antony and Octavian were also conscious of the fact that their powers had been granted for five years, and would soon be coming to an end.

In January 38 Octavian made a shrewd, politically motivated move. He had divorced his wife Scribonia in 39, on the day that she gave birth to his daughter Julia, and then after a scarcely suitable interval he married Livia Drusilla, who was well connected and would bring her connections to bear in recruiting allies from among the leading senators. Octavian was not deterred by the fact that Livia was already married to Tiberius Claudius Nero. She was also the mother of a young son, who would become the Emperor Tiberius, and she was pregnant with another child. Since the paternity of these children was not in doubt, and Tiberius Claudius Nero was willing to accommodate Octavian by divorcing his wife, the marriage went ahead and lasted throughout Octavian's lifetime.

Later in the year 38 the prospect of peace was shattered. Sextus Pompey had not received the Peloponnese, so instead of wasting time trying to fight for it he adopted his usual tactics of raiding the ships carrying food supplies to Rome. Octavian's response was to invade Sicily, but he was badly beaten and lost nearly all his ships, the first batch in a battle off Cumae, and most of the surviving vessels in a storm the next day. He was forced to ask Antony for help.

Antony had spent the winter of 39 in Athens, preparing for the Parthian campaign. His general Ventidius had restored order in Syria, and it remained to ensure the loyalty of the kingdoms and tribes of the east before the army set off to make war on the Parthian king, Pacorus. When Octavian's request for assistance arrived, Antony put everything on hold and sailed once again to Brundisium. There was no one there to meet him, so he sailed back, having pointlessly wasted a lot of time. He arrived in Syria in the middle of the summer. Ventidius had fought a battle with the Parthians at Gindarus in northern Syria, in which the Parthian king had been killed. The remnants of the Parthian army had taken refuge with the King of Commagene, Antiochus, at Samosata on the right bank of the River Euphrates. Ventidius marched there and laid siege to the place. Antony took over in autumn 38, and Ventidius returned to Rome to celebrate the triumph that he had undoubtedly earned. It was a personal triumph as well as a public one. The family of Ventidius had been on the losing side in the Social War, and as a child he had been paraded through the streets of Rome in the wake of Pompeius Strabo's triumphal

chariot. Now he rode in his own triumphal chariot.

In the autumn of 38, Antony made peace at Samosata and returned to Athens for the winter, intending to resume his preparations for the Parthian campaign in the spring of 37. For the third time he was interrupted. Octavian's efforts against Sextus Pompey had failed once again, so this time Antony assembled 300 ships and sailed with them to Brundisium. According to the ancient sources, for the third time he could not gain entrance to the town, and sailed on to Tarentum, where Octavian met him. Antony gave up 120 ships to help Octavian in the struggle against Sextus Pompey, and received a promise of 20,000 soldiers for the Parthian campaign. The agreement that they made at Tarentum concerned more than just the immediate military needs of each commander. The Triumvirate had technically ended in 38, five years after it had been formed, but the two men had continued to hold power unchallenged because their own men were holding the most important magistracies and the Senate had been so weakened by the proscriptions that there was hardly anyone left who would argue that in the eyes of the law, neither Octavian nor Antony was entitled to command armies or govern provinces. For the sake of appearances, they renewed their powers for another five years, and the necessary law was passed by the people's assembly in Rome. This removed the likelihood of any challenge to their authority and actions until the end of 33.

Antony now deferred the start of the Parthian campaign until the spring of 36, and wintered in Antioch in Syria, closer to the scene of action than Athens. He left his wife Octavia in Italy, looking after their infant daughter, the elder Antonia. Octavia was pregnant with another child who would be the younger Antonia, and she was also caring for Antony's two sons by Fulvia, Antyllus and Iullus Antonius. She was the perfect Roman mother, modest, forbearing and gentle. The contrast with Antony's immoderate behaviour, especially when he invited Cleopatra to come to Antioch for the winter of 37–36, made it easier for Octavian to blacken Antony's name. The perfect wife Octavia had been repudiated, and it seemed as though Antony had turned his back on Rome. His close association with Cleopatra could be portrayed as treachery.

The Parthian campaign of 36 went badly for Antony, but the naval campaign that Octavian mounted against Sextus Pompey was a resounding success. Octavian's most successful and loyal general, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, had spent some time building a new fleet and training the crews in an artificial harbour that he had constructed. Agrippa joined two lakes together by removing the strip of land that separated them, and spent most of the year 37 and the early part of 36

building up the expertise of the sailors and soldiers until they were ready to face Sextus Pompey. Agrippa adapted the grappling iron called the *harpax* that could be catapulted onto enemy ships to draw them close enough to board. He had added protective covering on the ropes that were attached to them so that the enemy could not cut them and break free. This intensive preparation and training eventually paid off, after some reverses on land in Sicily, and an indecisive sea battle off Mylae. Then Agrippa finally brought about the success that Octavian required in September 36, at the naval battle of Naulochus.

The victory elevated Octavian to new heights in Rome, save for an unpleasant episode when the third and forgotten Triumvir, Lepidus, tried to gain control of Sicily. He had gained control of the cities that Sextus Pompey had taken over, but unfortunately Lepidus had failed to realize the persuasive powers of Octavian, the affection that the legions had for him, and the money that he promised them. The soldiers deserted Lepidus, and he had no choice but to surrender. Octavian spared his life, allowed him to retain his office as Pontifex Maximus, and kept him closely watched in Rome for the rest of his life.

Octavian was the man of the hour in Rome, showered with tremendous honours voted to him by the Senate and people, and yet more power, this time that of the tribunes. It is debatable whether he was granted full tribunician power at this time or whether he achieved it by gradual stages, but it was to become the mainstay of his own and all future emperor's imperial power. Tribunes were sacrosanct and could direct and modify all public business. The consulship was an important office which Octavian certainly valued, but he did not hold it on a permanent basis, whereas he never relinquished tribunician power. The problem is that he counted his tribunician years only from 23, not from 36, which seems to indicate that in 36 he had not yet been granted the whole panoply of tribunician power.

As Octavian went from strength to strength, successfully removing the threat to the grain supply and conveniently close to the Romans so that he was able to mould them into his supporters, Antony remained far distant, achieved little against the Parthians, and was scandalously associated with, perhaps even married to, the Queen of Egypt. The rumour that he may have married Cleopatra probably started in Antioch. The pair were hailed in the east as the embodiment of the Egyptian gods Osiris and Isis, or the Greek deities Dionysus and Aphrodite. All this was very shocking, especially as Romans were forbidden marry foreigners. No one knows for certain whether Antony

and Cleopatra had taken part in some sort of ceremony that could be construed as a wedding, but their relationship was consummated while they were at Antioch, and their son Ptolemy Philadelphus was born the following year. If there had been a splendid victory over the Parthians, Antony may have been able to redeem himself, but his timing was not right. In the previous year, the Parthian royal house was in turmoil after the death of Pacorus, and the new king, Phraates, was busily killing off all his relatives who might have been able to challenge him. Antony had more than once delayed the start of his campaign in order to come to the aid of Octavian, and consequently he had lost the chance to exploit the distracting mayhem among the Parthians.

When he finally started the campaign, Antony drew up his army at Zeugma in north-eastern Syria, as if he intended to invade at that point, significantly opposite Carrhae where Crassus had been killed, but instead he made a dash northwards to march through Armenia and Media, hoping that the Parthians would assemble in the wrong place and he could attack them from the north. The plan failed because he was stalled in Media trying to besiege the capital at Phraaspa, and had to retreat, through the horrendous terrain and bitter wintry weather of Armenia. He lost many of his men, and finally left the army with his generals Domitius Ahenobarbus and Canidius, while he travelled ahead to the Syrian coast, sending messengers on ahead to Cleopatra, asking her to meet him with clothing, food and money. She gathered the supplies and set off in person, probably in January, risking her life in an inadvisable winter sea voyage. It may not have been true love, but it was certainly devotion.

There was no question of mounting a campaign against Parthia in 35. The army would have to be rebuilt and he needed money. When his wife Octavia arrived in Athens with supplies, soldiers and cash, Antony did not go to meet her, but simply sent her a message, directing her to send on the money, supplies and troops. He went to Alexandria with Cleopatra. It was not a sound policy. By maltreating his wife he had broken with Octavian, and even worse, he had chosen instead to link himself with the Queen of Egypt and all things eastern. The road to war was open.

Civil War

It was perhaps not inevitable at this stage that another civil war would break out. Rifts had been healed before, but there was no room for powerful rivals in Octavian's ambition for himself and for Rome. He had already neutralized Lepidus. It would be harder to neutralize Antony, but for the fact that Antony himself gave Octavian so much

ready ammunition to fire back at him. In his preoccupation with his tasks in the east, Antony ignored Rome, where he ought to have been exercising the same level of self-advertisement as Octavian. His agents were ineffective, giving Octavian the chance to eclipse him. In 34 Antony was consul, but *in absentia* and only nominally for one day, relinquishing the office in favour of other candidates. He mounted a campaign against Armenia, hoping to consolidate his power in that kingdom so that he could attack Parthia. His conquest of Armenia has been belittled, but it was sound enough, even if not permanent, and Antony issued coinage with the legend *Armenia Devicta*. This was wholly in keeping with the Roman ethos, and it would have greatly assisted Antony's cause if he had celebrated his victory in Rome, dedicating the spoils of war to Jupiter in the temple on the Capitol. Instead Antony chose to celebrate it in Alexandria. He held a parade through the streets of the city, perhaps not intending to make a mockery of the Roman triumph, but it was easy to interpret it as such.

If the street parade had been the end of the matter, the episode might have been forgotten, but the next day Antony sealed his fate with Octavian and Rome. He held another celebration, known as the Donations of Alexandria. Seated on a dais with Cleopatra at his side and their children before them, Antony bestowed on them kingdoms and territories of the east. Alexander Helios was to rule Armenia, Media and Parthia, even though the last two kingdoms were not yet within his gift. Cleopatra Selene was given Cyrenaica and Libya, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, still an infant, was to rule Syria and Cilicia. What was more threatening, from Octavian's point of view, was Antony's proclamation of Caesarion as the true heir of Caesar.

Octavian was engaged in campaigns in Illyricum, to give him military prestige to match Antony's and also to give him legitimate grounds to command armies. He could not yet expect to stir up the populace and the troops to go to war against Antony, most especially since he had announced an end to civil wars when Sextus Pompey had been defeated. On the other hand if he delayed, it was possible that Antony would go on to defeat the Parthians and exact revenge for the death of Crassus. In that case he would be a hero, and there would be no cause to make war on him. Octavian began a political campaign against Antony. He made much of the shameful treatment of Octavia, who had done nothing to warrant desertion, but this was only personal and hardly a basis for war. As consul in 33 Octavian tested public feelings with a speech against Antony, but he shifted most of the opprobrium onto Cleopatra, portraying Antony as her bewitched consort. Cleopatra was foreign and a legitimate enemy. It was rumoured that she went about saying that she would one day issue her

orders from the Capitol. Clearly, said Octavian, she harboured an ambition to take over the whole Roman world, and Antony would help her.

In the autumn of 33 Antony abandoned any idea of a Parthian campaign and turned away from the east, focussing on Rome. He started to prepare for war against Octavian, but tried to soothe public feeling in Rome by offering to lay down his triumviral powers if Octavian did the same. The Triumvirate was probably due to end in December 33 anyway, although the date is disputed. If this was so, then in 32 neither Octavian nor Antony was entitled to command armies, but like Pompey and Caesar before them, they were too powerful to be stopped.

The consuls of 32, Sosius and Domitius Ahenobarbus, were both Antony's men, but they were overwhelmed by Octavian's determination to block them. He convened a meeting of the Senate where he arrived with his bodyguard, forcing his way in to seat himself between the two consuls. The illegality of his actions was ignored. He said he had obtained documentary evidence to condemn Antony and would produce it at the next meeting. It precipitated a mass exodus. The consuls and about 300 senators fled to Antony. The Roman world was once again dividing itself into two opposing camps.

About 700 senators remained with Octavian, and some of Antony's men came to Rome, sensing that they might be on the losing side if they stayed in the east. It was said that two of them revealed to Octavian that Antony had lodged his last will and testament with the Vestal Virgins in Rome, so Octavian seized it and read it out at a meeting of the Senate. Antony reaffirmed Caesarion's status as the heir of Caesar, granted legacies to his children by Cleopatra, made his son Antyllus his own personal heir, and finally expressed a wish to be buried in Alexandria with Cleopatra.

Octavian did not advocate war openly, but allowed the indignation of the Senate and people to speak for him. He also took the precaution of having all the inhabitants of Italy swear an oath of allegiance to him, save for the towns such as Bononia where Antony had many clients. It was an unprecedented gesture which gave Octavian the moral support to make war on Cleopatra, and by default on Antony.

The war was fought in Greece. Antony strung his army out to watch the inlets and harbours on the western coast, concentrating on the Gulf of Ambracia, where two projecting peninsulas almost encircled the waters of the gulf. In the spring of 31 Octavian sailed to confront Antony there. Most of Antony's fleet was now bottled up in

the gulf. For several months, Octavian's army and Antony's faced each other on the northern and southern sides of the gulf, while Agrippa steadily annihilated Antony's troops on the islands and coasts. The morale of Antony's army sank lower and lower as malaria and dysentery decimated them. Desertions began, and Antony's punishments for indiscipline and betrayal grew more and more severe. Finally, he decided to try to break out with the fleet through the narrow entrance to the gulf, and make for Alexandria, leaving the army under his general Canidius to march overland to Egypt.

The result was the much discussed battle of Actium, often used as a turning point in the civil war and the establishment of Octavian as sole ruler of the Roman world. As a battle it was not deeply significant. Cleopatra escaped carrying the treasury and after desultory fighting Antony followed, transferring from his doomed flagship to a boat and then to Cleopatra's vessel. Most of his ships were captured or sunk. When they arrived in Egypt, Cleopatra entered Alexandria with flags flying as though they had won a great victory, while Antony hid himself away in a hut on the shore.

It was certain that Octavian would follow. He had already purchased the Antonian troops in Greece, except for their commander Canidius, who preferred to join Antony in Egypt. Cleopatra tried to revive Antony, but although he participated in her plans and joined in the drinking revels, he knew he was beaten. Octavian allegedly offered lenient terms for Cleopatra if she would surrender Antony, but she refused. She probably distrusted Octavian, knowing that what he really needed was access to her treasure and the wealth of Egypt. The people were prepared to go to war on her behalf, but she refused to embroil them in death and destruction, knowing that Octavian would have no interest in them beyond gathering their tax payments.

When Octavian appeared in Egypt in 30, Antony took some of his troops to meet him, hopelessly outnumbered. His cavalry routed Octavian's advance guard, and he came back to Alexandria to celebrate, but it was only a matter of time. The soldiers and the fleet went over to Octavian. Antony watched the mass desertion and rode into Alexandria to find that Cleopatra had locked herself into her mausoleum, and was probably already dead. He fell on his sword, but did not die immediately. The story goes that he was hauled up into the mausoleum to die in Cleopatra's arms. It may be true. It may also be true that after a few days, Cleopatra was bitten by the asp hidden in the basket of figs, and died willingly rather than be led as a captive in Octavian's triumph.

Caesarion, the son of Cleopatra and Caesar, had been sent away to try to ensure his safety. He was pursued and killed, as was Antony's

son Antyllus. There the vendetta ended. Antony's younger son Iullus Antonius, and the three children of Antony and Cleopatra, were all spared. Octavian was undisputed sole ruler of the Roman world. Arriving at this point had been difficult and protracted; now he needed a legitimate means of staying there.



1. The timeless symbol of Rome: the She-Wolf who rescued the twins Romulus and Remus. This is a copy in the EUR, Museo della Civiltà Romana; the original is in the Palazzo dei Conservatori on the Capitoline Hill in Rome, complete with the round twins who were added c.1510 by Pallaiuolo. This famous bronze sculpture dates from the fifth century BC, made by an Etruscan artist who was influenced by the Greeks. No one knows where the wolf was located until the tenth century AD when she was given a home in the Lateran Palace. She was brought from there to the Capitol in 1471.



2. The Lacus Curtius, or Lake of Curtius, in the Forum Romanum in Rome. The area is of great antiquity, being repaved at least twice, the lower pavement dating to the second century BC. Traditionally the sculpture represents Marcus Curtius, who saved Rome by leaping into a chasm that appeared in the Forum, sacrificing himself and his horse, presumably to appease the gods.



3. The Pons Fabricius, the bridge spanning the gap between the Campus Martius on the left bank of the Tiber, and the north-eastern side of the Tiber island. This bridge is the most ancient of all the bridges still in use in Rome. It dates from 52 BC, probably replacing an earlier timber bridge. Its builder was Lucius Fabricius, who recorded his work by means of two inscriptions, one on each side of the bridge. There was a tremendous flood in 23 BC, which may be the reason why the consuls of 21 BC examined the structure, declaring it to be safe, and recording their results in another inscription.




4. The remains of the Basilica Aemilia in the Forum Romanum. A basilica was originally founded on this site in 179 BC, replaced in 55 BC by a new structure, begun by Lucius Aemilius Paullus (hence its other name of Basilica Paulli). It was completed in 34 BC, but was unfortunately burnt down c.14 BC. Augustus and his friends financed a new building, retaining its association with the family of Aemilius Paullus. It contained at least two storeys, and was fronted by a row of shops running alongside the Via Sacra that led from the Palatine to the Capitoline Hill. On the marble floor of the Basilica there can be seen some green splotches, where some bronze coins melted in the tremendous heat of a fire that destroyed the building in the early fifth century AD.

5. The Via Sacra, the Sacred Way, the road from the Palatine Hill to the temples of the Capitol, along which triumphant generals processed bearing the spoils of war to the Temple of Jupiter. The arch in the middle distance was erected to commemorate the victories of the Emperor Septimius Severus, and the building behind it and to its left is founded on the lower storey of the Tabularium, where Roman official records were kept.



6. The oldest surviving temples in Rome, in the Largo Argentina. These are victory temples probably dating from the third century BC, but no one knows to which gods they were dedicated. There were four temples in all, of which three are visible here. The furthest one, near to the surrounding wall, is known as temple A, probably built in the second half of the third century BC by Lucius Catulus, and between the two sets of steps leading to the rectangular temples, there is a circular temple, built by members of the same family.





7. The Forum Romanum, viewed from the Palatine Hill. The arch of Severus stands in the centre of the photo and to its right the oblong, unadorned brick building is the Senate House. In 52 BC the earlier Senate House was burned down when the Roman people were rather too zealous in giving their benefactor Publius Clodius a good funeral. Julius Caesar planned a new building as part of his whole new Forum complex, which was completed by Augustus. The present building is a restored version of the Senate House of the late third century, when many buildings were repaired or rebuilt after a fire. The new building followed the same the ground plan of its predecessor, save for the brick buttresses projecting from the long sides.



8. The Temple of Hercules in the Forum Boarium, the Cattle Market, near the Tiber. Its dedication to Hercules is not proven, and because of its round shape the temple is often attributed to the goddess Vesta. It dates probably from the later second century BC, and was repaired in the first century AD.

9. The Forum Romanum viewed through the arch of Severus, looking towards the Palatine Hill. Next to the free standing column can be seen the ruins of the Rostra, where politicians made speeches to the people. Beyond that are the remains of the circular white Temple of Vesta.



10. The three columns of the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum Romanum. The first temple on this site was dedicated in the fifth century BC after the twins Castor and Pollux, sons of Jupiter, assisted the Romans in their battle against the Latins at Lake Regillus. They were seen shortly afterwards wading their horses in the Forum. The temple was repaired twice in the second century BC, and rebuilt by Augustus after a fire. Statues of Castor and Pollux with their horses can be seen today at the entrance to the





Above: 11. Copy of a bust of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Pompey the Great, in the EUR Museo della Civiltà Romana. The original is in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen. Pompey was the foremost general of his day, starting very young as an independent commander of his own legions, raised in aid of Lucius Cornelius Sulla. An anomaly all his life, Pompey was given extraordinary commands that fell outside the legal parameters of the Roman Republic, but he performed all his tasks for Rome with considerable aplomb and, more importantly, success. He was never defeated in a war until he was manoeuvred into fighting his final battle against his former associate Gaius Julius Caesar in 48 BC.



Centre: 12. Head of Gaius Julius Caesar from Turin. Caesar was the man whose vision of the Roman world as a whole enabled him to bridge the gap between the Republic and the Empire, but he was killed before his ideas could be put into practice. All his schemes may have disappeared without trace if he had not adopted as his son the young Gaius Octavius, who was made Augustus by the grateful Senate after the end of the tumultuous civil wars against the murderers of Caesar and then against Mark Antony and Cleopatra. Photo David Bearley

Below: 13. Apartments on the Via di Grotta Pinta in Rome, built over the remains of Pompey's Theatre the first permanent theatre in Rome. This restricted view shows only half of the inner curve of the theatre, and gives an impression of the dizzying height to which it rose. Some of the concrete vaulting survives in restaurants in the Piazza del Biscione and Piazza del Paradiso. Photo by James Eden.



14. Ruins of the Forum of Julius Caesar in Rome, situated behind the Forum Romanum and the Senate House. It was planned before the civil war with Pompey, and building had started in 54 BC, but at the battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC Caesar made a vow that if he was victorious he would build a temple to Venus Victrix. He added the temple to his Forum, but he dedicated it to his mythical ancestress Venus Genetrix instead of Venus Victrix.

15. Slightly damaged sculptured head from the Capitoline Museum, Rome, identified as that of Mark Antony. It resembles Antony's coin portraits, showing a thickset neck and fleshy face with a wide jaw.



16. Bust of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Antony's vigorous opponent. Cicero's letters to his friends, and principally to Atticus, provide a close-up of Caesar and the events before and after the assassination in 44 BC. He wrote his *Philippics* towards the end of Antony's consulship, and though they are unremittably hostile to Antony, they provide almost the only extant information about his youth and early activities. *Courtesy Victoria and Albert Museum.*





Above left: 17. Stylised portrait of Caesar's great-nephew, Gaius Octavius, better known as Octavian. He was only nineteen when he inherited Caesar's estate, but he was determined to inherit Caesar's political power as well. At first he played along with Cicero and the Senate until he obtained command of an army and the consulship, then he allied with Antony. *Photo by K. R. Dixon.*



Above right: 18. Cleopatra portrayed as the goddess Isis, the supreme deity of Egypt. The Ptolemaic Queen consorted strongly with Isis, and Cleopatra fostered the old Egyptian religion and customs to a greater extent than her predecessors. *Photo by David Beasley.*

Left: 19. All Cleopatra's children by Antony survived the fall of Alexandria, but Caesarion, as the heir of Caesar, represented an obstacle to Octavian. On this relief from the temple at Dendera, she depicted herself and Caesarion in the style of the Pharaohs, promoting him as her consort and co-ruler. Unfortunately Caesarion did not live to inherit the kingdom; he was sent away from Egypt after Actium, but Octavian found him and had him killed. *Photo by Graeme Stobbs.*

Glossary

Aedile: city magistrate originally responsible for supervision of the *aedes*, or the temples of the plebs. During the Republic there were two aediles subordinate to the tribunes of the plebs, and later two more were elected from the patricians (*aediles curules*). In the Empire the main duties of the aediles were care of the city, including keeping the streets clean, keeping public order, attending to the water supply and markets. They were also in charge of the public games (*ludi*) until Augustus transferred this duty to the praetors. All the municipalities of the Empire employed elected aediles fulfilling the same purposes as they did in Rome.

Aerarium militar: military treasury set up by Augustus in AD 6 to provide pensions for veterans.

Ala milliaria: auxiliary cavalry unit of c.1,000 men.

Ala quingenaria: auxiliary cavalry unit of c.500 men.

Annona militaris: provisions for the army; in the later Empire the Praetorian Prefects were placed in charge of the supplies for the troops.

As: lowest denomination Roman coin, made of bronze.

Atrium: the central reception area of a Roman house, with a square or oblong opening in the roof to let in light. Rain water was caught in a sunken area in the floor, called the *impluvium*, corresponding to the roof opening.

Auctoritas: a measure of the reputation and social and political standing of Roman senators and politicians. The literal translation 'authority' does not convey its true meaning. *Auctoritas* could be earned and increased by political or military achievements and lost after disgraceful conduct.

Aureus: Roman gold coin, worth twenty-five *denarii*.

Auxilia: literally 'help troops', the term used by the Romans to describe the units recruited from non-Romans, organized as *alae* and *cohortes* during the Empire.

Caldarium: the hot room of a bath house.

Canabae: the civilian settlement outside a legionary fortress; see also *vicus*.

Capitatio: a poll-tax, paid in cash.

Capitum: fodder; in the later Empire payments to the soldiers were made partly in kind. *Capitum* and *annona* were the terms used for food for the horses and the men.

Cataphractarii: heavy-armoured cavalry, perhaps armed with lance and shield.

Centuria: a century, or a division of a cohort, nominally of 100 men, but in practice of 80 men, from the late Republic and throughout the Empire; also a voting unit of the people of Rome.

Centurion: commander of a century, or *centuria*.

Clibanarii: slang term for heavy-armoured cavalry, derived from *clibanus*, meaning oven. It is not certain whether these troops were the same as *cataphractarii* or whether they were armed and fought in a different way.

Cohors: a cohort, denoting two types of unit, the first a division of a legion containing six centuries, and the second denoting an auxiliary infantry unit, either 500 or 1,000 strong.

Cohors equitatae: part-mounted auxiliary unit.

Colonus: tenant of a landowner.

Comitatenses: collective name for the units of the late Roman mobile field army, comprising cavalry and infantry.

Comes: the entourage of an emperor consisted of his friends (*comites*) on an unofficial basis at first, but Constantine gave the title *Comes*, usually translated as Count, to his military commanders and provincial governors. There was originally no connotation of rank in the title, but with the passage of time three grades were established, called *ordinis primi*, *secundi*, and *terti*.

Comitatus: derived from *comes*, initially describing the entourage of the emperor; by the fourth century *comitatus* denoted the field army.

Consul: senior magistrates of the Republic, elected annually in pairs, responsible for civil duties and command of the armies. During the Empire the consuls were still elected annually, but with reduced military responsibilities and subordinate to the emperor.

Consul ordinarius: during the Empire there were often more than two consuls in the year. The *ordinarii* were the officially elected consuls, who might hold office for a month or two, giving way to the *consules suffecti*. The *ordinarii* were the eponymous consuls, giving their name to the year.

Consul suffectus: the suffect consuls were those who held office after the *ordinarii*, gaining experience and rank before going on to other appointments.

Constitutio Antoniniana: act passed by Caracalla in AD 212, making all freeborn inhabitants of the Empire Roman citizens.

Contubernium: tent party or the soldiers sharing one barrack block, normally eight men.

Corrector: (plural *correctores*) Roman officials with the title *corrector* were appointed from the reign of Trajan, originally for the purpose of attending to the financial affairs of free cities which did not come under the jurisdiction of the provincial governors. *Correctores* held military and civil powers and their responsibilities, which eventually extended to any of the cities in a province if the emperor wished to investigate their affairs.

Curiales: members of the city councils.

Denarius: Roman silver coin worth four *sestertii*.

Diocese: administrative grouping of several provinces, instituted by Diocletian.

Dromedarius: camel rider.

Dux: (plural *duces*) literally, leader; the term used for equestrian military officers in command of troops in the frontier regions, usually with the title *dux limitis*, accompanied by an explanation of where they operated, such as *dux limitis per Africam*. Their commands sometimes covered more than one province. *Duces* were raised to senatorial status by Valentinian I.

Equites legionis: cavalry of a legion, initially thought to number 120 men, but increased by the Emperor Gallienus to over 700 men.

Foederati: literally those who are allied in war, derived from *foedus*, a treaty, and denoting troops raised according to the terms of a treaty. To be distinguished from the sixth century *foederati*, which were regular troops.

Imperium: the early kings of Rome were holders of *imperium*, comprising command of the armies and exercise of legal power. During the Republic, this power passed to the higher magistrates, the annually elected consuls and the praetors, and the dictators for their six month term of office. It was extended to the proconsuls and propraeors as commanders and later governors of the provinces. In Imperial times, only the emperors held *imperium*, which was delegated to his appointed commanders and governors.

Iugum: a unit of land for tax purposes, not always a standard measure

since the type of land and the crops grown were taken into consideration by the assessors.

legion: the term *legio* originally meant the choosing, or the levy, and was eventually applied to the main unit of the Roman army. Around 5,000 strong, the legion was an infantry unit, but also contained some cavalry. Legions of the late Empire were smaller, newly raised units being only about 1,000 strong.

Limes: (plural *limites*) frontier(s).

Magister equitum: master of horse; in the Republic this title was given to the second in command of a dictator; in the late Roman army it was an important military post in command of the cavalry units.

Magister militum: master of the soldiers; like the *Dux/Duces* the various *magistri militum* could be in command of the troops of a province or a region, but the title sometimes denotes a supreme commander, otherwise expressed as *magister utriusque militiae*.

Magister officiorum: late Roman head of the secretarial offices.

Magister peditum: master of the infantry of the late Roman army.

Maniple: literally 'a handful', a term denoting a unit of the Republican army consisting of two centuries.

Peristyle: the courtyard of Roman house, usually planted as a garden, surrounded by a colonnade.

Pilum: missile weapon used by legionaries, consisting of a long thin metal shank with a pyramidal tip, attached to a wooden shaft. There were various different sizes and types of *pila*.

Praefectus: prefect, a title given to several different civilian officials and military officers. The summit of an equestrian career was to be appointed to one of the four great prefectures, *Praefectus Annonae* (the Prefect of the *annona*, in charge of military supplies), *Praefectus Vigilum* (the Prefect of the *Vigiles*, the fire brigade in Rome), the Praetorian Prefect, or the Prefect of Egypt.

Praeses: (plural *praesides*) provincial governor of equestrian rank, common from Severan times onwards.

Praetor: the praetorship had a long history. Originally the praetors were the chief magistrates in early Republican Rome, but were superseded by the consuls. When the consuls were absent the praetor was in charge of the courts, acted as president of the Senate, and had the right to command armies.

Proconsul: as the Romans extended their power over wider territories, more magistrates were required to govern the provinces or

command armies in wars, so the powers of the consuls could be bestowed upon men who had held a magistracy, or in emergencies upon private individuals for an appointed time.

Protectores: a title used by Gallienus for his military entourage, not simply a bodyguard, but perhaps the foundation of a staff college formed from officers loyal to the emperor.

Quaestor: originally the lowest ranking magistrates of the Republic appointed to assist the consuls in financial matters. The office was held by young men at the start of their career, before they had entered the Senate. As the Empire expanded more quaestors were created to deal with provincial administration. Quaestors acted as deputies to consular governors, and could hold commands in the army. Sometimes in modern versions of ancient works, quaestor is translated in the military context as quartermaster, which is not strictly accurate.

Schola: late Roman cavalry guard unit; *scholae palatinae* were the emperor's guard.

Sestertius: Roman silver coin; four *sestertii* equalled one *denarius*.

Stipendium: military pay, also applied to a period of service.

Triclinium: dining room in a Roman house, with three couches arranged around the central space where the food would be served.

Triumph: during the Republic, a triumph was granted by the Senate to victorious generals, who valued this opportunity to show off their captives and the spoils of war by processing along the Via Sacra in Rome, to the Temple of Jupiter. The *triumphator* rode in a chariot with his face painted red, and was supposed to approach the temple on his knees to dedicate the spoils, with a slave at his side constantly reminding him that he was mortal. Augustus recognized the inflammatory nature of the triumph and took steps to limit it to members of the Imperial family. Other generals were denied the procession, and were granted *ornamenta triumphalia*, triumphal insignia, instead of the procession through the streets of Rome.

Vicarius: governor of a diocese, answerable to the Praetorian Prefects.

Vicus: a term that could mean an area within a town, or a rural village, but in the military context it refers to the civilian settlement outside a Roman auxiliary fort; see also *canabae*.

Vigiles: the fire brigade of the city of Rome, organized in military fashion by Augustus to cover the fourteen regions, or districts, of

the city of Rome.

Select Bibliography for Further Reading

Books about the Romans are, as it were, legion, with new books appearing all the time. With the new publications and all the past to catch up on, reading about the Romans could become a full-time occupation. The following list represents only a small percentage of what is available, but the reading lists in each book will cover much of the rest.

Ancient Sources

The surviving sources for the history of the Roman Empire are vast, but fragmentary and uneven. For certain periods such as the foundation of Rome, the rule of the kings and the development of the Republic, and the later Roman Empire of the third century, the sources are frustratingly inadequate. The full panoply of sources from ancient times includes not only literature, but art and architecture, Greek and Latin inscriptions and archaeological evidence. Books on these topics are listed below, while this section includes some of the more accessible translations of ancient works.

A good place to start is with the *Loeb Classical Library*, published by Harvard University Press, with the Latin or Greek text on one page and the English translation on the opposite page, complete with explanatory notes and indexes. This is a brief selection of the more important works for Roman history:

Ammianus Marcellinus: (no title given except the author's name) 3 volumes. Ammianus was a military commander during the second half of the fourth century AD, and wrote a history of his own turbulent times, using other historical sources and his accounts of events, including the expeditions under the Emperor Julian, which he had witnessed for himself.

Appian: *Roman History*. 4 volumes, covering the Civil Wars between Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, Octavian and Antony.

Caesar: *The Gallic War, the Civil Wars, and The Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars*. 3 volumes, covering most of Caesar's career, as presented by Caesar himself.

Cicero: *Letters to Atticus* and *Letters to his Friends*. 8 volumes, written during the lives of Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar, Octavian and

Mark Antony, and providing a detailed and very human account of the political machinations of all the leading men of the times.

Dio Cassius: *Roman History*. 9 volumes. Written at the beginning of the third century, Dio's work covers the period from the earliest years until AD 229, but some of the original books are lost and only some of the gaps can be filled from references in later works.

Livy: (Titus Livius) *History of Rome*. 14 volumes. Livy worked in the reign of Augustus and wrote a history of Rome from its foundation to 9 BC, in 142 books, of which only 35 are extant.

Polybius: *Histories*. 6 volumes. Covers the rise of Rome to the later second century BC and is of particular importance for the organization of the Republican army.

Scriptores Historiae Augustae: supposedly written by different authors, but now referred to more commonly as the *Historia Augusta* since it has been shown that there was only one author, picking up where Suetonius (see next entry) left off with biographies of the emperors of the second and third centuries. A good sensationalist read, but use with caution.

Suetonius: *The Lives of the Caesars*. 2 volumes. Suetonius worked in the reign of Hadrian, and wrote biographies of the emperors from Augustus to Domitian.

Tacitus: *Agricola*. 1 volume. Writing in the later first century AD, Tacitus wrote about the exploits in Roman Britain of his father-in-law, the governor Gnaeus Julius Agricola, during the reigns of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian.

Tacitus: *Histories* and *Annals*. 4 volumes. Covers the period from the death of Augustus in AD 14 to the assassination of Domitian in AD 96.

The works of some of these authors are available in English, with introductions, notes, maps and indexes, published in paperback by Penguin Books, of which this is a small selection:

Ammianus Marcellinus: *The Later Roman Empire*, trans W. Hamilton, 1986.

Cicero: *Selected Letters*, trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, 1986

Livy: *The Early History of Rome*, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, 1960.

Rome and Italy, trans. Betty Radice, 1982.

The War with Hannibal, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, 1965.

Rome and the Mediterranean, trans. Henry Bettenson, 1976.

Pliny: *Letters of the Younger Pliny*, trans. Betty Radice, 1974.

Tacitus: *The Annals of Imperial Rome*, trans. Michael Grant, 1956, revised 1996.

Histories, forthcoming, June 2009.

Reference Books

Oxford Classical Dictionary eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, Oxford: 3rd ed. 1993. An invaluable reference tool, with alphabetical entries on people, places and topics in Greek and Roman history, each entry accompanied by lists for further reading.

Cambridge Ancient History: several volumes covering Roman history from the earliest times to the later Empire, with chapters written by specialist scholars, and brimming with notes explaining where the information comes from. The price tags for each volume indicate the vast amount of work involved.

Routledge History of the Ancient World: an up to date (1990s to c.2004) series devoted to the history of Greece and Rome, available in affordable paperback volumes, bristling with notes to explain details and to give the sources for the information. Specifically, in chronological order for Roman history:

T. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome; Italy and the Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars*, 1995.

M. Goodman, *The Roman World 44 BC–AD 180*, 1997.

D.S. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay AD 180–395*, 2004.

A. Cameron, *The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity AD 395–600*, 1993.

Examples of text-book style works for students, with analyses of events and trends, references to ancient literature, and bibliographies, are the following:

M. Boatwright (et al.), *The Romans from Village to Empire*, Oxford, 2004.

M. Leglay (et al.), *A History of Rome*, Blackwell: 3rd ed. 2005.

Atlases

T. Cornell and J. Matthews, *Atlas of the Roman World*, Phaidon, 1982. Coloured maps of the provinces with the main cities, towns and fortresses, but this book is much more than just a series of maps, containing a historical survey from the earliest times to the sixth

century AD, and it is fully illustrated throughout.

- C. Scarre, *The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Rome*, Viking Press and Penguin, 1995. This book follows the development of Rome from the beginning to the sixth century, well illustrated, with sections highlighting certain topics, all supported by the coloured maps.

Studies of Specific Periods & Rulers

This list is potentially endless, so here are just a few titles, in chronological order from Republic to Late Empire.

- P. Matyszak, *Chronicle of the Roman Republic: the rulers of ancient Rome from Romulus to Augustus*, Thames and Hudson, 1993. A good read as well as a popular reference tool. It concentrates on the various personalities as the title suggests, with timelines, background history and potted biographies of each personality, well illustrated.
- R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, Oxford University Press, 1936. Very scholarly, still the revered text book for the transformation of the Republic into the Empire under Augustus, written in an unforgettable idiosyncratic style at a time when tyrants were gaining individual power in Europe. Essential for serious students.
- E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, University of California Press, 1974. Covers the same period as Syme, awesomely detailed and scholarly but readable, not revised since 1974, but for the paperback edition a new introduction contains an annotated bibliography to document the major new work since it was first published.

A series of books on the lives and reigns of various emperors has been published by Batsford, and continued by Routledge:

- P. Southern, *Augustus*, 1998.
- B. Levick, *Tiberius the Politician*, 1999.
- A.A. Barrett, *Caligula: corruption of power*, 1990.
- B. Levick, *Claudius*, 1990.
- M. Griffin, *Nero: End of a Dynasty*, 1987.
- K. Wellesley, *The Year of Four Emperors*, 3rd ed. 2000.
- B. Levick, *Vespasian*, 2005.
- P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, 1997.

- J. Bennett, *Trajan: Optimus Princeps*, 1997.
- A.R. Birley, *Hadrian: the Restless Emperor*, 1997.
- A.R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius a Biography*, rev. ed. 1996.
- A.R. Birley, *Septimius Severus: the African Emperor*, rev. ed. 1988.
- A. Watson, *Aurelian and the Third Century*, 1999.
- S. Williams, *Diocletian and the Roman Recovery*, 1997.
- C.M. Odahl, *Constantine and the Christian Empire*, 2004.
- P. Southern, *The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine*, Routledge, 2001. Chronological history from the accession of Severus to the sole rule of Constantine, with chapters on the contemporary histories of the northern barbarians and the Persians, and how the various threats on the Roman frontiers engendered usurpations and rebellions within the Empire. Lucidly written, it says on the cover.
- A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284–602*, Blackwell, 1964. 2 vols. Once the bible for the study of the later Roman Empire, some points have been revised by succeeding scholars, but it is still invaluable for the amount of references and notes.
- S. Mitchell, *A History of the Later Roman Empire AD 284–641*, Blackwell, 2007. Scholarly book, covering chronological history from the reign of Diocletian to the sixth century, then covers topics such as the Roman state, the barbarians, religion, economy, society, with a chronological list of emperors, usurpers and the kings of Persia.
- P. Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: a New History*, Macmillan, 2005. Extremely readable on a very complicated period, the first two chapters covering the Romans and the barbarians, followed by the various wars against the tribes. Attila gets a chapter to himself. There is an appendix containing short biographies of the major Romans and leading tribesmen

Social History

- D. Cherry (ed.), *The Roman World: a Sourcebook*, Blackwell, 2001. Latin and Greek source material in translation, derived from literary works, inscriptions, papyri, grouped under chapter headings, such as women, marriage and family, politics and government, economy etc. Accessible and readable history, with an introduction to each section and notes
- J.A. Shelton, *As the Romans Did: a Sourcebook in Roman Social history*,

Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1998. More source material in translation, scholarly but easy to read, and well organized, easy to find relevant sections from the contents list and index, all entries well annotated.

- P. Grimal, *The Civilization of Rome*, Allen and Unwin, 1963. Getting on a bit now, but still a good read, packed with black and white photos, and a historical and biographical dictionary.
- U.E. Paoli, *Rome, Its People Life and Customs*, Bristol Classical Press 1990. Classic work available in several editions, first published in the 1940s, containing lots of photos and notes on sources.

Government & Administration

Apart from the source books listed above:

- A. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, Oxford University Press, 1999. The Roman Republic did not have a formal written constitution, but this book brings together all the customs and procedures of the popular assemblies and the Senate, and describes how the magistrates functioned.
- F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, Duckworth, 1977. Although over thirty years old, this is still a valuable work explaining how the emperors governed, their relationship with the senators and equites, the provinces and cities, and latterly the Church. Readable and full of sources and references.

The Roman Army

- B. Campbell, *The Roman Army 31 BC to AD 337: a sourcebook*, Routledge, 1994. Various sources from literature, inscriptions and papyri, all translated into English dealing with aspects of the Roman army, readable and well organized.
- L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, Routledge, 1998. Covers the army of the kings of Rome and its transition into the early Republican army.
- A. Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, Thames and Hudson, 2003. Covers the whole period from early Republic to later Empire, concentrating on the Imperial army of the second and third centuries, very well illustrated and a good read.
- P. Southern and K.R. Dixon, *The Late Roman Army*, Batsford, 1996. Brings together the sporadic evidence for the organization of the late Roman army, arranged in sections including the history of the army from Constantine to Justinian, recruitment, conditions of

service, fortifications, and what happened in the end. Criticised for not pushing back the frontiers of knowledge, but then, it was never meant to; it collects what there is.

The Barbarians

- P.S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak: How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe*, Princeton University Press, 1999. Covers Rome's relationship with various tribes from the earliest times, including the way in which the barbarians and the Romans interacted beyond the frontiers, and how the blend of cultures affected both.
- M. Todd, *Migrants and Invaders: the Movements of Peoples in the Ancient World*, Tempus, 2001. Looks at the relationship between Romans and barbarians from the earliest times to the sixth century AD, in a series of chapters originally designed as lectures. It examines the attractions that the Roman world offered, and concentrates on the transformation of the western Empire.
- T.S. Burns, *Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome: a Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians ca. 375–425 AD*, Indiana University Press, 1994. A study of the relationship between the Romans and the tribesmen in the later Empire, how and why the Romans employed some tribesmen in their armies, the different ways in which they employed them, and the policy of settling whole tribes or groups of barbarians on Roman land.

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